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Human beings have a fundamental need to form and maintain lasting positive relationships 
with others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). These relationships are a source of companionship, 
intimacy, and support from infancy to old age. During childhood and adolescence, relationships 
with peers provide an important socialization context in which many important skills and 
psychological capacities develop. In interactions with peers, children and adolescents acquire 
key social skills (e.g. cooperation, conflict resolution) and cognitive abilities (e.g. emotion 
regulation, perspective taking) that are needed for successful functioning in a complex social 
environment (Bukowski, Buhrmester, & Underwood, 2011; Ladd, 1999; Rubin, Bukowski, & 
Parker, 2006). 
The need for social connection is so vital that many problems arise when this need remains 
unsatisfied. Events that threaten our need for social connection, such as social exclusion and 
rejection, are highly distressing and can have detrimental consequences for well-being. Children 
and adolescents who are chronically rejected by their peers suffer from widespread impairments 
in daily life that can persist across development and into adulthood, ranging from poor academic 
achievement (DeRosier, Kupersmidt, & Patterson, 1994) and dropping out of school (Hymel, 
Comfort, Schonert-Reichl, & McDougall, 1996), to delinquency (Kupersmidt, Burchinal, & 
Patterson, 1995) and the development of psychopathology (Boivin, Hymel, & Bukowski, 1995; 
Coie, Terry, Lenox, Lochman, & Hyman, 1995; Parker & Asher, 1987). Therefore, it is of great 
importance to understand the developmental processes that play a role in the emergence and 
maintenance of peer group rejection. 
The goal of this thesis was to examine the neurocognitive underpinnings of processes that 
play a role in sustaining peer rejection as well as those that are instrumental in gaining peer 
acceptance. The first part of the thesis focuses on the neurocognitive processes underlying 
subjective and behavioral responses to social exclusion, which have been hypothesized to play a 
crucial role in the emergence or maintenance of peer group rejection (Coie, 1990; Sandstrom, 
2004). For example, children and adolescents who react to social exclusion with retaliatory 
vengeance might be more likely to elicit further rejection from their peer group than those 
who show behavior aimed at reconnecting after exclusion (Coie, 1990; Sandstrom, 2004). 
The second part of this thesis concentrates on the neural and psychological processes involved 
prosocial behavior, based on the widely established finding that frequent displays of prosocial 
behaviors, such as cooperating, helping, and sharing, are associated with both gaining and 
maintaining peer acceptance (Coie & Kupersmidt, 1983; Deković & Gerris, 1994; Layous, 
Nelson, Oberle, Schonert-Reichl, & Lyubomirsky, 2012). Understanding the neural and 
psychological mechanisms underlying reactions to social exclusion and prosocial behavior is 
therefore vital for a better understanding of the emergence and maintenance of peer rejection.  
 The remainder of this chapter sketches a conceptual framework for the empirical studies in 
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this thesis. First, a working model is presented that was used for studying the developmental 
processes governing emergence and maintenance of peer rejection (1.2). Next, we highlight 
key findings from the literature on the neural and psychological processes involved in reactions 
to social exclusion (1.3) and those involved in prosocial behavior in the form of sharing of 
valuable resources (1.4). Together, the working model of peer group rejection and the findings 
from prior work on social exclusion and sharing behavior laid the foundations for the empirical 
studies described in this dissertation, of which the aims are summarized at the end of this 
chapter (1.5).  
1.2 MECHANISMS OF EMERGENCE AND 
MAINTENANCE OF PEER REJECTION
Peer group acceptance and rejection reflect the collective valence of group members’ 
sentiments toward individuals in the group. Acceptance and rejection can be reliably assessed 
through asking members of a peer group who they like most and who they like least (Bukowski, 
Sippola, Hoza, & Newcomb, 2000; Coie, Dodge, & Coppotelli, 1982; Newcomb & Bukowski, 
1983). Children who receive many negative nominations (liked least) and who receive few 
positive nominations (liked most) are classified as having a rejected status1. 
Longitudinal studies have demonstrated that low levels of acceptance and high levels of 
rejection during childhood are associated with an array of negative adjustment outcomes, 
including poor academic achievement (DeRosier et al., 1994) and higher levels of both 
internalizing (Ladd & Troop-Gordon, 2003) and externalizing behavior problems (van Lier & 
Koot, 2010). Although the evidence for such longitudinal links is overwhelming, establishing 
longitudinal links between peer group rejection and adjustment difficulties does not provide 
insights into the developmental mechanisms through which peer sentiments impact later 
psychosocial adjustment. To better understand how peer group acceptance and rejection have 
their impact on adjustment, researchers have begun investigating the transactional relationship 
between the individual child and the way they are treated by their peer group (Coie, 1990; 
Sandstrom & Coie, 1999). Transactional models of peer relations posit that characteristics of 
1Acceptance and rejection are interconnected, but not polar opposite, constructs. Children low in peer acceptance 
(those who receive few liked most nominations from their peers) do not necessarily have to be rejected by peers 
(through receiving many liked least nominations from their peers). Indeed, correlations between acceptance and 
rejection are negative and modest in size (Bukowski et al., 2000). Thus, although acceptance is often regarded as 
the opposite of rejection, it is more precise to see the opposite of accepted as ‘not accepted’ and the opposite of rejected 
as ‘not rejected’.
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an individual child help to construct and shape their behavior in social interactions with peers, 
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Interaction Intra-individual 
Figure 1.1. A working model of processes playing a role in the emergence or maintenance of peer rejection at three 
levels of social complexity.
Based on such transactional models, we propose a simplified model of the reciprocal 
interactions between individual children and their peer group that guided the hypotheses for 
the empirical studies in this thesis (see Figure 1.1). The model is subdivided into three levels of 
social complexity comparable to a model proposed by Hinde (1979). To be specific, the model 
distinguishes between processes at the level of the individual child (i.e. intra-individual), those 
at the level of social interactions (i.e. interpersonal) and those at the level of the peer group.
Intra-individual processes such as emotions, cognitions, and expectations are the processes 
that individual children bring with them into social interactions. Social interactions are 
exchanges of sets of behaviors or overt displays of affect between two individuals. Social 
interactions with peers influence the individual’s reputation and standing in the peer group (e.g. 
peer group acceptance and rejection). Importantly, processes at each level of social complexity 
both constrain and influence processes at the other levels. 
In his transactional model of peer rejection, Coie (1990) distinguished between the so-
called ‘emergent phase’ and the ‘maintenance phase’ of peer rejection. The emergent phase is 
characterized by specific interactions between a child and their peer group, which give rise 
to peer group rejection. For example, a child who has difficulties in perspective taking (intra-
individual level) is less likely to consider the needs of other people and as a consequence refuses 
to share a toy with a classmate (interaction level). The refusal to share with his classmate can 
then trigger dislike in this member of the peer group. When this pattern of selfish behavior is 
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shown consistently in interactions with other members of the peer group, individual member’s 
disliking of the child may extend to a consensual disliking in the peer group (i.e. peer group 
rejection; group level). 
A wealth of research supports these proposed links by showing that consensual disliking 
in the peer group arises from specific behaviors displayed in social interactions with peers. 
For example, rejected children show higher levels of aggressive and disruptive behaviors, more 
social withdrawal and lower levels of prosocial behavior in interactions with their peers than 
accepted children (Coie, Dodge, & Kupersmidt, 1990; Haselager, Cillessen, Van Lieshout, 
Riksen-Walraven, & Hartup, 2002; Newcomb, Bukowski, & Pattee, 1993). These behavioral 
propensities have been shown to precede peer group rejection and to elicit dislike in the 
emergent phase of peer rejection. For example, children with a rejected status in their school 
class rapidly become rejected when they enter a new group with unfamiliar peers (Hardy, 
Bukowski, & Sippola, 2002), and this is driven by rejected children’s greater propensity for 
aggressive behaviors and lower levels of prosocial behavior (Coie & Kupersmidt, 1983; Dodge, 
1983). After initial rejection in the emergent phase, some children may maintain their rejected 
status because they continue to show behaviors that are poorly tolerated by their peer group. 
In the maintenance phase peer group rejection becomes stable, and cognitions, emotions 
and behaviors of both the individual child and its peers are changed in ways that sustain a 
rejected status. For example, chronic exposure to peer rejection has been shown to foster 
anxious or angry expectations about rejection (London, Downey, Bonica, & Paltin, 2007). 
Children with angry expectations about rejection show higher levels of distress in response to 
acute rejection experiences (e.g. a classmate refuses to work together on an assignment), and 
show increasingly higher levels of aggression and interpersonal difficulties in their peer group 
over time (Downey, Lebolt, Rincon, & Freitas, 1998). Thus, social-cognitive processes (intra-
individual) shaped by prior interactions in the peer group play a role in sustaining behaviors 
that further consolidate peer group rejection. These examples show that the three levels in the 
model are heavily intertwined and influence each other both in the emergent phase and the 
maintenance of peer rejection.
The emergent phase and the maintenance phase in Coie’s (1990) theory represent longer 
periods of time accruing multiple social interactions over the course of weeks, months or years. 
However, as can be seen from the examples described above, the developmental processes that 
contribute to the emergence or maintenance of rejection can be described at finer levels of 
analysis. That is, peer group rejection can be triggered or be maintained by recursive sequences 
between rejection-eliciting behaviors, the way the peer group reacts to those behaviors, and the 
impact of the reactions from the peer group on the rejected child’s feelings, cognitions, and 
behavior. 
The main goal of this thesis was to examine four such processes that play a role in the 
emergence and maintenance of a rejected status. Specifically, we examined the following 
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processes at the intra-individual level and at the level of the interaction: i) subjective and 
neural responses to social exclusion, ii) behavioral reactions to social exclusion, iii) behavioral 
reactions to the exclusion of a peer, and iv) prosocial behavior in the form of sharing valuable 
resources. To investigate these processes, we used experimental social interaction paradigms in 
combination with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), which is a neuroimaging 
technique that enables the study of brain function while participants are asked to perform a 
specific task. Furthermore, to gain a better understanding of how these processes at the intra-
individual level and the level of the interaction are influenced by processes at the level of the 
peer group, we examined how these processes varied as function of chronic exposure to peer 
group rejection. The next sections describe the theories and empirical findings that provided the 
background for the empirical investigations of these four processes. To highlight each process’ 
involvement in the emergence or maintenance of peer rejection, prior work will be discussed in 
the light of our working model.
1.3 REACTIONS TO SOCIAL EXCLUSION
Excluding a peer from a group or activity is one of the most common methods children 
and adolescents use to express dislike toward rejected peers (Coie et al., 1990). In child and 
adolescent peer groups, social exclusion can take the form of both direct refusals of entry to a 
group or activity (e.g. telling a child he cannot join a game) and indirect actions (e.g. ignoring a 
peer’s requests to join a game, or not choosing a peer as a partner for a group activity) (Gazelle & 
Ladd, 2003). Although social exclusion is a distressing experience across the lifespan (Williams, 
2007), adolescence has been hypothesized to be a developmental period during which reactions 
to exclusion are intensified. During adolescence, concerns about fitting in with the peer group 
peak (O’Brien & Bierman, 1988), and the failure to integrate oneself in a network of peers 
both reflects and precedes serious adjustment difficulties (e.g. social withdrawal, loneliness, or 
depressive symptoms) (Boivin et al., 1995; Prinstein & Aikins, 2004). It has been proposed 
that adolescence might be particularly stressful for those who were chronically rejected during 
childhood (Coie et al., 1990). Rejected children have fewer positive affiliations with peers in 
which many social skills are acquired (e.g. conflict resolution, negotiation) (Boivin & Hymel, 
1997; Parker & Asher, 1993). Consequently, as they enter adolescence, chronically rejected 
children might lack the social skills needed for coping with the increased stresses of the 
adolescent peer world. 
Although not every child with a rejected status is targeted for social exclusion, rejected children 
are more likely to be excluded from peer activities than their accepted counterparts. Moreover, 
adjustment difficulties associated with peer group rejection (e.g. school disengagement) are 
exacerbated among children who are both rejected and frequently excluded from peer activities 
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(relative to non-excluded rejected children) (Buhs & Ladd, 2001; Buhs, Ladd, & Herald, 2006). 
Yet, the processes through which social exclusion may influence the maintenance of a rejected 
status are far from clear. Therefore, we examined three processes that could each play a unique 
role in the emergence or maintenance of peer rejection: i) subjective and neural responses to 
social exclusion, ii) retaliatory and prosocial reactions to social exclusion and iii) behavioral 
reactions to the exclusion of a peer. 
Subjective and neural responses to social exclusion
The way a child responds to social exclusion has been argued to play an important role in 
determining whether exclusion forms an isolated incident as opposed to a recurring phenomenon 
(Ladd & Troop-Gordon, 2003; Sandstrom, Cillessen, & Eisenhower, 2003; Zakriski, Jacobs, & 
Coie, 1997). For example, children who immediately start crying in response to social exclusion 
are likely to be targeted for exclusion again. As such, heightened exclusion-related distress and 
associated neural activity might represent potential mechanisms at the intra-individual level 
of social complexity through which a rejected status might emerge or be maintained across 
development. 
Neuroimaging studies have shown that the distress adolescents and adults report after they 
are excluded can be reliably linked to activity in neural systems processing negative emotions 
and emotion regulation (Eisenberger, 2012; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). After 
being ostensibly excluded by two strangers in a virtual ball-tossing game called Cyberball 
(Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000), children, adolescents, and adults report heightened levels 
of exclusion-related distress in the form of negative emotions (e.g. anger, sadness) and decreases 
in the satisfaction of vital human needs (e.g. belonging, self-esteem, control, and a meaningful 
existence) (Abrams, Weick, Thomas, Colbe, & Franklin, 2011; Sebastian, Viding, Williams, & 
Blakemore, 2010). Self-reports of such exclusion-related distress have been shown to correlate 
positively with neural activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior insula (AI) 
- brain regions involved in processing conflict and (negative) emotions - during the exclusion 
experience (Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Masten et al., 2009). Negative correlations have been 
found between self-reported distress and activity in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) 
– a region implicated in top-down regulatory control- suggesting that the vlPFC is involved 
in regulating the distress caused by exclusion (Eisenberger et al., 2003; Masten et al., 2009).
Neural activity in brain regions linked to the distressing aspect of exclusion has been shown 
to vary with individual and social factors characteristic of children with a rejected status. That 
is, ACC activity is exacerbated in individuals who anxiously expect rejection (DeWall et al., 
2012; Masten et al., 2009) and who perceive lower levels of social support in their relationships 
(Eisenberger, Taylor, Gable, Hilmert, & Lieberman, 2007). To critically test whether neural 
processing of social exclusion shows associations with chronic peer group rejection, we 
examined subjective (i.e. mood and need satisfaction) and neural responses to social exclusion 
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in adolescents with a history of chronic peer rejection and tested how their responses differed 
from those in adolescents with a history of stable peer acceptance (Chapter 2). Heightened 
neural reactivity to social exclusion might be an intra-individual process involved in attaining 
or maintaining a rejected status, given that a heightened emotional or neural reactivity to 
exclusion might reinforce or provoke excluders and consequently could promote progressively 
greater dislike in the peer group. 
Behavioral reactions to social exclusion
A potential mechanism at the level of the interaction through which a rejected status 
among peers might emerge or is maintained, is the way children respond behaviorally to 
social exclusion (Sandstrom, 2004). For example, retaliatory reactions to exclusion are likely 
to elicit repeated instances of exclusion from the peer group. In contrast, controlling the urge 
to lash out against the bullies might stop exclusion, which is likely to have positive effects on 
peer status. Concurrent associations between peer status and coping with exclusion and other 
peer-related conflicts suggest that behavioral responses to exclusion might play a role in the 
maintenance of a rejected status. That is, children and adolescents with a rejected status report a 
more frequent use of aggressive coping styles when faced with social exclusion in a hypothetical 
scenario (Sandstrom, 2004) or a recalled conflict with a peer (Bowker, Bukowski, Hymel, & 
Sippola, 2000). On the contrary, accepted children more often deal with interpersonal anger in 
non-aggressive ways that minimize further conflict (Fabes & Eisenberg, 1992). Furthermore, 
prosocial reactions to negative peer treatment have been associated with greater psychological 
well-being in victims of bullying compared to victims of bullying who predominantly seek 
revenge (Flanagan, Hoek, Ranter, & Reich, 2012; Park, Enright, Essex, Zahn-Waxler, & Klatt, 
2013)
To gain insight into the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying retaliatory and 
prosocial reactions to social exclusion, we turned to game theoretical paradigms derived from 
behavioral economics (Camerer, 2003; Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). These paradigms offer a context 
of social interactions where the decisions people make have actual consequences for their own 
and their interaction partner’s well-being. In two-player exchange games such as the Dictator 
Game one player receives a valuable set of rewards (e.g. money or candy) from the experimenter 
and is then given the opportunity to propose a split of the rewards between themselves and a 
second player (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994). In the Dictator Game, the second 
player cannot influence the distribution of resources and thus passively receives the amount of 
rewards that the first player is willing to share. Prior work using such economic exchange games 
has demonstrated that social decision-making depends on distinct, but interacting, networks of 
brain regions. Importantly, these networks have been shown to support different psychological 
processes involved in social decision-making, including cognitive/emotional processes involved 
in the detection of norm-violations (Güroğlu, van den Bos, van Dijk, Rombouts, & Crone, 
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2011; van den Bos, van Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2011), cognitive-regulatory 
processes (e.g. impulse control; Steinbeis, Bernhardt, & Singer, 2012), and socio-cognitive 
processes (e.g. perspective taking; Güroğlu et al., 2011; van den Bos et al., 2011) . 
To examine retaliatory and prosocial reactions to exclusion, we gave participants the 
opportunity to play a Dictator Game in which they could punish (i.e. retaliate) or forgive 
(i.e. act prosocial toward) the individuals who previously excluded them in Cyberball (i.e. 
the excluders). Participants could punish the excluders through decreasing their monetary 
outcomes or they could forgive them through refraining from punishment and sharing a 
sum of money equally with them. A better understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms 
underlying these reactions can increase our understanding of the processes underlying children’s 
decisions to seek revenge or reconnection after exclusion. Prior work has demonstrated that a 
tendency to retaliate against excluders (interaction level) has been shown to rely on cognitive 
control capacities (intra-individual level) in adults (Chester et al., 2013). In addition, prosocial 
motivations toward offenders have been linked to higher levels of socio-cognitive capacities such 
as perspective taking (i.e. the tendency to adopt another person’s perspective; Brown, 2003) and 
higher levels of activity in neural circuitry implicated in thinking about other people’s mental 
states (e.g. beliefs, intentions, and desires; Young & Saxe, 2009). Consequently, we anticipated 
that refraining from punishment and acting prosocial toward the excluders would be associated 
with activity in brain networks supporting cognitive control and perspective taking.
To test whether perspective taking and cognitive control are involved in prosocial reactions 
to exclusion, we first examined the neural processes involved in punishment and forgiveness 
of excluders in a sample of young adults (Chapter 3). The findings from this study laid the 
foundations for our next study in which we examined how the neural processes involved 
in punishment and forgiveness vary as a function of a history of chronic peer rejection and 
individual differences in cognitive control and perspective taking (Chapter 4). Given that 
aggressive reactions to exclusion are likely to aggravate the situation, we expected that finding 
links between chronic peer rejection and neural processes underlying behavioral reactions to 
exclusion would lead to a better understanding of how chronically rejected children might 
become trapped in a pattern of sustained rejection.
Behavioral reactions to the exclusion of a peer 
The peer group plays a crucial role in determining whether a rejected child is targeted for 
exclusion or not. For example, the likelihood that children with a rejected status are victimized 
is higher in classrooms with fewer peers who stand up for victims of bullying compared to 
classrooms with more of such prosocial defenders (Kärnä, Voeten, Poskiparta, & Salmivalli, 
2010). Indeed, observations in school playgrounds have shown that peers who stand up for 
victims of bullying are successful in stopping bullying in more than half of the time (Hawkins, 
Pepler, & Craig, 2001). Furthermore, victims who are defended by classmates are more accepted 
22
in their peer group and report higher levels of self-esteem, and lower levels of internalizing 
symptoms than non-defended victims (Sainio, Veenstra, Huitsing, & Salmivalli, 2010). 
Therefore, in addition to examining reactions to social exclusion at the level of the excluded 
child, we also investigated processes at the level of the peer group that play a role in stopping 
or enabling exclusion. 
Specifically, we investigated intra-individual processes (i.e. mood and perspective taking) 
in uninvolved bystanders who witnessed the exclusion of a peer and who were subsequently 
given the opportunity to help the victim of exclusion and to punish the excluders. Advanced 
forms of perspective taking, such as inferring another person’s feelings in the absence of 
explicit emotional cues (i.e. affective perspective-taking), have been shown to continue to 
develop across adolescence (Hoffman, 2000). Given the importance of such perspective-
taking skills for prosocial behavior (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009), we examined 
helping and punishment in various phases of adolescent development (from late childhood 
to young adulthood) and tested how individual and developmental differences in perspective 
taking contributed to performing those behaviors (Chapter 5). Identifying the socio-cognitive 
processes that motivate bystanders to help a victim of exclusion is important, given the positive 
effects of prosocial action toward victims of bullying in terms of well-being and peer status 
(Sainio et al., 2010).
1.4 SHARING 
Prosocial behaviors such as helping, cooperating and sharing have been shown to been 
among the strongest predictors of peer acceptance across childhood and adolescence (Caprara, 
Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2000; Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin, & Banerjee, 2012; 
Crick, 1996; Deković & Gerris, 1994; Parker & Asher, 1987; Zimmer-Gembeck, Geiger, & 
Crick, 2005). Prosocial behaviors have even been shown to have a causal effect on gaining 
acceptance among peers; both when they are displayed spontaneously (Coie & Kupersmidt, 
1983) and when children are instructed to display them more often (Layous et al., 2012). 
Consequently, understanding the neural and psychological processes involved in prosocial 
behavior is critical for a better understanding of the emergence and maintenance of an accepted 
or rejected status. 
A form of prosocial behavior that allows for the examination of several underlying neural 
and psychological processes and which has been studied extensively is: sharing of valuable 
resources. First of all, sharing decisions have consequences for both the well being of the person 
making the distribution and for the person receiving a portion of the resources. Therefore, it has 
been argued that socio-cognitive capacities such as perspective taking are needed to recognize 
the need in the other person in order to share with them (Güroğlu, van den Bos, & Crone, 
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2014). Furthermore, when humans distribute resources, considerations of fairness, that is a 
concern for an equal distribution based on a comparison of the needs of two or more parties, 
come into play. Already in infancy, humans prefer equal distributions to unequal distributions 
and show behaviors that are indicative of aversion to inequality (Schmidt & Sommerville, 
2011; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012). Failing to share with a peer might thus rely on 
separate processes (e.g., failing to recognize the need of the other person, but also diminished 
aversion to inequality), which have been shown to be supported by separate neural networks. 
Perspective taking in social exchange is associated with activity in brain regions in the medial 
frontal and temporo-parietal cortex (Fett, Gromann, Giampietro, Shergill, & Krabbendam, 
2013; Güroğlu et al., 2011; van den Bos et al., 2011), whereas the detection of violations of 
fairness norms have been shown to activate brain regions involved in processing conflict and 
negative emotions (pre-Supplementary Motor Area/ACC and AI) (Chang & Sanfey, 2011; 
Güroğlu et al., 2011). 
What mechanisms could underlie the typically found lower levels of prosocial behavior 
shown by rejected children relative to their accepted counterparts? First of all, rejected children’s 
lower levels of prosocial behavior have previously been linked to a lesser understanding of 
other people’s minds (e.g. less advanced ‘theory of mind’ skills) (Fink, Begeer, Hunt, & de 
Rosnay, 2014; Slaughter, Dennis, & Pritchard, 2002). Second, a diminished tendency to behave 
prosocially could also be associated with lower degrees of internal conflict or negative affect 
experienced when violating a fairness norm (e.g. when keeping all resources to oneself ). To 
gain insights into these two underlying processes, we first examined the neural correlates of 
violations of fairness norms in sharing decisions in a sample of young adults (Chapter 7). 
Subsequently, to investigate whether the previously described mechanisms involved in sharing 
decisions show associations with peer group acceptance or rejection, we examined the neural 
correlates of sharing decisions in adolescents with a history of stable peer acceptance and 
adolescents with a history of chronic peer rejection (Chapter 8). A better understanding of 
the mechanisms underlying prosocial behavior at the intra-individual level and at the level of 
the interaction can provide valuable insights into the role of prosocial behavior in gaining or 
maintaining peer acceptance.
1.5 OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS
The overarching goal of this thesis was to examine the neural, psychological, and behavioral 
processes, which play a role in the emergence or maintenance of a rejected status. To explore 
these processes, we combined experimental paradigms borrowed from social psychology 
(Cyberball) and behavioral economics (economic games such as the Dictator Game) with 
neuroimaging methods from cognitive neuroscience (fMRI), and multi-informant survey 
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measures on psychological and social functioning from developmental psychology (self-, peer, 
and parent-reports). The empirical studies were guided by our transactional model of peer 
interactions, which distinguished between processes at the level of the individual child (i.e. 
intra-individual), those at the level of social interactions and those at the level of the peer group. 
Together these studies not only aimed to advance our understanding of the processes that give 
rise to peer group rejection and its maintenance, but they also provide valuable insights into 
the affective, cognitive-regulatory, and socio-cognitive processes underlying social interactions 
in general. 
The first part of this thesis (Chapters 2-5) focuses on the affective, cognitive and neural 
(intra-individual) processes underlying subjective and behavioral reactions to social exclusion 
(at the level of the social interaction) and how these processes varied as function of chronic 
peer group rejection (group level). Chapter 2 describes a neuroimaging study that shows how 
sustained exposure to peer group rejection across six years of elementary school is associated 
with heightened neural responses to social exclusion in early adolescence. Chapter 3 reports on 
a study that examined the neural correlates of retaliatory (i.e. punishment) and prosocial (i.e. 
forgiveness) reactions toward peers who previously excluded them in a sample of young adults. 
Chapter 4 investigated how the neural processes involved in punishment and forgiveness of 
excluders in adolescence vary as a function of individual differences in chronic exposure to 
peer rejection, cognitive control capabilities and perspective-taking skills. Chapter 5 describes a 
behavioral study that examined how affective perspective-taking skills contribute to individual 
and developmental differences (age 9-22) in third-party decisions to help victims of social 
exclusion and to punish excluders.
The second part of this thesis (Chapter 6-8) focuses on the neurocognitive (intra-
individual) processes underlying sharing decisions (in social interactions) involving real costs 
and benefits for self and others and how these processes are associated with individual histories 
of sustained exposure to either high or low levels of peer acceptance (group level). Chapter 6 
presents a review of the evidence for the hypothesis that developmental changes in cognitive 
control and perspective-taking skills and their underlying neural circuitry are critical to 
understanding developmental changes in strategic thinking and an increased incorporation of 
other’s perspectives into social decisions. Chapter 7 describes a study on the neural correlates of 
violations of a fairness norm in sharing decisions in young adults. We examined neural activity 
when participants violated a norm of equality to benefit themselves, but also when they violated 
a norm of equality to benefit another person. Chapter 8 investigated how activation of neural 
systems involved in the detection of norm-violations and those supporting perspective taking 
during sharing choices differs between adolescents who were stably accepted and adolescents 
who were chronically rejected during childhood. Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the results of 
the studies in this thesis and discusses the implications of the findings for understanding the 
mechanisms of emergence and maintenance of peer rejection.
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CHRONIC CHILDHOOD PEER REJECTION IS 
ASSOCIATED WITH HEIGHTENED NEURAL 
RESPONSES TO SOCIAL EXCLUSION DURING 
ADOLESCENCE
This chapter is published as: 
Will, G.-J., van Lier, P. A. C., Crone, E. A., & Güroğlu, B. (2015). Chronic childhood peer rejection is 
associated with heightened neural responses to social exclusion during adolescence. Journal of Abnormal 
Child Psychology. [Epub ahead of print]
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ABSTRACT
This functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) study examined subjective and neural 
responses to social exclusion in adolescents (age 12–15) who either had a stable accepted (n 
= 27; 14 males) or a chronic rejected (n = 19; 12 males) status among peers from age 6 to 12. 
Both groups of adolescents reported similar increases in distress after being excluded in a 
virtual ball-tossing game (Cyberball), but adolescents with a history of chronic peer rejection 
showed higher activity in brain regions previously linked to the detection of, and the distress 
caused by, social exclusion. Specifically, compared with stably accepted adolescents, chron-
ically rejected adolescents displayed: 1) higher activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
(dACC) during social exclusion and 2) higher activity in the dACC and anterior prefrontal 
cortex when they were incidentally excluded in a social interaction in which they were overall 
included. These findings demonstrate that chronic childhood peer rejection is associated with 
heightened neural responses to social exclusion during adolescence, which has implications 
for understanding the processes through which peer rejection may lead to adverse effects on 
mental health over time. 
Chapter 2: Peer rejection and neural responses to exclusion | 31
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Children and adolescents who are rejected by peers suffer from widespread impairments 
in mental health that can persist across development (Ladd, 2006; Ladd & Troop-Gordon, 
2003; Prinstein & Aikins, 2004). A potential mechanism through which a rejected status 
among peers leads to mental health problems is a heightened emotional and neural reactivity to 
negative treatment that accompanies a rejected status (e.g., being ignored, harassed, excluded). 
For example, boys with a rejected status who are more distressed by a rejection experience 
have more externalizing behavioral problems than boys with a rejected status who show lower 
levels of reactive distress (Sandstrom et al., 2003). Similarly, adolescents who display enhanced 
neural responses to social exclusion are more likely to exhibit depressive symptoms 1 year later 
(Masten et al., 2011a). Given that children’s social experiences in peer groups play a crucial role 
in shaping their perceptions and expectations about future social interactions (Crick & Dodge, 
1994; Ladd, Ettekal, Kochenderfer-Ladd, Rudolph, & Andrews, 2014; London et al., 2007), 
sustained exposure to either high or low levels of peer group rejection is likely to have an impact 
on how adolescents respond to negative peer treatment, such as social exclusion. Therefore, we 
examined subjective and neural responses to social exclusion in adolescents who either had a 
stable accepted or a chronic rejected status among their classmates across six elementary school 
grades. 
Chronic peer group rejection and psychosocial development
Adverse adjustment outcomes resulting from peer group rejection have been well 
documented. Peer group rejection has proven to be reliably assessed by asking children to 
nominate the classmates they like and dislike (Asher & Coie, 1990; Bukowski et al., 2000; 
Jiang & Cillessen, 2005; Parker & Asher, 1987). Children who receive many negative (dislike) 
nominations and who receive few positive (like) nominations are classified as having a rejected 
status (Asher & Dodge, 1986; Bukowski et al., 2000). A rejected status has been found to be 
highly stable across time and across different social contexts (Coie & Kupersmidt, 1983; Hardy 
et al., 2002; Jiang & Cillessen, 2005). 
Moreover, a chronic rejected status has been prospectively linked to an array of impairments 
in daily life, ranging from poor academic achievement (DeRosier et al., 1994) to an increased 
incidence of both internalizing (Ladd & Troop-Gordon, 2003) and externalizing behavior 
problems (Sturaro, van Lier, Cuijpers, & Koot, 2011).
Transactional models of peer rejection posit that such impairments in daily life arise from 
a sustained pattern of reciprocal interactions between peers expressing their dislike and the 
way a rejected child responds to being disliked (Coie, 1990). For example, repeated exposure 
to rejection experiences (e.g., social exclusion) may elicit negative emotions (e.g., anger at 
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exclusion) resulting in aggressive reactions, which in turn could trigger repeated instances 
of exclusion by the peer group ultimately giving rise to externalizing problems (Coie, 2004; 
Dodge et al., 2003). Internalizing problems have been hypothesized to arise from a similar 
developmental cascade in which repeated exposure to rejection experiences may amplify 
negative emotions (e.g., sadness, distress), which in turn heighten anxiety, lead to withdrawal or 
bolster psychological processes that underlie the development of internalizing disorders (e.g., 
low self-esteem, lower levels of trust in others) (Ladd et al., 2014; Troop-Gordon & Ladd, 
2005). As such, a rejected status could be maintained across development through a heightened 
emotional or neural reactivity to negative treatment such as social exclusion. Understanding 
the mechanisms underlying the maintenance of a rejected status can aid in understanding why 
some children are able to deal with episodes of peer rejection without much difficulty whereas 
others become trapped in a pattern of sustained rejection and associated impairments in daily 
life (Sandstrom, 2004; Sandstrom & Coie, 1999). 
Social exclusion: distress and neural correlates
Social exclusion is highly distressing and immediately threatens fundamental human 
needs, such as our need to belong, our need for control over our (social) environment and 
our needs for self-esteem and a meaningful existence (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 
2007). Relationships with peers are vital to satisfying these needs across the lifespan (Ladd, 
1999; Rubin et al., 2006) and therefore we hypothesized that childhood peer acceptance and 
rejection have an impact on the extent to which these needs are threatened by social exclusion 
in adolescence. An experimental design, which has proven to be a reliable paradigm to elicit 
exclusion-related distress, is a virtual ball-tossing game called Cyberball (Williams et al., 2000). 
After being ostensibly excluded by two peers in Cyberball, children, adolescents and adults 
consistently report heightened levels of distress in the form of higher levels of negative mood 
(e.g., sadness and anger) and a decreased satisfaction of the need to belong, the need for control, 
self-esteem, and the need for a meaningful existence (Abrams et al., 2011; Gunther Moor et al., 
2012; van Beest & Williams, 2006). 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies using the Cyberball game have 
identified a network of brain regions involved in processing exclusion-related distress of which 
three regions are most consistently found: the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the anterior 
insula (AI) and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) (Cacioppo et al., 2013; Eisenberger, 
2012; Rotge et al., 2014). Higher levels of need threat have been associated with higher levels of 
activation in the AI and dorsal, ventral and subgenual regions of the ACC (Bolling et al., 2011a; 
Eisenberger et al., 2003; Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Masten et al., 2009). Consistent with 
the ACC and AI’s involvement in processing conflict and (negative) emotions, these findings 
suggest that the ACC and AI are involved in processing the distress caused by exclusion. 
Negative associations have been found between self-reported need threat and activation in the 
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vlPFC, suggesting that the vlPFC is involved in regulating the distress caused by exclusion 
(Bolling et al., 2011a; Eisenberger et al., 2003; Masten et al., 2009). 
Notably, fMRI studies have also highlighted that activity in these brain regions during 
exclusion may be enhanced or attenuated depending on individual or social factors. Chronic 
peer group rejection may be one such social factor, and individual factors identified in previous 
research (e.g., sensitivity to rejection, an anxious attachment style, perceived social support) 
are likely characteristic of adolescents who have experienced chronic rejection. That is, higher 
levels of ACC activity during social exclusion have been observed in adolescents who reported 
to be more sensitive to rejection (Masten et al., 2009) and in adults with an anxious attachment 
style characterized by a vigilance to cues of rejection (DeWall et al., 2012). Furthermore, adults 
who perceived their daily social interactions to be more comforting and supportive showed 
dampened ACC activation during exclusion (Eisenberger et al., 2007) and young adults who 
spent more time with friends during late adolescence showed a similar pattern of reduced ACC 
and AI activity during exclusion (Masten, Telzer, Fuligni, Lieberman, & Eisenberger, 2012). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that people who are more sensitive to rejection or who 
have lower levels of (perceived) social support display higher levels of activity in brain regions 
involved in processing the distress caused by social exclusion. Consequently, it is likely that 
adolescents with a history of peer rejection, who are often more sensitive to rejection (London 
et al., 2007) and perceive lower levels of peer social support (Ladd et al., 2014) than adolescents 
with a history of peer acceptance, display enhanced neural responses in the ACC or AI when 
they are excluded. 
The current study
To test the hypothesis that adolescents with a history of chronic peer rejection display 
enhanced neural responses to social exclusion compared to stably accepted adolescents, we 
recruited participants from a sample of adolescents who were followed yearly in their classrooms 
since they were 6 years old. We invited participants who were, across six elementary school 
grades, consistently nominated by their peers to be liked and almost never disliked (i.e., those 
with a stable high social preference among their peers, or, stably accepted adolescents) and 
participants who were consistently disliked and almost never liked (i.e., those with a chronic 
low social preference, or, chronically rejected adolescents), and examined differences in their 
subjective and neural responses to exclusion in Cyberball using whole-brain fMRI analyses. 
Based on previously found negative associations between concurrent social preference and 
self-reported distress after a mild social rejection experience (Sandstrom et al., 2003), we 
hypothesized that adolescents with a history of chronic rejection would report higher levels of 
distress (i.e., lower mood and need satisfaction) after exclusion compared to adolescents with 
a history of stable acceptance. We further hypothesized that adolescents with a history of peer 
rejection would show heightened activity in brain regions previously linked to the distressing 
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aspect of social exclusion (e.g., ACC and AI) compared to adolescents with a history of stable 
acceptance. To test whether chronically rejected adolescents would also show neural reactivity 
indicative of a hypervigilance to cues of potential rejection, we investigated neural responses to 
events during which participants did not receive the ball in a social interaction in which they 
were overall included (i.e., incidental exclusion).
2.2 METHOD
Participants
The current study formed the eighth wave of a longitudinal study on the impact of 
elementary school social experiences on child behavioral, emotional and academic outcomes 
where participants were followed between the ages of 6 and 12. A total of 1,189 participants 
were followed annually from first to sixth grade of elementary school. Each year participants 
filled out a peer-nomination procedure (unlimited nominations), in which participants were 
asked to name the peers in their class who they liked most and liked least. An average social 
preference score (liked most minus liked least nominations) across the six waves was computed. 
Subsequently, participants were identified as chronically rejected if they were in the lower 10th 
percentile or as stably accepted if they were in the upper 10th percentile of that 6-year average 
social preference. By using a 10% threshold it was ensured that none of the chronically rejected 
adolescents were ever classified as sociometrically popular and none of the stably accepted 
adolescents were ever classified as having a rejected status across the six waves. Correlation 
coefficients between social preference scores of adjacent years ranged from .67 to .70 (all ps < 
.001), which is comparable to those reported in other studies (Salmivalli & Isaacs, 2005; Vitaro, 
Pedersen, & Brendgen, 2007). Participation rates of in the classrooms across cohorts and six 
annual assessments ranged from 88 - 99%, indicating that participation rates in the classroom 
nomination assessments were above recommended thresholds (Marks, Babcock, Cillessen, & 
Crick, 2013).
Based on these criteria, 219 adolescents were eligible for participation in the fMRI study. 
Of these youths, recent full contact information was available for 131 adolescents, who were 
subsequently approached for participation in the fMRI study. Twenty adolescents were excluded 
because they were left-handed (n = 4), had an autism spectrum disorder (n = 1) or had braces (n 
= 15). Seven adolescents could not be reached. Of the remaining 104 candidate participants, 47 
adolescents and their parents agreed to participate in the fMRI study. Those who chose not to 
participate in the fMRI study (n = 57) did not differ from those who were scanned with respect 
to average social preference, age, gender, and average levels of anxiety and conduct problems 
across 6 years of elementary school (all ps > .19). A radiologist reviewed all anatomical scans, 
and one participant was excluded from the analyses due to an anomaly. Two participants were 
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a All p-values obtained using t tests except for race and gender (Chi-square tests).
b Average across 6 years of elementary school, Z-standardized
excluded from the analyses because their head movement parameters exceeded 1 voxel (3 
mm) in at least one direction. 
The remaining 44 participants had a mean age of 14.0 years (SD = 0.70; 26 males). Twenty-
seven adolescents met our criteria for a history of stable peer acceptance (M age = 14.0; SD 
= 0.77; 14 male) and 17 for a history of chronic peer rejection (M age = 14.0; SD = 0.56; 12 
male). All participants indicated to be healthy and reported no contraindications for MRI 









Mean Social Preferenceb  
(selection variable)
-1.62 (0.52) 1.16 (0.18) < .001
Gender (% Male) 70.6 51.9 .22
Age 13.98 (0.77) 14.04 (0.58) .78
Pubertal status (PDS)
   0 Males












IQ (WISC Similarities and 
Block Design)
95 (12.68) 100 (10.24) .16
Current social competence 
(parent reported)
4.59 (0.62) 5.40 (0.57) < .001 
Anxiety during elementary 
school (teacher reported)b
0.41 (0.80) -0.31 (1.01) < .05
Conduct problems during 
elementary school (teacher 
reported)b
0.81 (1.39) -0.67 (0.52) < .001
Table 2.1 Participant characteristics. 
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participants with a history of chronic peer rejection who were diagnosed with Attention-Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Three of these participants with ADHD were on a stable 
dose of methylphenidates, but were medication-free on the day of scanning and the preceding 
day. One participant was on medication during scanning. The two groups of adolescents did not 
differ in gender, age, pubertal status, ethnicity, or IQ (all ps > .15; see Table 2.1). 
Chronically rejected adolescents had higher average levels of anxiety and conduct problems 
across 6 years of elementary school and they had lower levels of social competence at the moment 
of scanning than stably accepted adolescents (all ps < .05). Researchers and research assistants 
were familiar with the recruitment procedure based on childhood histories of acceptance and 
rejection, but were not informed about individual participants’ peer status history to ensure 
blind assessments during data collection. All participants and their parents gave informed 
consent for the study. The medical ethical committee of the VU University Medical Center 
approved the longitudinal study and the MRI study was approved by the Leiden university 
medical ethical committee. After scanning, participants filled out a battery of questionnaires 
and were debriefed. Participants received a monetary compensation for participation and small 
gifts.
fMRI task: Cyberball
Participants were given a cover story, in which they were told that they were about to 
perform a mental visualization task and that this would be investigated by means of an online 
ball-tossing game (Williams et al., 2000). Accordingly, they were asked to imagine what the 
other players looked like, what kind of personalities they would have and in what kind of weather 
conditions the game would be played (Williams, 2007). It was explained that the players were 
unfamiliar peers and that they would be connected through the Internet. Unbeknownst to the 
participants, the behavior of the other players in Cyberball was preprogrammed. The other 
players in the game were depicted as cartoon characters with their names depicted below them 
(1 male; 1 female). The participants were represented by a hand in the middle of the screen and 
they could throw the ball to the left or right player with a button press of the index finger of 
the corresponding hand. 
Participants first played an inclusion condition in which each player received the ball an equal 
amount of times (10 out of 30 throws). After filling out short questionnaires assessing mood 
and need satisfaction in the scanner (see below), participants played the exclusion condition 
where, after receiving the ball once at the start of the game and throwing it to one of the other 
players, they did not receive a single ball for the remainder of the game (28 out of 30 throws). 
Scans were acquired during two separate runs each lasting about 3 minutes. Participants’ throws 
were self-paced, ball throws of the other players were preceded by a random jitter interval 
(100- 4000 ms) and it took 2 seconds before each throw reached the designated player. During 
debriefing, we administered a funneling suspicion probe about the authenticity of the players 
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in Cyberball consisting of three open-ended questions (see supplementary material; 2.5). The 
number of participants who raised suspicions did not differ between the two groups (7 stably 
accepted vs. 6 chronically rejected adolescents), χ²(1) = .4, p = .51.
Questionnaires: Mood and need satisfaction
To assess exclusion-related distress we used self-report measures of mood and need 
satisfaction (Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Lelieveld, Gunther Moor, Crone, Karremans, & van 
Beest, 2013; Sebastian et al., 2010; Will, Crone, & Güroğlu, 2014). Mood and need satisfaction 
were assessed at three time points: (i) immediately after inclusion, (ii) immediately after 
exclusion, and (iii) approximately 30 minutes after exclusion (when participants came out of 
the scanner). 
The Need Satisfaction questionnaire consisted of eight items taken from the Need Threat 
Scale (van Beest & Williams, 2006), with two questions assessing each of the following four 
needs: belonging, self-esteem, control and meaningful existence (see Supplementary Table 
S2.1; 2.5). All need satisfaction items were rated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) 
and negative items were recoded. Higher scores on this measure thus reflect satisfaction of 
these needs and lower scores reflect the threat of these needs. The mood questionnaire consisted 
of eight mood items (feeling good, bad, happy, sad, relaxed, tense, friendly and unfriendly (see 
Supplementary Table S2.1; 2.5). All mood items were rated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(very much) and negative mood items (bad, sad, tense, unfriendly) were recoded. 
Internal consistency of the need satisfaction scale proved to be good (Cronbach’s α = .78) 
and therefore, consistent with previous studies using Cyberball (van Beest & Williams, 2006; 
Williams et al., 2000), the four need scales were averaged to create an overall index of need 
satisfaction at each time-point, i.e., after inclusion, after exclusion and post-scanning. Internal 
consistency of the mood scale was acceptable (Cronbach’s α = .67) and the four mood constructs 
were averaged to create an overall index of mood at each time-point. 
fMRI data acquisition
Participants were first familiarized with the scanner environment through the use of a mock 
scanner. Scans were acquired using a 3T Philips Achieva MRI system at the Leiden University 
Medical Center. Stimuli were projected onto a screen located at the head of the scanner bore 
using Authorware. Participants viewed the screen via a mirror mounted on the head coil. Foam 
inserts that surrounded the head were used to minimize head movement. First, we obtained 
a localizer scan for each participant. Second, T2*-weighted Echo-Planar Images (EPI) were 
obtained (repetition time (TR)= 2.2 sec, echo time (TE)= 30ms, sequential acquisition, 38 
slices of 2.75 mm, field of view (FOV) = 220 × 220 × 114.68 mm) during two functional runs: 
Cyberball inclusion and exclusion. The first two volumes of each functional run were discarded 
to allow for equilibration of T1 saturation effects. Finally, we obtained a high-resolution 3D 
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T1-FFE scan for anatomical reference (TR = 9.76 ms, TE = 4.59 ms, flip angle = 8°, 140 slices, 
voxel size = 0.875 × 0.875 × 1.2 mm voxels, FOV = 224 × 177 × 168 mm) after the functional 
runs. 
fMRI data analysis
MRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM8 statistical parametric mapping 
image analysis software (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College 
London). Functional images were slice-time corrected, realigned, co-registered to individual 
structural T1 scans, normalized to a T1 template, and spatially smoothed using an 8 mm, full-
width at half-maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel. The normalization algorithm, resampled 
the volumes to 3 mm cubic voxels using a 12-parameter affine transformation and a nonlinear 
transformation involving cosine basic functions. All results are reported in MNI305 stereotactic 
space.
We analyzed the fMRI data using an event-related design based on previous studies 
(Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Will et al., 2014). Data were modeled as zero-duration events at 
the onset of a ball-toss and convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). 
Statistical analysis was carried out using a general linear model. Regressors were defined for three 
Cyberball events (throwing, receiving or a ball-toss between the two other players) and were 
analyzed separately for the inclusion game and the exclusion game. The model contained a basic 
set of cosine functions that high-pass-filtered the data and a covariate to control for run effects. 
The least-squares parameter estimates of the height of the best-fitting canonical HRF for each 
condition separately were used in pair-wise contrasts at the subject level. The resulting contrast 
images were submitted to group analyses where participants were treated as a random effect. 
Subsequently, we performed whole-brain one-tailed t-tests to examine the neural correlates of 
social exclusion and incidental exclusion across the sample. For group comparisons, contrast 
images were entered into separate second-level analyses for each contrast of interest, where peer 
status history (chronically rejected vs. stably accepted) was the between-subjects variable in 
whole-brain independent samples t-tests. Results were considered significant at an uncorrected 
threshold of p < .001 with a minimum cluster size of 10 contiguous voxels to balance between 
Type 1 and Type 2 errors (Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009). We also report which results 
remain significant using a whole-brain voxel-wise false discovery rate (FDR) correction (p < 
.05, > 10 voxels). We used the MarsBaR toolbox (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002; 
http://marsbar.sourceforce.net/) to extract activity in functional regions of interest.
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Figure 2.1 A) Mean levels of a composite score of self-reported satisfaction of fundamental human needs (belong-
ing, self-esteem, control and meaningful existence) assessed immediately after inclusion, exclusion and 30 minutes 
after exclusion. B) Mean levels of a composite score of mood assessed immediately after inclusion, exclusion and 30 
minutes after exclusion (error bars represent standard errors of the mean).
2.3 RESULTS
Self-reported distress
A repeated measures ANOVA with time point (3 levels: inclusion, exclusion, and 30 
minutes after exclusion) as within-subjects factor for the composite score of need satisfaction 
and peer status history (2 levels: chronically rejected vs. stably accepted) as a between-subjects 
factor yielded a main effect of time point, F(2, 84) = 221.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .84. Follow-up 
pairwise comparisons showed that need satisfaction assessed immediately following exclusion 
was lower than need satisfaction after inclusion (p < .001) and 30 minutes after exclusion (p < 
.001) (see Figure 2.1A). The interaction effect between time point and peer status history was 
not significant (p =.49), indicating that effects of social exclusion on need satisfaction were 
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similar for stably accepted and chronically rejected adolescents. 
Similarly, a repeated measures ANOVA with time point (3 levels: after inclusion, after 
exclusion and 30 minutes after exclusion) as within-subjects factor for overall mood with peer 
status history (2 levels: chronically rejected vs. stably accepted) as a between-subjects factor 
yielded a main effect of time point, F(2, 84) = 98.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .71. Follow-up pairwise 
comparisons showed that mood assessed immediately following exclusion was lower than after 
inclusion (p < .001) and 30 minutes after exclusion (p < .001) (see Figure 2.1B). The interaction 
effect between time point and peer status history was not significant (p = .87), indicating that 
effects of social exclusion on mood were similar for stably accepted and chronically rejected 
adolescents. 
Neuroimaging results
Neural responses to social exclusion across the sample
Before we tested for differences in brain responses between chronically rejected and stably 
accepted adolescents, we first investigated the neural correlates of social exclusion across the 
whole sample. Three contrasts were used: two examining the neural correlates of social exclusion 
and a third contrast examining the neural correlates of incidental exclusion. 
The first contrast, which compared activation on trials where participants did not receive 
the ball in the exclusion game with trials where participants received the ball in the inclusion 
game (Exclusion: not receiving the ball  > Inclusion: receiving the ball), resulted in activation 
in a set of brain regions (Figure 2.2A), including ventral ACC/medial PFC (vACC/mPFC; 
peak voxel of cluster at -12, 47, 1), striatum (peak at -6, 17, -2), bilateral vlPFC (peaks at 27, 32, 
-11 and -45, 32, -8) and the dorsomedial PFC (peak at -6, 47, 46).The second contrast, which 
compared activation on trials where participants did not receive the ball in the exclusion game 
with trials where they did not receive the ball in the inclusion game (Exclusion: not receiving 
the ball  > Inclusion: not receiving the ball), resulted in activation in the striatum (peak at -6, 
17, -2) and the vACC (peak at -6, 44, 1) (Figure 2.2B).
To identify the neural regions associated with incidental exclusion, we compared activation 
on trials where participants did not receive the ball during the inclusion game with trials 
where participants received the ball during the same game (Inclusion: not receiving the ball 
> Inclusion: receiving the ball). This whole brain contrast resulted in increased activation in 
several brain regions, including bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; peaks at 36, 32, -11 and 
-39, 32, -11), medial PFC (peak at -9, 50, -5) and left vlPFC (peak at -54, 29, 7) (see Figure 
2.2C). All significant clusters (uncorrected and FDR corrected) are reported in Supplementary 
Table S2.2 (2.5).
Neural responses to social exclusion associated with peer status history 
To examine differences in brain responses between adolescents with a history of stable 
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Inclusion: not receiving ball  > Inclusion: receiving ball  
Exclusion: not receiving ball  > Inclusion: not receiving ball  
 







y = 26  x = -6  
z = 2  x = -6  
y = 32  x = -6  
Social exclusion 





Figure 2.2 Whole-brain results for the Cyberball interaction collapsed across peer status groups. (A) Social exclu-
sion 1: Not receiving the ball during the exclusion game  > receiving the ball during inclusion game. (B) Social 
exclusion 2: Not receiving the ball during the exclusion game  > Not receiving the ball during inclusion game. (C) 
Incidental exclusion: Not receiving the ball during the inclusion game  > receiving the ball during inclusion game.
acceptance or chronic rejection, we ran whole-brain independent samples t-tests on all three 
contrasts outlined above. Chronically rejected adolescents showed increased activation in dACC 
(peak at -3, 41, 16) when they were excluded. That is, compared to stably accepted adolescents, 
chronically rejected adolescents showed higher dACC activity on events where they did not 
receive the ball during the exclusion game compared with events where they received the ball 
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Figure 2.3 Chronically rejected adolescents showed increased activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
(dACC; -3, 41, 16) during social exclusion compared to stably accepted adolescents. Subject-level contrast values 
in this region of the dACC were extracted for events on which participants received the ball during the inclusion 
game, when they did not receive the ball during the inclusion game and when they did not receive the ball during 
the exclusion game and plotted to facilitate interpretation (error bars represent standard errors of the mean).
in the inclusion game (Chronically rejected adolescents [Exclusion: not receiving the ball - 
Inclusion: receiving the ball] > Stably accepted adolescents [Exclusion: not receiving the ball 
- Inclusion: receiving the ball]) (see Figure 2.3).
Additionally, differences in neural responses to incidental exclusion were found. Specifically, 
a whole brain contrast showed that compared to stably accepted adolescents, chronically rejected 
adolescents showed increased activation in the pre- supplementary motor area (peak at -9, 23, 
46), dACC (peak at -15, 29, 31) extending into left anterior prefrontal cortex [aPFC; peak at 
-36, 50, 13]), and right aPFC (peak at 24, 50, 13) on incidental exclusion trials (Chronically 
rejected adolescents [Inclusion: not receiving the ball - Inclusion: receiving the ball] > Stably 
accepted adolescents [Inclusion: not receiving the ball - Inclusion: receiving the ball]) (see 
Figure 2.4).
A direct comparison between stably accepted and chronically rejected adolescents on the 
second social exclusion contrast (Exclusion: not receiving the ball  > Inclusion: not receiving 
the ball) did not result in activation in regions associated with cognitive or affective processes. 
No regions showed higher activity in stably accepted adolescents than chronically rejected 
adolescents in any of the three contrasts. All significant clusters are reported in Table 2.2.
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Figure 2.4 Chronically rejected adolescents, compared to stably accepted adolescents, showed increased activation 
in the pre-supplementary motor area (-9, 23, 46), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC; -15, 29, 31) extending 
into left anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC; -36, 50, 13), and right aPFC (24, 50, 13) during incidental exclu-
sion. Subject-level contrast values in this region of the dACC (cluster of activation masked with an anatomical 
ROI of the ACC from the Automated anatomical labeling ROI library (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) were 
extracted for events on which participants received the ball during the inclusion game, when they did not receive 
the ball during the inclusion game and when they did not receive the ball during the exclusion game and plotted 
to facilitate interpretation (error bars represent standard errors of the mean). 
2.4 DISCUSSION
The present study investigated differences in subjective and neural responses to social 
exclusion in adolescents who either had a stable accepted or a chronically rejected status across six 
elementary school grades. We first replicated previous findings, showing that a brief episode of 
social exclusion is distressing for adolescents (Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Sebastian et al., 2010) 
and that social exclusion is associated with activation in brain regions implicated in emotion 
processing and emotion regulation, such as the dorsal and ventral ACC, medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC), the striatum and vlPFC (Bolling et al., 2011a; Gunther Moor et al., 2012; 
Masten et al., 2009; Sebastian et al., 2011). Our findings extend the literature by showing that 
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Table 2.2  Brain regions revealed by whole-brain analyses testing for peer status history differences in the 
Cyberball game (all thresholded p < .001 uncorrected, > 10 voxels).
Brain region L/R Voxels z MNI coordinates
x y z
Social exclusion: Chronically rejected adolescents > Stably accepted adolescents
[Exclusion: not receiving the ball  - Inclusion: receiving the ball]
Postcentral gyrus L 19 3.60 -45 -19 31
Anterior Cingulate cortex L 17 3.48 -3 41 16
Superior Temporal gyrus L 10 3.38 -60 -34 19
Social exclusion: Chronically rejected adolescents > Stably accepted adolescents 
[Exclusion: not receiving the ball  - Inclusion: not receiving the ball]
Heschl’s gyrus R 15 3.52 48 -22 10
Incidental exclusion: Chronically rejected adolescents > Stably accepted adolescents [Inclusion: 
not receiving the ball  - Inclusion: receiving the ball]
Anterior Cingulate cortex L 148 4.21 -15 29 31
extending into: 3.70 -15 35 19
Middle Frontal gyrus
(anterior prefrontal cortex)
3.45 -36 50 13
Superior Frontal gyrus/ L 26 3.56 -15 20 52
Supplementary Motor Area 3.49 -9 11 55
Superior Frontal gyrus 
(anterior prefrontal cortex)
R 11 3.40 24 50 13
Supplementary Motor Area R 16 3.37 9 23 46
differences in sustained patterns of peer group acceptance and peer group rejection during the 
elementary school period are associated with differential neural processing of social exclusion in 
adolescence. That is, chronically rejected adolescents showed, in comparison to stably accepted 
adolescents: 1) increased activation in the dACC when they were excluded, and 2) increased 
activation in the dACC and aPFC during incidental exclusion events in a social interaction in 
which they were included.
Childhood peer status and self-reported distress after exclusion
Our results show that a brief episode of exclusion in Cyberball results in immediate distress 
in the form of decreased mood and need satisfaction and that chronically rejected adolescents 
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and stably accepted adolescents report similar levels of distress. Our results partially overlap 
with the results from a previous study that examined individual differences in subjective distress 
after receiving a video message from another child telling the participants that he/she did not 
want to play with them (Sandstrom et al., 2003). Consistent with our findings, Sandstrom and 
colleagues (2003) found no differences in acute distress reported by accepted and rejected boys. 
However, their findings indicated that rejected girls reported higher levels of distress compared 
to accepted girls. Our sample was not large enough to test for such interactions between sex 
and peer status history in order to examine whether distress differed between rejected and 
accepted girls. Future studies with larger samples could test whether individual differences in 
self-reported distress associated with a stable high or low peer status might be different for boys 
and girls. 
Additionally, methodological differences between paradigms used to elicit rejection-related 
distress may account for differences in results. That is, the relatively mild rejection experience in 
Sandstrom and colleagues’ (2003) study could have allowed more room for individual differences 
in responses compared to the Cyberball paradigm. That is, meta-analyses have shown that 
exclusion in the Cyberball paradigm very reliably induces distress (large effect sizes of exclusion 
in Cyberball on mood and need satisfaction; D’s between 1 and 2; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009), 
but also that the self-reports of such distress seem to be less amenable to moderation by 
individual differences, such as the participant’s sex (Williams & Sommer, 1997), their levels of 
loneliness (Wesselmann, Wirth, Mroczek, & Williams, 2012) or social anxiety (Zadro, Boland, 
& Richardson, 2006). Thus, the strength of the Cyberball paradigm (i.e., its ability to reliably 
induce distress) might also be a limitation when investigating individual differences. A milder 
or more ambiguous rejection experience might allow for more variability in responses, which 
could be related to individual differences such as peer status.
Childhood peer status and neural responses to exclusion 
The neuroimaging results show that neural responses to both social exclusion and incidental 
exclusion differ between adolescents who were chronically rejected and those who had a stable 
accepted status during childhood. Compared to stably accepted adolescents, chronically rejected 
adolescents showed heightened dACC activity during social exclusion. Our findings are in 
line with previous work showing enhanced dACC activation during exclusion in adolescents 
who are more sensitive to rejection (Masten et al., 2009), adults with low self-esteem (Onoda 
et al., 2010), adults who perceived their daily social interactions to be less comforting and 
supportive (Eisenberger et al., 2007) and young adults who spent less time with friends during 
late adolescence (Masten et al., 2012). Combining these previous findings with our results 
suggest that chronically rejected adolescents show an enhanced neural response to exclusion 
that they share with people who are more sensitive to rejection, who have lower levels of self-
esteem and who have less satisfying social relations.  
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What could the higher levels dACC activity during exclusion reflect? The ACC is 
implicated in a wide variety of cognitive and emotional processes including conflict monitoring 
(Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004), expectancy violation (Somerville, Heatherton, & Kelley, 
2006), physical pain and other negative emotions (Shackman et al., 2011), reactions to being 
treated unfairly (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003) and social exclusion 
(Eisenberger et al., 2003). It has been proposed that the ACC is central to a system involved in 
monitoring the extent to which autonomic/affective signals elicited by salient events interfere 
with goals or ongoing behavior and therefore require increased attention (Shenhav, Botvinick, 
& Cohen, 2013). Furthermore, it has been put forward that there is a functional dissociation 
between dorsal and ventral parts of the ACC (Somerville et al., 2006). That is, the dorsal ACC 
is connected with prefrontal, parietal and motor cortices, and is important for signaling conflict 
and integrating top-down and bottom-up processes (Shenhav et al., 2013). The ventral ACC 
is connected to regions involved in generating and processing affect, such as the amygdala, 
striatum, and AI, and has been implicated in integrating emotional and motivational valence of 
stimuli (Somerville et al., 2006).  
Chronically rejected and stably accepted adolescents did not show differences in ventral 
ACC activity, suggesting that exclusion is emotionally salient irrespective of childhood peer 
status. This notion was mirrored by the similarities in self-reported distress after exclusion. Thus, 
although it could be hypothesized that chronic exposure to negative peer experiences might 
desensitize children’s reactions to social exclusion, our findings suggest otherwise. Specifically, 
the finding that chronically rejected adolescents showed increased activation of the dACC 
compared to stably accepted adolescents suggests that a persistent low status among peers is 
associated with a neural signal possibly indicating increased conflict or salience associated with 
being excluded. 
Notably, chronically rejected, compared to stably accepted, adolescents, showed enhanced 
activity in dACC and aPFC in response to incidental exclusion, that is, events during which 
they did not receive the ball in an interaction in which they were overall included. Higher 
levels of activity in the dACC and aPFC during exclusion in Cyberball have been shown to 
be associated with higher levels of rejection sensitivity (Masten et al., 2009), which has been 
defined as “the disposition to defensively (i.e., anxiously or angrily) expect, readily perceive, and 
overreact to social rejection” (Downey et al., 1998, p. 1074). Enhanced neural responses to not 
receiving the ball in the inclusion game in brain regions previously linked to a greater sensitivity 
to rejection suggest that chronically rejected adolescents might be more sensitive to cues of 
potential exclusion than stably accepted adolescents. Taken together, these findings show that 
adolescents with a history of chronic rejection exhibit heightened neural responses to actual 
and incidental exclusion, which could be indicative of a hypersensitivity or hypervigilance to 
exclusion. 
One possible mechanism accounting for this hypersensitivity could be that chronically 
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rejected adolescents have been exposed to higher levels of negative peer treatment similar to 
the treatment in Cyberball (being ignored or excluded) than the stably accepted adolescents. 
Although peer group rejection has been found to be predictive for experiencing peer 
victimization, including relational victimization (e.g., being left out or excluded from peer 
activities) (Salmivalli & Isaacs, 2005; van Lier & Koot, 2010), there are large individual 
differences in the extent to which children with a rejected status are victimized; both in terms 
of frequency and severity (Boivin et al., 1995; Boulton, 1999). Future studies should examine 
individual differences related to chronic exclusion/victimization using peer nominations of 
being excluded/victimized in a larger sample of chronically rejected adolescents. Such endeavors 
can shed light on the question of whether neural responses to social exclusion are particularly 
pronounced in adolescents who have been chronically excluded or victimized.
Limitations
Several limitations to the current study warrant consideration. First, although our study is 
the first demonstration of differences in neural responses to exclusion between adolescents with 
a history of stable peer acceptance and those with a history of chronic peer rejection, we cannot 
conclude that these differences are the result of their respective peer status histories. Although 
the more pronounced brain responses among chronically rejected adolescents could plausibly 
be attributed to their manifest social experiences, we cannot rule out that such differences were 
already present before elementary school and their emerging peer status. Future longitudinal 
studies investigating whether changes in peer status are linked to changes in brain response may 
shed more light into the question of direction of effects.  
Second, our results are based on a comparison of two extreme groups on the outer ends of 
the social preference spectrum. Although a hypersensitivity to exclusion in adolescents with a 
history of rejection is highly consistent with both theoretical accounts of peer relations (Coie, 
1990; Ladd & Troop-Gordon, 2003; Zakriski et al., 1997) and the development of rejection 
sensitivity (Downey et al., 1998; London et al., 2007), we cannot rule out the possibility that 
differences between the two groups are partly explained by a hyposensitivity to exclusion in 
the stably accepted adolescents. That is, a greater exposure to positive peer relations in the 
stably accepted group could have also had a dampening effect on neural responses to exclusion 
(Masten et al., 2012). Future research can inform this question by contrasting adolescents with 
a history of chronic rejection and acceptance with a sample of adolescents with a stable average 
peer status. 
Third, our sample of chronically rejected adolescents contained adolescents with and 
without a clinical diagnosis of ADHD. Although removing the participants with ADHD 
from our analyses did not influence our findings, it is important to investigate whether neural 
responses to exclusion differ between chronically rejected children with ADHD and those 
without such a diagnosis.  
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Conclusions, implications and future directions
To conclude, the present study forms an important first step toward understanding how 
social exclusion might be experienced differently as a function of an adolescent’s prior peer status 
history. Using neuroimaging methods we showed that, despite chronically rejected and stably 
accepted adolescents reporting similar negative feelings following exclusion, chronically rejected 
adolescents showed enhanced neural responses to social exclusion and incidental exclusion. Our 
findings shed light on the processes, occurring at the level of an individual child, through which 
peer rejection may lead to adverse effects on mental health over time. Crucially, adolescents who 
have been exposed to chronic peer rejection process the same exclusion experience differently 
on a neural level compared to adolescents who were not exposed to chronic rejection, which 
might not be easily captured by self-reports. Longitudinal studies have shown that peer 
rejection is a very persistent phenomenon, which can generalize across different social contexts. 
For example, when children with a rejected status in their classroom enter new social situations 
where they are unknown, they rapidly reestablish a rejected status (Coie & Kupersmidt, 1983; 
Hardy et al., 2002). Consistent with transactional models of peer rejection, children with a 
heightened neural reactivity to social exclusion might show more pronounced emotional or 
behavioral reactions to acute rejection experiences (e.g., social exclusion), which could in turn 
elicit repeated instances of rejection in a new social situation. Thus, sensitivity at the neural level 
might lead to more negative peer experiences that put adolescents with a history of peer group 
rejection at greater risk for developing mental health problems. However, more work is needed 
to definitively pinpoint the psychological processes that heightened neural responses in ACC 
and aPFC represent and how they affect subsequent psychosocial adjustment. 
The current study lays the foundations for future work that can examine how neural responses 
to social exclusion among rejected adolescents might predict behavioral reactions to exclusion. 
For example, a heightened responsiveness to exclusion might be related to more aggressive 
reactions, which could sustain the cycle of repeated instances of rejection and increasingly 
more behavioral problems in which chronically rejected children might have become trapped. 
Similarly, a heightened neural reactivity to exclusion might be related to anxious expectations 
of rejection leading to withdrawal from social interactions. Finally, the current findings can 
inform interventions aimed at reducing rejected children’s social difficulties by targeting their 
hypersensitivity to exclusion. Neuroimaging studies of emotional reappraisal have shown that 
emotion regulation strategies can alter emotion-related neural activity (Ochsner, Silvers, & 
Buhle, 2012). An interesting future direction would be to test whether emotion regulation 
strategies could be used to attenuate the heightened neural response to exclusion and how 
attenuation of the response might influence subsequent acceptance in the peer group. 
Ultimately, a neurocognitive perspective on the complex interplay between peer relations and 
psychosocial development may contribute to our understanding of which rejected children are 
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2.5 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Table S2.1
Assessment of Need Satisfaction and Mood following Inclusion, Exclusion and 30 minutes after exclusion (when 




Belonging 1. I had the feeling that I belonged to the group during the game. 
2. During the game I felt connected with one or more players.
Control 3. I had the feeling that the other players decided everything. (R)
4. I felt in control over the game. 
Self esteem 5. I felt good about myself.
6. My self-esteem was high.
Meaningful existence 7. During the game it felt as if my presence was not meaningful. 
(R) 
8. I had the feeling that my presence during the game was import-
ant. 








8. Unfriendly (R) 
at risk for developing problems and how subjective and neural responses to exclusion might 
predict adjustment trajectories.
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Table S2.2
Brain regions revealed by whole-brain contrasts during the Cyberball game across the sample (all thresholded p < 
.001 uncorrected, > 10 voxels).
Brain region L/R Voxels z MNI coordinates
x y z
Social exclusion (Exclusion: not receiving the ball  > Inclusion: receiving the ball) 
Calcarine gyrus/Cuneus L 1376 6.70 -12 -97 4*
6.63 -12 -88 1*
5.70 12 -88 1*
Caudate L 82 5.26 -6 17 -2*
3.17 9 8 1*
Ventral Anterior Cingulate cortex/ L 174 4.62 -12 47 1*
Medial Prefrontal cortex 4.10 0 50 -5*
3.99 12 47 -2*
Precentral gyrus L 64 4.57 -39 -16 40*
Inferior Frontal gyrus R 47 4.37 27 32 -11*
3.76 36 35 -11*
Inferior Frontal gyrus (vlFPC) L 89 4.28 -45 32 -8*
4.12 -24 32 -11*
3.84 -36 32 -11*
Superior Temporal gyrus/ R 46 3.76 66 -10 4*
Posterior Insula 3.49 42 -19 4*
3.37 54 -10 7*
Superior Frontal gyrus (dmPFC) L 22 3.63 -6 47 46*
Superior Temporal gyrus L 13 3.54 -66 -28 4*
Social exclusion (Exclusion: not receiving the ball  > Inclusion: not receiving the ball) 
Caudate L/R 79 4.00 -6 17 -2
3.86 12 8 1
3.84 6 17 -2
Posterior Cingulate L/R 56 3.88 -6 -34 25
3.88 0 -34 19
Ventral Anterior Cingulate cortex/ L/R 38 3.72 -6 44 1
Medial Prefrontal cortex 3.19 12 47 -2
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Incidental exclusion (Inclusion: not receiving the ball  > Inclusion: receiving the ball) 
Cuneus/Calcarine gyrus L 648 6.66 -12 91 1*
6.12 12 -85 4*
3.91 27 -79 5*
Paracentral Lobule/Precentral gyrus L 350 4.90 -6 -34 61*
4.63 15 -31 64*
Poscentral gyrus 4.49 -18 -34 76*
Posterior Insula/ 88 4.69 36 -13 19*
Precentral gyrus 4.00 39 -16 37*
Precentral gyrus L 24 4.58 -39 -16 40*
Fusiform gyrus R 106 4.47 27 -40 -14*
4.09 33 -40 -14*
Inferior Frontal gyrus L 19 4.18 -39 32 -11*
Middle Temporal gyrus L 20 3.88 -60 -7 -17*
Postcentral gyrus R 10 3.87 63 -7 22*
Hippocampus L 16 3.87 -30 -10 -23*
Inferior Frontal gyrus R 18 3.75 36 32 -11*
Medial Prefrontal cortex L 12 3.75 -9 50 -5*
Inferior Frontal gyrus (vlPFC) L 13 3.66 -54 29 7*
Parahippocampal gyrus/ L 26 3.55 -24 -37 -14*
Fusiform gyrus 3.28 -33 -31 -17*
Suspicion probe about authenticity of peers in Cyberball game
Decreases in need satisfaction and mood across the sample provide evidence that participants 
felt excluded and less accepted after exclusion in Cyberball, showing that the manipulation had 
an effect. 
Using an explicit check, such as “Did you believe that the other players were real people?” 
often proves not to be very reliable as people very easily deduct from the question that they were 
deceived and in turn confess to having had suspicions all along. Therefore, we administered a 
funneling suspicion probe during a debriefing interview, which included three open ended 
questions:
1. “What did you think of the ball game?” 
2. “How did you like being connected through the Internet with the other players?”
3. “What do you think this study was about?”
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In response to the first question 3 participants raised suspicion about either the players in 
the Cyberball game not being real people (n = 2) or that the players were told not to throw to 
ball to the participant (n = 1).  In response to the second question an additional 8 were doubtful 
about the connection being real and in response to the final question 1 participant raised doubts 
about the interaction being real.
The number of participants who raised suspicions about the authenticity of the players in 
Cyberball did not differ between the two peer status history groups (7 stably accepted vs. 6 
chronically rejected adolescents), χ²(1) = .4, p = .51.
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CHAPTER 3
ACTING ON SOCIAL EXCLUSION: NEURAL 
CORRELATES OF PUNISHMENT AND 
FORGIVENESS OF EXCLUDERS
This chapter is published as: 
Will, G.-J., Crone, E. A., & Güroğlu, B. (2015). Acting on social exclusion: Neural correlates of 
punishment and forgiveness of excluders. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 10, 209-218.
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ABSTRACT
This functional magnetic resonance imaging study examined the neural correlates of pun-
ishment and forgiveness of initiators of social exclusion (i.e. ‘excluders’). Participants divided 
money in a modified Dictator Game between themselves and people who previously either 
included or excluded them during a virtual ball-tossing game (Cyberball). Participants selec-
tively punished the excluders by decreasing their outcomes; even when this required partici-
pants to give up monetary rewards. Punishment of excluders was associated with increased ac-
tivation in the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and bilateral anterior insula. Costly 
punishment was accompanied by higher activity in the pre-SMA compared with punishment 
that resulted in gains or was non-costly. Refraining from punishment (i.e. forgiveness) was 
associated with self-reported perspective-taking and increased activation in the bilateral 
temporoparietal junction, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and 
ventrolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These findings show that social exclusion can 
result in punishment as well as forgiveness of excluders and that separable neural networks 
implicated in social cognition and cognitive control are recruited when people choose either 
to punish or to forgive those who excluded them.
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Social exclusion is a highly distressing experience and poses a severe threat to fundamental 
human needs, such as our need to belong and a need for control (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; 
Williams, 2007). In response to social exclusion, people often attempt to restore their thwarted 
needs in subsequent social interactions. For example, after people are excluded they show 
increased levels of prosocial behavior toward potential new sources of affiliation, which possibly 
reflects a motivation to seek renewed acceptance and restore a sense of belonging (Maner, 
DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007). Furthermore, victims of exclusion selectively decrease 
prosocial behavior toward the specific individuals who excluded them (Hillebrandt, Sebastian, 
& Blakemore, 2011) and are even willing to aggress against them (Twenge, Baumeister, 
DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007), which has been suggested to be an attempt to regain a 
sense of control (Williams, 2007). However, not everyone chooses to aggress against those who 
excluded them (Chester et al., 2013) and some might even decide to forgive the initiators of 
exclusion (i.e. the excluders). This study set out to investigate punishment as well as forgiveness 
of excluders and the neural correlates of these behavioral reactions to social exclusion.
A series of neuroimaging studies have identified a network of brain regions involved in 
emotional reactions to social exclusion using a virtual ball-tossing game called Cyberball 
(Bolling et al., 2011b; Eisenberger et al., 2003; Sebastian et al., 2011). After being excluded in 
Cyberball, people report heightened levels of sadness and anger and lowered levels of a sense of 
belonging, self-esteem, control and meaningful existence (van Beest & Williams, 2006; Zadro, 
Williams, & Richardson, 2004). Such exclusion-related distress has been positively associated 
with activation in brain regions involved in processing negative affect, such as the anterior 
insula (AI) and dorsal, ventral and subgenual regions of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
(Bolling et al., 2011b; Eisenberger et al., 2003; Masten et al., 2009). Activity in the ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), a region implicated in emotion regulation, has been found to be 
negatively related to distress after exclusion (Bolling et al., 2011b; Eisenberger et al., 2003).
Although these studies have informed us on the neural correlates of processing and 
regulating exclusion-related distress, the neural correlates of social behavior after an episode 
of exclusion have received less attention. A recent study showed that although participants 
showed low levels of trust toward peers who previously excluded them, reinforcement signals in 
the striatum still guided learning from the trustworthiness of excluders and enabled sustaining 
trust (Fareri, Chang, & Delgado, 2012). In a Dictator Game - where profits are not dependent 
on the second player’s decisions - people kept more money to themselves and shared less with 
excluders, which was associated with increased activation in dorsal ACC (dACC), AI, the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and lateral regions of the PFC (Gunther Moor et al., 2012). 
How activation in these regions relates to punishment of excluders or refraining thereof (i.e. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION
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forgiveness) is not yet clear, because these prior studies’ experimental designs did not provide a 
dissociation between a self-oriented motive aimed at maximizing one’s own profits and other-
oriented motives aimed at increasing (Fareri et al., 2012) or decreasing (Gunther Moor et al., 
2012) another person’s profits.
The goals of this study were threefold: (i) to examine whether people punish excluders when 
it does not result in monetary gains or when they have to pay to punish, (ii) to investigate how 
activation in brain regions involved in punishment of norm-violators is differentially sensitive 
to gains and losses for the punisher, and (iii) to examine the neural correlates of forgiving 
excluders (i.e. refraining from punishment by equally sharing with excluders when sharing was 
not confounded by strategic motivations aimed at maximizing personal profits) (Brüne, Juckel, 
& Enzi, 2013; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). We modified the Dictator Game 
in such a way that participants could choose to either forgive excluders by sharing a sum of 
money equally with them, or to punish them and punishment could coincide with: (i) gains 
(beneficial inequality), (ii) no monetary consequences (non-costly inequality), or (iii) losses 
(costly inequality).1 We regarded unequal distributions as punishment and equal distributions as 
forgiveness only in interactions with peers who violated a social norm during Cyberball, i.e. the 
excluders. Therefore, to get a clean measure of punishment, we examined unequal distributions 
allocated to excluders relative to unequal distributions allocated to includers.
We hypothesized that participants would punish excluders by reducing the excluders’ 
monetary rewards (i.e. choosing more unequal distributions for excluders than for includers). 
We predicted punishment to be inflicted most often when it led to monetary gains (i.e. beneficial 
inequality) and least often when it was costly, with non-costly inequality at an intermediate 
position. Based on previous neuroimaging studies we expected brain regions implicated 
in reward processing (striatum), negative affect (AI) and the detection of norm-violations 
(pre-supplementary motor area [pre-SMA]/ACC) to be involved in delivering punishment 
(Baumgartner, Gotte, Gugler, & Fehr, 2012; De Quervain, 2004; Sanfey et al., 2003; Strobel 
et al., 2011).
Participants could forgive the excluders, defined as refraining from retaliation and acting 
prosocial toward the offenders despite the offenders’ hurtful actions (McCullough et al., 
1997), by sharing a sum of money equally with them (Brüne et al., 2013). Prior studies have 
demonstrated that adopting a transgressor’s perspective facilitates forgiveness (Brown, 2003; 
1 We included a prosocial inequality condition (where inequality offers would result in sharing more than half of 
the stake) in order to avoid automaticity in responding, such that inequality for excluders always indicated pun-
ishment. Thus, it served as a filler condition to prevent predictability of the task, and keep participants engaged. We 
excluded the prosocial inequality condition from the analyses investigating punishment and forgiveness because 
the prosocial inequality condition did not offer participants the opportunity to punish (because excluders’ outcomes 
could not be reduced) nor to forgive (since there is no possibility to refrain from punishment).
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Exline, Baumeister, Zell, Kraft, & Witvliet, 2008). Consequently, we tested whether higher 
levels of self-reported perspective-taking would be related to lower levels of punishment 
behavior toward excluders. We hypothesized that forgiveness would coincide with increased 
activation in brain regions implicated in ‘theory of mind’ and perspective taking, such as 
the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the TPJ (Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007; 
Young & Saxe, 2009). Furthermore, cognitive control has been shown to play an important 
role in refraining from aggression against excluders (Chester et al., 2013) and control-related 
brain regions, such as regions of the lateral PFC are activated when people share equally with 
peers who previously treated them unfairly (Brüne et al., 2013). Accordingly, we predicted 
that forgiving excluders would also be associated with activity in regions of the lateral PFC, 
consistent with their involvement in cognitive control in social decision-making (Knoch, 
Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006; Steinbeis et al., 2012).
3.2 METHODS
Participants
Twenty-eight right-handed healthy volunteers were recruited through local advertisements 
and gave informed consent for the study. Two participants were excluded from the analyses 
because they expressed doubts about the cover story. The remaining 26 participants had a mean 
age of 20.7 years (SD = 1.97, 16 females). All participants indicated to be healthy and reported 
no contraindications for fMRI (e.g. no head injuries, no history of neurological or psychiatric 
disorders). All anatomical scans were reviewed and cleared by a radiologist; no anomalies were 
reported. After scanning, participants filled out several questionnaires and were debriefed. 
Participants received €25 for participation and an additional amount of money, which was told 
to be determined by their decisions in the Dictator Game. In reality, each participant received 
an extra €5. The study was approved by the university’s medical ethical committee.
fMRI tasks
Cyberball
Participants were instructed that they were about to perform a mental visualization task by 
means of an online ball-tossing game with two other participants in the experiment (Williams 
et al., 2000). Participants were told that they were about to interact with other participants who 
were present at the experiment site and with whom they would not meet face-to-face after the 
experiment. In reality, all ball tosses by the other players were preprogrammed. The participants 
were represented by a cartoon hand along with their own name and the other players were 
displayed as two cartoon characters accompanied by one male and one female name (Figure 
3.1A). Participants could throw the ball to a player on their right or their left side by a button 
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Figure 3.1 (A) Experimental procedure. Participants carried out the following tasks in the scanner: (i) Cyber-
ball inclusion with two anonymous peers, (ii) Cyberball exclusion by two novel anonymous peers, (iii) Dictator 
Game in which participants divided money between themselves (depicted with red coins) and the players from 
the Cyberball games (i.e. includers and excluders; depicted with blue coins). (B) Five different forms of inequality; 
each trial consisted of a dichotomous choice between an equal distribution and one of these five forms of inequality.
Dictator Game 






















press with the index finger of the corresponding hand. Participants first played the inclusion 
condition where each of the three players received the ball an equal number of times (10 out 
of 30 trials). Next, participants played the exclusion condition with two novel players, during 
which they received the ball once at the start of the game. After throwing it to one of the players 
they did not receive the ball on any of thefollowing 28 trials. Scans were acquired during two 
separate runs that lasted approximately 3 min each. Throwing was self-paced. Ball throws lasted 
2 s and were preceded by a random jitter interval (100–4000 ms).
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Dictator Game
After Cyberball, participants were given the opportunity to divide coins between themselves 
and one player from either the first or the second ball game, that is, Team 1 and Team 2, 
respectively. It was emphasized that coins were valuable and that a randomly selected allocation 
would be converted into real money, which both allocators (the participants) and recipients 
would receive at the end of the experiment. Furthermore, the Dictator Game was introduced 
as the final game of the experiment. Therefore, it was unlikely that the participants anticipated 
further interactions with the includers and excluder.
Participants were given a dichotomous choice between an equal distribution of five coins 
for themselves and five for the recipient (5/5) and one of five different unequal distributions 
(Figure 3.1B). These five unequal distributions were as follows and should all be interpreted 
relative to the alternative equal (5/5) distribution: beneficial inequality (eight coins for the 
participant and two coins for the recipient: 8/2), mild non-costly inequality (5/4), severe non-
costly inequality (5/2), costly inequality (4/2) and (costly) prosocial inequality (4/6). Although 
in the non-costly inequality conditions choosing the inequality option instead of the equal 
distribution had no consequences for the participant’s own earnings, beneficial inequality was 
advantageous and costly inequality was disadvantageous to the participant. 
We did not include a condition with neutral recipients with whom the participants had not 
interacted before, because this would increase the length of the task with 150% and this could 
lead to greater trial-to-trial variability, e.g. bigger differences in emotional valence between the 
first and final trials of the task possibly due to negative emotions toward excluders diminishing 
over time. Moreover, previous work has repeatedly shown that: (i) although exclusion elicits 
negative affect, inclusion does not elicit positive affect (Maner et al., 2007; Wesselmann et 
al., 2012; Will, van den Bos, Crone, & Güroğlu, 2013) and (ii) treatment of includers does 
not differ from treatment of neutral interaction partners or people with whom participants 
had not interacted before (Fareri et al., 2012; Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Güroğlu, Will, & 
Klapwijk, 2013; Hillebrandt et al., 2011). The Dictator Game consisted of 180 trials (18 trials 
per condition; 5 inequality conditions × 2 recipients) and was administered in three runs of 
210 volumes each, lasting about 23 min in total. After a fixation screen with a jittered duration 
(M = 1540 ms; SD = 1221 ms; min = 550 ms; max = 7700 ms optimized with Opt-Seq2, Dale, 
1999;  surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/) participants were presented with a decision screen 
that showed (i) which distributions they could choose from and (ii) who the recipient would be 
(Figure 3.1A). Responses could be made by a button press with the index finger (left bucket) 
or middle finger (right bucket) of the right hand. As soon as participants made a decision 
a red rectangle appeared around the distribution of their choice until 6 s after trial onset. If 
participants had not responded within 5 s, a screen was presented with “Too late!” for 1 s. Trials 
without a response consisted of <1% of all trials and were excluded from further analyses.
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Questionnaires
Mood reports and need satisfaction
To measure exclusion-related distress, we assessed mood and need satisfaction at three time 
points: (i) after inclusion, (ii) after exclusion and (iii) after the Dictator Game (outside the 
scanner). The mood questionnaire consisted of eight mood items (feeling good, bad, happy, sad, 
relaxed, tense, friendly and unfriendly). The need satisfaction questionnaire consisted of eight 
items (two items assessing each need) taken from the need threat scale including ratings of 
belonging, self-esteem, control and meaningful existence (van Beest and Williams, 2006). All 
items were rated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) and negative items were recoded. 
Lower scores on these measures reflect distress, i.e. need threat and lower mood.
Trait perspective-taking
 Participants completed the perspective-taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) to assess dispositional perspective-taking, i.e. the tendency to adopt 
another person’s point of view (e.g. “When I get mad at someone, I try to imagine what they 
might be thinking”). All items were rated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) and 
averaged to a mean score of trait perspective-taking.
fMRI data acquisition
Scans were acquired using a 3T Philips Achieva MRI system at the University Medical 
Center. Stimuli were projected onto a screen located at the head of the scanner bore using 
Authorware (Cyberball) and E-prime (Dictator Game). Participants viewed the screen via a 
mirror mounted on the head coil. Foam inserts that surrounded the head were used to minimize 
head movement. The following scans were acquired: (i) a localizer scan, (ii) T2*-weighted Echo-
Planar Images (EPI; repetition time = 2.2 sec, echo time [TE] = 30ms, slice matrix = 80 × 80 
matrix, slice thickness = 2.75 mm, slice gap = 0.28 mm gap, field of view [FOV] = 220 mm) 
during five functional runs, (iii) high-resolution T1-weighted and T2-weighted anatomical 
scans (with the same slice prescription as the EPIs). The first two volumes of each functional 
run were discarded to allow for equilibration of T1 saturation effects. 
fMRI data analysis
MRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM5 statistical parametric mapping 
image analysis software (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College 
London). Images were slice-time corrected, realigned, corrected for motion, spatially 
smoothed using an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian filter, and spatially normalized to EPI templates. 
Translational movement parameters never exceeded 1 voxel (< 3 mm) in any direction for any 
subject or scan. The normalization algorithm, resampled the volumes to 3 mm cubic voxels 
using a 12-parameter affine transformation and a nonlinear transformation involving cosine 
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basic functions. All results are reported in MNI305 stereotactic space.
Data were modeled as zero-duration events at the onset of a ball-toss (Cyberball) or the 
decision screen (Dictator Game) (Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Lelieveld et al., 2013) and 
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). Statistical analysis was 
carried out using a general linear model (GLM). Regressors were defined for three Cyberball 
events (a ball-toss between virtual peers, throwing, or receiving the ball) and were analyzed 
separately for the inclusion game and the exclusion game. Regressors were defined separately 
for equality and inequality choices made in each of the five inequality conditions in the Dictator 
Game and analyzed separately for the includers and the excluders. This model consisted of 20 
decision-related regressors (i.e. inequality condition [5] × recipient [2] × choice [2]), a regressor 
indicating missed trials, and a covariate for each run to control for run effects (3), which resulted 
in a GLM with a total of 24 predictors. To investigate the main effect of interacting with the 
excluders compared with includers in the Dictator Game (Excluders > Includers), we contrasted 
all decisions for excluders with all decisions for includers in conditions where participants could 
punish or forgive (i.e. all conditions except prosocial inequality). To test how activation in 
regions derived from the ‘Excluders > Includers’ contrast was differentially sensitive to personal 
gains when punishing excluders, we employed a region of interest (ROI) approach (see below). 
To investigate the neural correlates of punishment, we contrasted inequality decisions for 
excluders with equality decisions for excluders (Excluders inequality > Excluders equality). 
Finally, to examine forgiveness we contrasted equality decisions for excluders with equality 
decisions for includers (Excluders equality > Includers equality). For the latter two contrasts, 
we only considered the four Dictator Game conditions involving punishment and forgiveness 
(i.e. all conditions except prosocial inequality). Both GLMs contained a basic set of cosine 
functions that high-pass-filtered the data. The least-squares parameter estimates of the height 
of the best-fitting canonical HRF for each condition separately were used in pair-wise contrasts 
at the subject level. The resulting contrast images were submitted to group analyses where 
participants were treated as a random effect. One-tailed t-tests were considered significant at 
an uncorrected threshold of p < .001 with a minimum cluster size of 10 contiguous voxels to 
balance between Type 1 and Type 2 errors (Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009). We also report 
which results remain significant using a whole-brain voxel-wise false discovery rate (FDR) 
correction (p < .05, >10 voxels).
For ROI analyses, we used the MarsBaR toolbox (Brett et al., 2002; http://marsbar.
sourceforce.net/) to extract activity in functionally defined ROIs in the ‘Excluders > Includers’ 
contrast (in the Dictator Game) about which we had a priori hypotheses, i.e. pre-SMA/ACC, 
left and right AI. For each ROI, the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal across 
functional clusters of voxels was averaged and the center of mass is reported. For all ROI 
analyses, effects were considered significant at p < .017, based on a Bonferonni correction for 
multiple comparisons (p = .05/3 ROIs).
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3.3 RESULTS
Behavioral data
Need satisfaction and mood. Consistent with previous studies (van Beest & Williams, 
2006; Williams et al., 2000) the four need scales were averaged to create an overall index of 
need satisfaction at each time-point, i.e. after inclusion, after exclusion and after the Dictator 
Game. Similarly, the four mood constructs were averaged to create an overall index of mood 
at each time-point2. A repeated measures ANOVA with time point (3 levels: inclusion vs. 
exclusion vs. after the Dictator Game) as within-subjects factor for the composite score of need 
satisfaction yielded a main effect of time point, F(2, 48) = 219.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .90. Overall 
need satisfaction measured after inclusion (M = 3.7) declined during exclusion (M = 1.7) and 
returned to pre-exclusion levels after the Dictator Game (M = 4.1). A repeated measures 
ANOVA with time point (3 levels: inclusion vs. exclusion vs. after the Dictator Game) as 
within-subjects factor for overall mood yielded a main effect of time point, F(2, 48) = 50.73, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .68. Overall mood measured after inclusion (M = 4.4) dropped during exclusion (M 
= 3.5) and returned to pre-exclusion levels after the Dictator Game (M = 4.5).
Punishment of the excluders in the Dictator Game 
To investigate whether excluders were punished, a repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed with inequality condition (5 levels: beneficial inequality, non-costly mild inequality, 
non-costly severe inequality, costly inequality and prosocial inequality) and recipient (2 levels: 
includers vs. excluders) as within-subjects factors and the percentage of unequal offers as the 
dependent variable. These analyses resulted in main effects of recipient, F(1, 25) = 27.149, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .52 and inequality condition, F(4, 100) = 31.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .56, and a significant 
recipient × inequality condition interaction, F(4,100) = 13.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. Unequal 
distributions were chosen more often for excluders than for includers in each condition, (all ps 
< .01), except for the prosocial inequality condition (p = .09) (see Figure 3.2A). Post hoc pair-
wise comparisons showed that, in exchange with the excluders, beneficial inequality was chosen 
more than the two non-costly inequality options (p < .05), which were chosen at similar rates (p 
=.09) and more than costly inequality, (all ps <.01). A similar analysis for the includers showed 
that the beneficial inequality was chosen more often than the other forms of inequality, p < .01. 
Perspective taking and forgiveness 
A negative correlation between self-reported perspective-taking and punishment frequency 
2 Univariate analyses on the separate needs and mood constructs demonstrated that each need and each mood con-
struct yielded the same results as the overall indexes. 
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(percentage of inequality offers to the excluders – percentage inequality offers to the includers 
in all conditions except prosocial inequality), r = -.40, p < .05, confirmed that perspective taking 
is important for forgiving excluders (see Figure 3.2B). Perspective-taking skills were unrelated 
to exclusion-related distress (mood after exclusion, r = .30, p = .14, and need satisfaction after 
exclusion, r =.21, p = .29). 
Neuroimaging results
fMRI results Cyberball
To examine the neural correlates of social exclusion, we compared activation on trials where 
participants did not receive the ball in the exclusion game with trials where participants received 
the ball in the inclusion game (Exclusion: not receiving the ball  > Inclusion: receiving the ball). 
This whole-brain contrast resulted in activation in several regions, including the medial PFC 
(mPFC; peak at 3, 45, -15) and subgenual ACC (sgACC; peak at -9, 24, -6) (see Figure 3.3A). 
A regression analysis with need satisfaction as a predictor revealed a positive correlation in the 
ventral ACC (peak at 6, 42, 3) and the right vlPFC/insula (peak at 45, 21, -3) (see Figure 3.3B). 
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Figure 3.2 (A) Mean percentages of trials on which participants chose an unequal distribution in the Dictator 
Game for players who previously included and excluded them during Cyberball (error bars represent standard 
errors of the mean). Each form of inequality is displayed on the x-axis (red coins for participants; blue coins for the 
recipients). Unequal distributions were pitted against an equal distribution of money (5 coins for the participant 
/ 5 coins for the recipient). BI = beneficial inequality; NCI = non-costly inequality; CI = costly inequality; PI = 
prosocial inequality; (B) Self-reported trait perspective-taking was negatively associated with punishment of the 
excluders (difference between unequal distributions chosen for excluders and includers).
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Exclusion: not receiving the ball  > Inclusion: receiving the ball  
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Figure 3.3 Whole-brain results from the Cyberball interaction. (A) Not receiving the ball during the exclusion 
game > receiving the ball during inclusion gam resulted in activation in the mPFC (peak at 3, 45, -15) and 
sgACC (peak at -9, 24, -6) (B) A whole-brain regression analysis showed that activity in the ‘Exclusion: not 
receiving the ball  > Inclusion: receiving the ball ’ contrast was positively associated with need satisfaction after 
exclusion in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC; peak at 45, 21, -3). 
fMRI results Dictator Game
Decision-making with excluders.
To investigate brain regions that were more active when making a decision in the Dictator 
Game for excluders compared to includers, we conducted a whole-brain analysis collapsed 
across the four Dictator Game conditions involving punishment (i.e., all conditions except 
prosocial inequality) and collapsed across choices. The ‘Excluders > Includers’ contrast resulted 
in increased activation in the pre-SMA (peak at 3, 21, 60) and bilateral AI (peaks at 30, 21, -9 
and -30, 21, -15) (see Figure 3.4). All areas of activation are listed in Table 3.1.
Punishing excluders.
To examine the neural correlates of punishment, we conducted a whole-brain analysis and
ROI analyses. A whole-brain contrast between inequality choices for excluders and equality
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Table 3.1 Brain regions revealed by whole-brain contrasts when participants made an allocation in the Dictator 
Game with excluders vs. includers as recipients (all thresholded p < .001 uncorrected, > 10 voxels). 
Note. L/R=Left/Right; k=cluster size in 3×3×3mm voxels; z=z-score; MNI coordinates =xyz voxel coor-
dinates in MNI space of the peak voxel. PFC = Prefrontal cortex.
choices for includers (Excluders inequality > Excluders equality) collapsed across the four Dic-
tator Game conditions involving punishment (i.e. all conditions except prosocial inequality) did 
not result in significant clusters of activation. To investigate how activation in the pre-SMA/
ACC, left and right AI were differentially sensitive to self-gain while punishing the excluders, 
we performed functional ROI analyses based on these regions obtained from the ‘Excluders > 
Includers’ contrast reported earlier.
First, using activation levels in each ROI during inequality choices for the excluders as the 
dependent variable, we conducted three separate repeated measures ANCOVAs for each brain 
region with inequality condition (4 levels: beneficial inequality, non-costly mild inequality, 
non-costly severe inequality, and costly inequality) as a within-subjects factor and punishment 
frequency as a covariate. We controlled for punishment frequency because of the involvement 
Brain region L/R Voxels z MNI coordinates
x y z
Excluders > Includers
Middle Cingulate cortex R 31 4.13 3 -6 30
Precentral gyrus L 13 3.84 -42 0 21
Pre-Supplementary Motor Area R 20 3.83 3 21 60
Inferior Parietal lobe L 59 3.81 -48 -45 57
3.80 -54 -45 42
3.70 -57 -36 48
Anterior Insula (extending into R 14 3.64 36 24 -18
Inferior Frontal gyrus) 3.41 30 21 -9
Inferior Frontal gyrus (Lateral PFC) R 17 3.61 42 42 -18
Anterior Insula (extending into L 15 3.55 -30 21 -15
Inferior Frontal gyrus) 3.25 -36 21 -9
Includers > Excluders
Superior Occipital gyrus L 62 4.04 -12 -99 12
3.40 -15 -96 0
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Figure 3.4 Activation of pre-SMA (peak at 3, 21, 60) when choosing unequal offers for excluders in the four 
different punishment conditions (error bars represent standard error of the mean). BI = beneficial inequality; NCI 
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of the pre-SMA/ACC and AI in deviations from default response patterns (Güroğlu, van den 
Bos, Rombouts, & Crone, 2010; van den Bos, van Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 
2009) and to control for the amount of trials contrast values were based on. These analyses 
yielded a main effect of Inequality condition in the pre-SMA, F(3, 33) = 5.17, p < .01, ηp2 = .32, 
qualified by more activity for costly inequality choices compared to the three other inequality 
choices for excluders (Figure 3.4). Activity in left (p = .27) and right AI (p = .12) did not differ 
between inequality choices after controlling for punishment frequency.
Second, we correlated activation in the ROIs with the frequency of inequality choices made 
in each condition. These analyses yielded a negative correlation between BOLD response and 
costly punishment frequency in the pre-SMA (r = -.64, p < .017) and right AI (r = -.63, p 
< .017). Thus, the participants who less often opted for costly punishment exhibited higher 
BOLD responses in these regions when they chose costly punishment.
Forgiving excluders.
 To investigate which brain regions were involved in forgiveness of excluders we contrasted 
equality choices for excluders with equality choices for includers in the four Dictator Game 
conditions involving punishment and forgiveness (i.e., all conditions except prosocial inequality). 
This comparison (Excluders equality > Includers equality) revealed activity in the right TPJ 
(peak at 57, -57, 45), dmPFC (peak at 3, 42, 36), right vlPFC (peak at 42, 42, -15) and the 
right AI (peak at 30, 21,  -9). A subsequent whole-brain regression analysis with punishment 
frequency as a predictor revealed a positive correlation in the left and right TPJ (peaks at -51, 
-48, 36 and 45, -54, 36), dmPFC (peak at -15, 60, 24), as well as in the Pre-SMA/ACC (peaks 
at -6, 18, 51 and 9, 36, 36), bilateral AI (peaks at -30, 21, -6 and 33, 18, -12) and dorsolateral 
and ventrolateral PFC (peaks at -30, 51, 0 and 33, 54, 9) (Figure 3.5). Thus, participants who 
punished more often recruited the left and right TPJ, dmPFC, lateral PFC and Pre-SMA/
ACC and bilateral AI to a greater extent when they forgave the excluders. All significant 
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clusters are reported in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Brain regions revealed by whole-brain contrasts when participants shared the stake equally in the Dic-
tator Game with excluders vs. includers (all thresholded p < .001 uncorrected, > 10 voxels).
Brain region L/R Voxels z MNI coordinates
x y z
Excluders equality > Includers equality 
Superior Frontal Gyrus (dmPFC) R 272 4.16 12 30 57
extending into:  
Pre-Supplementary Motor Area/
3.93 12 21 66
Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex 3.90 21 36 54
Inferior Frontal gyrus (Lateral PFC) R 21 3.81 42 42 -15
Temporoparietal junction R 87 3.79 57 -57 45
3.61 48 -63 48
3.60 57 -51 51
Middle Frontal gyrus R 60 3.76 42 24 51
3.29 48 24 30
3.27 45 12 48
Anterior Insula extending into: R 20 3.64 30 21 -9
Inferior Frontal gyrus 3.45 36 21 -15
3.42 30 18 -24
Superior Frontal Gyrus (dmPFC) R 15 3.57 15 66 21
Angular Gyrus L 28 3.44 -57 -60 39
3.42 -45 -69 48
 3.32 -42 -63 42
Middle Frontal gyrus L 15 3.40 -36 18 54
3.26 -30 18 54
Positive correlation with punishment frequency (percentage inequality for excluders – percentage inequality 
for includers) 
Temporoparietal junction L 550 5.23 -51 -48 36*
4.69 -51 -39 42*
4.40 -54 -27 39*
R 320 5.15 45 -54 36*
4.27 24 -60 42*
4.05 57 -54 42
Superior Frontal Gyrus (extending 
into:
L 557 5.20 -33 18 54*
Pre-Supplementary Motor Area / 4.68 -6 18 51
Dorsal Anterior Cingulate cortex) 4.57 9 36 36*
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Anterior Insula L 17 4.56 -30 21 -6*
Lateral PFC (dlPFC/vlPFC) L 90 4.47 -30 51 0*
3.71 -33 54 -9*
3.59 -42 48 3*
Middle Frontal gyrus L 110 4.39 -42 30 24*
4.04 -36 9 36*
3.90 -39 18 27*
Thalamus/Pallidum L 41 4.01 -9 -9 3*
3.97 -12 0 -3
3.77 -3 -18 -6*
Middle Frontal gyrus R 100 3.98 42 24 30*
3.92 45 30 24*
3.89 51 24 30*
Inferior Frontal gyrus R 15 3.94 45 24 9*
3.23 51 21 3*
Precentral gyrus L 17 3.76 -30 -6 48*
3.47 -21 -9 48*
Superior Frontal gyrus (dmPFC) R 15 3.73 15 60 24
Anterior Insula R 15 3.72 33 18 -12*
Middle Occipital gyrus R 11 3.62 39 -72 24*
Lateral PFC (dlFPC) R 12 3.50 33 54 9*
Posterior Cingulate cortex R 13 3.42 9 -27 30*
3.30 9 -30 24*
3.30 3 -33 27*
Includers equality > Excluders equality 
No significant activations
Note. L/R=Left/Right; k=cluster size in 3×3×3mm voxels; z=z-score; MNI coordinates =xyz voxel coor-
dinates in MNI space of the peak voxel. * = also significant using FDR correction, p < .05, > 10 voxels). 
dmPFC = Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; dlPFC = Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; vlPFC = Ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex 
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3.4 DISCUSSION
The current fMRI study set out to investigate how experiencing social exclusion relates to 
subsequent punishment and forgiveness of excluders and the neural correlates of such decisions. 
We replicated previous findings showing that social exclusion in Cyberball is distressing (van 
Beest & Williams, 2006; Zadro et al., 2004) and associated with activation in brain regions 
involved in processing negative affect (sgACC and vACC), emotion regulation (vlPFC) and 
social evaluation (mPFC) (Eisenberger et al., 2003; Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Sebastian 
et al., 2011). We extend previous work by showing that participants punished excluders, not 
only when punishment coincided with monetary gains (Gunther Moor et al., 2012) but also 
when punishment had no monetary consequences and even when it was costly to punish. 
This corroborates research showing that people selectively decrease prosocial behavior toward 
excluders (Maner et al., 2007), possibly to reestablish a sense of control over their social world 
(Williams, 2007). Through our modification of the Dictator Game, we could distinguish a 
motivation to reduce the excluders’ outcomes from a selfish motivation to maximize one’s own 
outcomes. Although excluders were punished in each condition, punishment was inflicted the 
most when it resulted in monetary gains and participants punished less when they had to 
give up money to do so. Taken together, our behavioral findings provide strong evidence for 
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Figure 3.5 A regression analysis for 
the ‘Excluders equality > Includers 
equality’ contrast with punishment 
frequency as a regressor resulted in 
activation in: left and right TPJ 
(peaks at -51, -48, 36 and 45, -54, 
36), dorso- and ventrolateral re-
gions of the PFC (peaks at -30, 51, 
0 and 33, 54, 9), pre-SMA/ACC 
(peaks at -6, 18, 51 and 9, 36, 36) 
and bilateral AI (peaks at -30, 21, 
-6 and 33, 18, -12). 
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maximization plays an important role in these decisions. 
Consistent with prior work demonstrating that punishment of unfairness coincides with 
activity in the pre-SMA/ACC and bilateral AI (Güroğlu et al., 2010; Sanfey et al., 2003), we 
show that this network is also important for punishing a non-economic norm-violation. In the 
pre-SMA, we found a dissociation between costly punishment and punishment that resulted 
in gains or was non-costly. Higher activation in the pre-SMA during costly punishment 
might suggest increased motor conflict when deciding to punish the excluders compared with 
forms of punishment that incur no costs or yield gains (Garavan, Ross, Kaufman, & Stein, 
2003). Inequality choices were more infrequent than equality choices in the costly inequality 
condition, which might be related to a possible motor conflict due to a prepotent response of 
choosing equality (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). Nonetheless, after 
controlling for differences in punishment frequency, the pre-SMA was still more active for 
costly inequality than the other inequality choices. Future, studies could scrutinize whether 
choosing costly punishment is indeed associated with increased conflict and what the nature 
of this possible conflict might be. AI activity did not differ across inequality conditions. Based 
on the notion that the four forms of inequality reduced the recipients’ outcomes, but differed in 
consequences for self-gain, our results suggest that the AI might not be sensitive to consequences 
for self-gain when punishing norm-violators (Sanfey et al., 2003) or dividing resources 
unequally (Corradi-Dell’Acqua, Civai, Rumiati, & Fink, 2013). The pre-SMA/ACC and the 
AI are part of a network that is important for encoding representations of the physiological 
state of the body and the integration of cognitive and emotional processes (Chang, Yarkoni, 
Khaw, & Sanfey, 2013; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). Activation in this cingulo-insular 
network has been associated with negative affective states, such as anger (Denson, Pedersen, 
Ronquillo, & Nandy, 2009) and disgust ( Jabbi, Bastiaansen, & Keysers, 2008). The ‘Excluders 
inequality > Excluders equality’ contrast did not result in clusters of activation, perhaps because 
the brain regions associated with punishing the excluders (pre-SMA and AI) were similarly 
activated during forgiveness. Possibly, increased activation in the pre-SMA/ACC and insula 
reflects higher levels of negative affect associated with a renewed interaction with the excluders 
in general, or more specifically with violating a norm of equality in order to punish (Zaki 
& Mitchell, 2011), which may also be experienced when sharing equally with them. The 
pre-SMA/ACC–insula network’s involvement in deviations from a default response pattern 
(Güroğlu et al., 2010; van den Bos et al., 2009) was also supported by two findings in this 
study: (i) participants who punished more often recruited the pre-SMA/ACC and insula when 
they forgave the excluders and (ii) people who less often opted for costly punishment exhibited 
greater activation in the pre-SMA and right insula when they chose costly punishment. No 
activation in reward-related brain regions (e.g. striatum or orbitofrontal cortex) was found when 
participants punished the excluders, which may be due to methodological differences between 
our Dictator Game and other punishment paradigms used in previous studies, e.g. classic costly 
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punishment paradigms (Baumgartner et al., 2012; Strobel et al., 2011) or administration of 
electric shocks to norm-violators (Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010; Singer et 
al., 2006). People high and low in trait perspective-taking were similarly hurt by exclusion, but 
people who reported higher levels of perspective-taking skills more often decided to forgive 
the excluders despite their hurt feelings. Forgiveness, which has been defined as an attempt to 
preserve the relationship with a norm-violator despite prior inflictions of harm (McCullough, 
Kurzban, & Tabak, 2013), has been associated with motivational changes, including (i) 
becoming less motivated to retaliate against a wrongdoer and (ii) becoming more concerned 
with the wrongdoer’s well-being (McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003; McCullough et al., 
1998; McCullough et al., 1997). It is plausible that both of these motivations apply to our 
behavioral index of forgiveness. Moreover, sharing equally with excluders is likely to result 
from a non-strategic prosocial motivation, because decisions in the Dictator Game were not 
confounded by strategic considerations to ultimately maximize personal gains and the amount 
of money participants gave to the excluders could not be influenced by the excluders (e.g. 
through rejection or punishment). This, in combination with the positive relationship with 
perspective-taking, suggests that sharing equally with the excluders is a prosocial tendency, 
which is likely to reflect an attempt to affiliate with the excluders (McCullough et al., 1997; 
Molden & Maner, 2013).
It has been argued that the ‘perceived likelihood of affiliation’ is a critical precondition 
for initiating efforts at social reconnection based on findings showing that people gave less 
money to a new interaction partner after being rejected when they expected not to actually 
meet their new partner face-to-face (Maner et al., 2007; Molden & Maner, 2013). In this study, 
participants were told that the recipients in the Dictator Game were unfamiliar, anonymous 
others and that there would be no face-to-face interaction after the experiment. An important 
consideration for future research is how expectations about future interactions with the 
excluders might influence forgiveness behavior and its neural correlates.
When participants forgave the excluders, they recruited regions of the ‘mentalizing’ 
network, such as the left and right TPJ and the dmPFC and regions involved in cognitive 
conflict and control, such as the dACC and the lateral PFC. Although activation in the 
mentalizing network has previously been linked to forgiveness of moral transgressions in 
hypothetical scenarios (Young & Saxe, 2009), here we show for the first time that bilateral TPJ 
and dmPFC are activated during actual forgiveness behavior involving real costs and benefits 
for self and offenders. A positive relationship between punishment frequency and activation in 
these regions suggests that people who punished more often might engage in increased mental 
state reasoning Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013) or perspective taking (Lamm et al., 2007) when 
forgiving. Forgiving was furthermore associated with activation in brain regions implicated 
in cognitive conflict and control (dACC and lateral PFC). These regions are activated when 
people counter their own response tendencies, for instance when they overcome a selfish impulse 
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(Knoch et al., 2006) or when they share equally with unfair people (Brüne et al., 2013). A role 
for cognitive control in forgiveness of excluders is in line with recent findings showing that 
people who performed relatively worse on an external measure of cognitive control were more 
likely to aggress against excluders than high performers (Chester et al., 2013). Taken together, 
activation in the mentalizing network and control-related brain regions during equal sharing 
with excluders suggests that higher demands on mental state reasoning have to be met and 
that possibly a prepotent response to retaliate has to be controlled in order to forgive excluders.
Several limitations to this study should be noted. First, the amount of trials varied across 
conditions due to the participants’ relatively stable decision-making patterns. Second, although 
a recent study used a similar operationalization of forgiveness (Brüne et al., 2013), we did not 
collect self-report measures of trait forgiveness to validate our index of forgiveness. Further 
research is thus required to validate our measure of forgiveness by linking it to cognitive and 
motivational aspects associated with forgiveness and to determine in what way our measure 
reflects an attempt at reaffiliation after being excluded.
Despite these limitations, the current results advance our understanding of the neural 
correlates of social interactions with excluders. Such insights are of crucial importance to 
understand how social exclusion exerts its detrimental effect on people’s lives. That is, chronic 
peer rejection has been associated with detrimental consequences for mental health and is 
further related to lower levels of prosocial behavior (Cillessen & Rose, 2005) and higher 
levels of aggression (Dodge et al., 2003). Such behavioral problems contribute to a mutually 
reinforcing pathway between repeated instances of rejection and increasingly more behavioral 
problems, which might exacerbate the psychosocial problems associated with rejection (Sturaro 
et al., 2011). Importantly, interventions that train aggressive victims to take their bullies 
perspective and to forgive them improve behavioral adjustment and psychological well-being 
(Park, Enright, Essex, Zahn-Waxler, & Klatt, 2013). Ultimately, a mechanistic understanding 
of the reciprocal relationship between aggressive (e.g. punishing) and prosocial (e.g. forgiving) 
responses to exclusion and neural and cognitive development has the potential to give us more 
insights on what might be the best way to act on social exclusion.
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3.5 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Table S3.1 Brain regions revealed by whole-brain contrasts during the Cyberball game (all thresholded p < .001 
uncorrected, > 10 voxels).
Brain region L/R Voxels z MNI coordinates
x y z
Exclusion no ball > Inclusion ball 
Calcarine gyrus/Cuneus L 783 5.45 -15 -93 -6*
4.85 15 -99 6*
4.69 18 -93 15*
Precuneus/Lingual gyrus L 85 4.76 -6 -57 12*
3.45 -15 -63 -6*
Middle Temporal gyrus L 134 4.42 -51 9 -30*
4.31 -54 0 -24*
3.66 -60 -9 -18*
Medial Prefrontal cortex R 45 3.85 3 45 -15*
3.47 -12 57 -6*
Subgenual Anterior Cingulate cortex L 15 3.79 -9 24 -6*
3.47 0 27 -9*
Lingual gyrus L 16 3.61 -18 -39 -12*
Positive correlation with need satisfaction after the exclusion game 
Superior Frontal gyrus L 22 4.37 -18 24 54
Ventral Anterior Cingulate cortex R 35 4.30 6 42 3
Inferior Frontal gyrus/Anterior Insula R 19 3.71 45 21 -3
Positive correlation with self-reported perspective-taking skills 
No significant clusters of activation
Positive correlation with need satisfaction after the exclusion game 
No significant clusters of activation
Inclusion ball > Exclusion no ball
Inferior Parietal lobule extending into: L 5059 6.42 -36 -39 45*
Postcentral gyrus R 6.33 33 -33 48*
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Postcentral gyrus L 6.32 -33 -33 54*
Middle Temporal gyrus extending into: L 280 5.06 -45 -66 0*
Middle Occipital gyrus 4.43 -51 -75 0*
3.70 -33 -99 -6*
Middle Temporal gyrus R 364 4.87 48 -66 -3*
4.79 48 -57 3*
4.42 60 -63 -3*
Insula (mid) extending into: L 200 4.80 -39 -3 9*
Inferior Frontal gyrus 4.70 -51 9 0*
4.27 -54 9 21*
Middle Cingulate cortex L 58 4.76 -12 -24 42*
Cerebellum Crus 1 R 95 4.66 39 -57 -30*
3.48 51 -57 -33*
3.26 30 -69 -30*
Inferior Frontal gyrus R 286 4.60 57 9 9*
4.38 57 12 21*
4.37 54 12 -6*
Thalamus L 27 4.46 -9 -24 6*
4.02 -12 -12 3*
Middle Occipital gyrus R 41 4.29 33 -78 30*
Middle Frontal gyrus L 151 4.14 -36 39 15*
3.96 -27 36 24*
3.84 -42 39 27*
Thalamus R 17 4.08 12 -18 6*
Insula L 18 4.07 -33 21 6*
Middle Frontal gyrus R 98 3.98 33 42 36*
3.70 36 45 24*
Middle Cingulate cortex R 10 3.69 9 -18 45*
Cerebellum 6 L 27 3.69 -33 -57 -30*
Exclusion no ball > Inclusion no ball
Caudate L 11 3.90 -3 12 0
Cuneus L 25 3.74 -6 -93 15
Middle Cingulate cortex R 30 3.74 3 -30 21
3.37 3 -21 33
Lingual gyrus R 20 3.65 18 -45 -3
Cuneus R 11 3.41 3 -78 27
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Inclusion no ball > Exclusion no ball
Precuneus R 174 4.76 12 -66 60*
4.06 -12 -63 60*
Inferior Parietal Lobule L 155 4.41 -42 -45 48*
3.58 -54 -33 48*
3.46 -27 -45 51*
Superior Temporal gyrus R 45 4.33 66 -42 12*
3.83 63 -36 21*
Middle Frontal gyrus R 79 4.28 30 0 51*
4.01 30 3 63*
3.67 33 9 57*
Inferior Frontal gyrus L 11 4.08 -33 33 9
Middle Temporal gyrus R 140 4.06 57 -69 0*
3.88 54 -60 6*
3.70 45 -63 0*
Inferior Frontal gyrus R 41 3.87 54 9 21*
Inferior Parietal lobule/ R 69 3.77 42 -42 51*
Superior Parietal lobule 3.58 42 -45 60*
Middle Temporal gyrus L 58 3.75 -51 -72 9*
3.63 -42 -66 6*
Superior Frontal gyrus/ L 28 3.65 -24 -9 63
Middle Frontal gyrus 3.59 -30 0 54
Inclusion no ball > Inclusion ball
Cuneus/Calcarine gyrus R 333 5.89 18 -102 9*
3.94 9 -93 30*
3.64 15 -81 9*
Middle Occipital gyrus L 208 4.86 -24 -99 15*
4.60 -15 -96 -9*
4.43 -18 -105 12*
Middle Temporal gyrus L 55 4.31 -51 6 -33*
3.60 -51 -3 -30*
3.58 -57 -12 -24
Inferior Frontal gyrus R 21 4.10 42 33 -15*
Inferior Frontal gyrus L 13 3.87 -39 33 -15
Inclusion ball > Inclusion no ball
Inferior Parietal lobule extending into: L 5283 6.59 -42 -30 42*
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Note. L/R=Left/Right; k=cluster size in 3×3×3mm voxels; z=z-score; MNI coordinates =xyz voxel coor-
dinates in MNI space of the peak voxel. 
Supramarginal gyrus/ 6.36 -60 -24 42*
Supplementary Motor Area 6.27 -12 -9 66*
Inferior Frontal gyrus extending into: R 1898 6.02 51 9 0*
Insula L 5.88 -45 3 -3*
Thalamus L 5.39 -12 -18 9*
Cerebellum 6 R 219 5.03 33 -60 -27*
3.59 30 -72 -27*
Inferior Temporal gyrus R 266 4.91 42 63 -6*
4.39 39 -54 -3*
Middle Temporal gyrus R 3.97 51 -54 0*
Cerebellum 6 L 154 4.69 -33 -51 -30*
4.61 -21 -54 -24*
Middle Occipital gyrus L 142 4.47 -45 -69 0*
Middle Frontal gyrus L 75 4.08 -33 39 30*
3.77 -27 33 30*
3.37 -39 45 15*
Middle Frontal gyrus R 76 3.94 33 45 33*
3.67 39 45 27*
3.62 33 39 27*
Vermis 4 5 R 20 393 3 -60 -9*
Precuneus L 46 3.73 -9 -75 42*
Superior Occipital gyrus 3.47 -21 -72 30*
Superior Parietal gyrus 3.14 -18 -66 39*
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Note. L/R=Left/Right; k=cluster size in 3×3×3mm voxels; z=z-score; MNI coordinates =xyz voxel coor-
dinates in MNI space of the peak voxel. 
*We explored sex differences in all reported whole-brain contrasts. Direct comparisons between males 
and females on the Cyberball, punishment (Inequality excluders > Equality excluders) and Forgiveness 
(Equality excluders > Equality includers) contrasts did not result in significant clusters of activation. Also 
the ROI analysis investigating differences between inequality conditions did not yield sex differences.
Supplementary analysis
Punishment of the excluders in the Dictator Game: time effects
To investigate whether punishment frequency progressively declined during the Dictator 
Game, we tested whether punishment frequency was lower in the second and third run of the 
experiment (each run lasted 7.7 minutes). First, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed 
with inequality condition (5 levels: beneficial inequality, non-costly mild inequality, non-costly 
severe inequality, costly inequality and prosocial inequality), recipient (2 levels: includers vs. 
excluders) and run (3 levels: run 1, 2 and 3) as within-subjects factors and the percentage of 
unequal offers as the dependent variable. This analysis resulted in a main effect of run, F(2, 
50) = 6.56, p < .01, ηp2 = .21 and significant interaction effects of run × inequality condition, 
F(8,200) = 2.52, p < .05, ηp2 = .09 and run × inequality condition × recipient, F(8,200) = 3.53, 
p < .01, ηp2 = .12. 
To further investigate these interaction effects, we ran two follow-up repeated measures 
ANOVAs for each recipient separately with inequality condition (5 levels) and run (3 levels) as 
within-subjects factors and the percentage of unequal offers as the dependent variable. For the 
includers, there was no main effect run (p = .276) and no significant run × inequality condition 
(p = .173). For the excluders this analysis yielded both a main effect of run, F(2, 50) = 6.60, p < 
.01, ηp2 = .21 and a significant interaction effect of run × inequality condition, F(8,200) = 3.82, 
p < .005, ηp2 = .13. This effect was driven by the costly inequality condition, F(2,50) = 8.72, p 
< .005, ηp2 = .26, showing that costly Inequality for the excluders was chosen more in the first 
run (37%) compared to the second (18%; p < .05 ) and third run (17%, p < .05), in which costly 
Table S3.2 Brain regions revealed by whole-brain analyses testing for sex differences* for the 'Excluders > Includ-
ers' contrast in the Dictator Game (all thresholded p < .001 uncorrected, > 10 voxels).
Brain region L/R Voxels z MNI coordinates
x y z
Males ([Excluders – Includers] > Females [Excluders – Includers])
Middle Temporal gyrus L 125 4.35 -51 0 -21
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inequality was chosen at similar rates (p = 1). There was no significant main effect of run in 
the beneficial inequality (p = .766), mild non-costly inequality (p = .054), severe non-costly 
inequality (p = .057) and prosocial inequality (p =.506) conditions (see Supplementary Figure 
S3.1). Together, these results show that punishment is executed less during the later stages of 
the experiments when participants have to give up money to punish the excluders. 
Figure S3.1 Mean percentages of trials on which participants chose an unequal distribution in each run of the 
Dictator Game (each run consisted of 60 trials and lasted 7.7 minutes) for players who previously included and 
excluded them during Cyberball (error bars represent standard errors of the mean). Each form of inequality is 
displayed on the x-axis (red coins for participants; blue coins for the recipients). Unequal distributions were pitted 
against an equal distribution of money (5 coins for the participant / 5 coins for the recipient). BI = beneficial 























Includers Run 1 Includers Run 2 Includers Run 3 
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CHAPTER 4
NEURAL CORRELATES OF PUNISHING 
AND FORGIVING SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
IN ADOLESCENTS WITH A HISTORY OF 
CHRONIC PEER REJECTION
This chapter is submitted as: 
Will, G.-J., Crone, E. A., van Lier, P. A. C., & Güroğlu, B. (submitted). Neural correlates of punishing 
and forgiving social exclusion in adolescents with a history of chronic peer rejection.
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ABSTRACT
Social exclusion is a distressing experience and can lead to both retaliatory and prosocial be-
haviors toward the sources of exclusion. However, no study has examined how retaliatory and 
prosocial reactions to social exclusion and their neural correlates vary as a function of chronic 
peer group rejection. This functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) study examined 
the neural correlates of punishment and forgiveness of social exclusion in adolescents (age 14) 
who either had a chronic rejected status among peers (n = 19) or a stable accepted status (n = 
27) across six elementary school grades. Participants played an economic game in which they 
distributed money between themselves and unknown peers who previously either included or 
excluded them in a virtual ball-tossing game (Cyberball). Decreasing the excluders’ mone-
tary profits (i.e., punishment) was associated with increased activity in the ventral striatum, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and parietal cortex in both groups. Refraining from 
punishment through equally sharing with the excluders (i.e., forgiveness) was associated with 
increased activity in dorsomedial PFC in both groups. Compared to stably accepted adoles-
cents, chronically rejected adolescents showed higher activity in the dorsal striatum and lateral 
PFC when they forgave the excluders. These findings demonstrate that a history of chronic 
peer rejection is associated with differential neural activity during prosocial, but not during 
retaliatory, reactions to social exclusion in adolescence.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
Humans have a fundamental need to form and maintain lasting positive relationships with 
others. Social exclusion and rejection frustrate this need and lead to retaliation toward the 
sources of exclusion (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001) and decreases in prosocial 
behavior (Maner et al., 2007). Yet, people differ considerably in their reactions to acute rejection 
experiences. For example, children who have been chronically rejected by peers develop anxious 
and angry expectations about being rejected, which in turn predict greater difficulties in 
interactions with peers over time (London et al., 2007). A potential mechanism through which 
chronically rejected children may come to experience more difficulties in their peer group is 
through their reactions to everyday rejection experiences. Children who react to exclusion with 
retaliatory vengeance might be more likely to elicit further rejection than those who show 
behavior aimed at reconnecting after exclusion (Sandstrom, 2004). Therefore, we examined 
the neural and psychological processes involved in retaliatory (i.e. punishing) and prosocial 
(i.e. forgiving) reactions to social exclusion among adolescents with a history of chronic peer 
rejection and tested how their reactions differed from adolescents with a history of stable peer 
acceptance. 
Social exclusion is a distressing experience and coincides with increased activity in brain 
regions involved in generating and regulating negative emotions, including the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), the anterior insula (AI), and ventromedial- and ventrolateral regions 
of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Eisenberger, 2012). Moreover, ACC activation during social 
exclusion is enhanced in people who are more distressed by exclusion (Eisenberger et al., 2003), 
people who have anxious or angry expectations about interpersonal rejection (DeWall et al., 
2012; Masten et al., 2009), who perceive lower levels of social support in their relationships 
(Eisenberger et al., 2007), and those who were chronically rejected by peers during childhood 
(Will, van Lier, Crone, & Güroğlu, 2015). Together, these studies demonstrate that a history 
of peer rejection and accompanying hypersensitivity to rejection are associated with enhanced 
neural responses to social exclusion, but how such a history might affect neural processes 
underlying retaliatory and prosocial reactions to exclusion remains to be investigated.
Neural processes underlying retaliatory and prosocial reactions have proven to be a reliably 
examined by giving participants the opportunity to distribute money between themselves and 
the people who previously included (i.e. includers) or excluded (i.e. excluders) them. Using 
this approach, studies have shown that people selectively punish the excluders by decreasing 
their monetary outcomes while treating the includers fairly (Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Will 
et al., 2014). This form of punishment has been associated with increased activity in the pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA)/ACC and AI. Refraining from punishment and sharing 
a sum of money equally with the excluders (i.e. forgiveness) has been associated with increased 
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activation in brain regions important for perspective taking (i.e., the temporo-parietal junction 
[TPJ] and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex [dmPFC]) and executive control (i.e., lateral 
prefrontal cortex (lPFC) (Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Will et al., 2014). 
Based on well-established behavioral and cognitive signatures of a rejected (vs. an accepted) 
status, we hypothesized that the neural processes underlying prosocial reactions to exclusion 
would vary as a function of peer status history. In comparison with their accepted classmates, 
children with a rejected status are more likely to deal with interpersonal anger in aggressive 
ways that instigate further conflict (Fabes & Eisenberg, 1992; Rabiner, Lenhart, & Lochman, 
1990) and they exhibit deficits in social cognition (e.g. less sophisticated ‘theory of mind’ skills) 
and executive control (e.g. problems in impulse control and emotion regulation) (Dodge et al., 
2003; Eisenberg et al., 1997; Fink, Begeer, Hunt, & Rosnay, 2014). Based on these findings, we 
hypothesized that status-related differences in social cognition and executive control are likely 
to be associated with differential recruitment of neural circuitry supporting social cognition 
(e.g. dmPFC and TPJ) and executive control (e.g. lPFC) during prosocial reactions to exclusion.
To test this hypothesis, we recruited participants whose peer status (i.e., peer group 
acceptance and rejection) was assessed annually across six elementary school grades as part of a 
large-scale longitudinal study (van Lier & Koot, 2010). Using strict selection criteria, we invited 
participants who were either chronically rejected or had a stable accepted status among peers 
to participate in the current study. While undergoing functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI), the participants were first included and then excluded by two unknown adolescents in 
a virtual ball-tossing game called Cyberball (Williams et al., 2000). Subsequently, they played 
an economic game, previously validated in adults, in which they could either punish or forgive 
the excluders (Will et al., 2014). Results on the neural correlates of exclusion in Cyberball are 
reported elsewhere (see: Will et al., 2015).
We anticipated that punishment of excluders would be associated with increased activity in 
the pre-SMA/ACC and AI (Sanfey et al., 2003; Strobel et al., 2011). In contrast, forgiveness 
was expected to be associated with increased activity in the dmPFC, TPJ and lPFC (Brüne et 
al., 2013; Will et al., 2014). With respect to individual differences, we expected that adolescents 
with a history of chronic peer rejection, relative to adolescents with a history of stable peer 
acceptance, would show: (i) lower levels of forgiveness toward excluders and (ii) enhanced 
recruitment of brain regions implicated in social cognition (e.g. dmPFC, TPJ) and executive 
control (e.g. lPFC) during forgiveness of excluders, consistent with findings demonstrating that 
adults who showed less forgiveness behavior activated these networks to a greater extent when 
they did forgive (Will et al., 2014). We also explored how individual differences in perspective 
taking and executive control were associated with punishment and forgiveness behavior and 
neural activity during forgiveness.
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Participants and recruitment procedure
Participants were recruited from a longitudinal study (N = 1,189) investigating the impact 
of social experiences on behavioral, emotional and academic outcomes between the ages of 
6 and 12 (annually from first to sixth grade of elementary school) (van Lier & Koot, 2010). 
Each year, participants were asked to nominate the peers in their class whom they liked most 
and liked least (unlimited nominations). Using those nominations, an average social preference 
score (liked most - liked least nominations) across the six waves was calculated to index stable 
histories of acceptance and rejection and adolescents from the lower (chronically rejected) and 
upper (stably accepted) 10th percentile were selected. 
Based on these criteria, suitability for participation in an fMRI study and availability 
of recent contact information, 131 adolescents were asked to participate in the fMRI study. 
Seventeen adolescents were excluded because they were left-handed (n = 4), had an autism 
spectrum disorder (n = 1) or had braces (n = 12). Eight adolescents could not be reached. Of 
the remaining 106 candidate participants, 47 adolescents and their parents agreed to participate 
in the current fMRI study. Adolescents who chose not to participate in the fMRI study (n = 
57) did not differ from those who did participant in terms of average social preference, age, or 
gender (all ps > .25).
All participants indicated to be healthy and reported no contraindications for MRI (e.g. no 
head injuries, no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders), except for four participants 
with a history of rejection who were diagnosed with Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD). Of those, three participants with ADHD were on a stable dose of methylphenidates, 
but were medication-free on the day of scanning and the preceding day. A radiologist reviewed 
all anatomical scans, and one participant was excluded from the analyses due to an anomaly. 
Three participants were excluded from neuroimaging analyses because their head movement 
exceeded 1 voxel (3 mm) in at least one direction. 
The final sample consisted of 43 adolescents, including 25 adolescents with a history of 
stable peer acceptance (M age = 14.0; SD = 0.78; 13 male) and 18 adolescents with a history 
of chronic peer rejection (M age = 14.1; SD = 0.57; 13 male). Stably accepted and chronically 
rejected adolescents did not differ in age, pubertal status, gender, race or IQ (all ps > .16; see 
Supplementary Table S4.1). This study was conducted in accordance with the ethical standards 
of the American Psychological Association as expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki. All 
participants and their parents gave informed consent for the study. The recruitment procedure 
was blind, such that experimenters were not informed about individual participants’ peer status 
history. Both the longitudinal study and the fMRI study were approved by the medical ethical 
committees of the respective universities.
4.2 METHODS
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Experimental procedure
Participants were first familiarized with the scanner environment with a mock scanner. After 
receiving instructions, participants carried out the following tasks in the scanner: (i) Cyberball 
inclusion with two anonymous peers, (ii) Cyberball exclusion by two novel anonymous peers, 
and (iii) A Dictator game in which participants distributed money between themselves and one 
of the players from the previous Cyberball games (i.e., one of the includers or the excluders; see 
Figure 4.1A). Participants could see the stimuli on a screen located at the head of the scanner 
bore via a mirror mounted on the head coil. Head movement was restricted through the use of 
foam inserts inside the coil. After scanning, participants filled out a battery of questionnaires 




Participants played two rounds of a virtual ball-tossing game called Cyberball (Williams et 
al., 2000). Participants were told that the other players in the game with were other participants 
in the experiment who were connected with them via the Internet. First, participants played 
Cyberball with two unfamiliar peers (i.e. the includers; two cartoon figures accompanied by a 
girl’s and a boy’s name) who included them in a game where each player received the ball an 
equal amount of times (10/30 throws). Subsequently, they played another round of Cyberball 
with two novel unfamiliar players (i.e. the excluders; with a new boy’s and a new girl’s name) 
who threw the ball once to the participants at the start of the game, but further excluded the 
participants by not throwing the ball to them for the remainder of the game (28/30 throws).
 
Dictator Game
Following Cyberball, participants played a modified Dictator Game in which they could 
distribute coins between themselves and a recipient (Will et al., 2014). The recipient was 
one of the players from either the first or the second Cyberball game (i.e., Team 1 and Team 
2, respectively). Participants were told that the coins represented real money and that their 
decisions determined how much money they and the recipients would receive at the end 
of the experiment. In reality, each participant received the same fixed amount of money as 
compensation.  
Participants were given a dichotomous choice to either share an amount of money equally 
or unequally (see Figure 4.1B). The equal distribution (which always took the form of 5 coins 
for self/5 for the recipient) was pitted against an unequal alternative, which varied across three 
conditions: (i) beneficial inequality (8 coins for the participant /2 for the recipient), (ii) non-
costly inequality (5 coins for the participant /2 for the recipient), (iii) prosocial inequality (4 
coins for the participant /6 for the recipient, which was a filler condition that was added to 
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the fMRI design but not analyzed separately. Decision-making in the prosocial inequality 
condition was only included in the behavioral analyses and not in the fMRI analyses examining 
the neural correlates of punishment and forgiveness.
The Dictator Game consisted of 120 trials (20 trials per condition; 3 inequality conditions 
× 2 recipients) and was administered in 2 runs of 207 volumes each, lasting about 15 minutes in 
total. After a screen with fixation cross which had a jittered duration (M = 1540 ms; SD = 1083 
ms; min = 550 ms; max = 4950 ms; optimized with Opt-Seq2, Dale, 1999;  surfer.nmr.mgh.
harvard.edu/optseq/), participants were presented with a decision screen that showed: (i) the 
two distributions they could choose from and (ii) whether the recipient was a player from Team 
1 (i.e. an includer) or Team 2 (i.e. an excluder) (see Figure 4.1A). Participants could choose one 
of two distributions of money by pressing a button with the index or middle finger of their right 
hand. After a button was pressed, a red rectangle appeared around the chosen distribution until 
6 seconds after trial onset. Failing to respond within 5 seconds resulted in the presentation of a 
screen with “Too late!” with the duration of 1 second. Trials without a response consisted of less 
than 1% of all trials and were excluded from further analyses.
Questionnaires
Executive functioning
To assess executive functioning the participants’ parents filled out the ‘Behavioral regulation 
index’ scale of the ‘Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function’ questionnaire (BRIEF; 
Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000; Huizinga & Smidts, 2011). The Behavioral regulation 
index represents the ability to shift cognitive sets and to modulate behavior and emotions. The 
scale comprises of three subscales: inhibition (the capacity to suppress impulses, e.g. “Blurts 
things out”), shifting (the capacity to flexibly adjust behavior to changing demands of a given 
situation, e.g. “Becomes upset by new situations”, and emotional control (the ability to regulate 
emotional responses, e.g. “Has explosive, angry outbursts”. All items were rated on a scale 
consisting of 1 (never), 2 (sometimes) to 3 (often) and summed. Higher scores on the Behavioral 
regulation index reflect increased difficulty with behavioral regulation. 
Perspective taking
To assess the capacity to adopt another person’s point of view participants filled out the 
perspective-taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) (e.g., 
“Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.”). All 
items were rated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) and averaged to a mean score of 
trait perspective-taking.
fMRI data acquisition
Scans were acquired using a 3T Philips Achieva MRI system at the Leiden University 
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Medical Center. After obtaining a localizer scan, T2*-weighted Echo-Planar Images (EPI)
were acquired (repetition time (TR)= 2.2 sec, echo time (TE)= 30ms, slice matrix = 80 × 80 
matrix, slice thickness = 2.75 mm, slice gap = 0.28 mm gap, field of view (FOV) = 220 × 220 
× 114.68 mm) during two functional runs of 207 volumes each. The first two volumes in each 
functional run were discarded to allow for equilibration of T1 saturation effects. High-reso-
lution T1-weighted and T2-weighted anatomical scans (TR = 9.760 ms; TE = 4.59 ms, 140 
slices, 0.875 × 0.875 × 1.2 mm voxels, field of view =224 × 168 × 177 mm) were acquired for 
Dictator Game 
















Figure 4.1 (A) Experimental procedure: Participants carried out the following tasks in the scanner: (i) Cyberball 
inclusion with two anonymous peers (includers), (ii) Cyberball exclusion by two novel anonymous peers (exclud-
ers), and (iii) Dictator game in which participants distributed money between themselves (depicted with red 
coins) and the players from the Cyberball games (i.e., includers and excluders; depicted with blue coins). (B) In 
every trial, participants were given a dichotomous choice between either an equal distribution of money and an 
unequal distribution, of which the latter varied depending on the inequality condition.
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anatomical reference.  
fMRI data analysis
MRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM8 statistical parametric mapping 
image analysis software (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College 
London). Images were slice-time corrected, realigned, spatially smoothed using an 8-mm 
FWHM Gaussian filter, and spatially normalized to each participant’s anatomical T1 scan. The 
normalization algorithm, resampled the volumes to 3 mm cubic voxels using a 12-parameter 
affine transformation and a nonlinear transformation involving cosine basic functions. All 
results are reported in MNI305 stereotactic space.
A first-level general linear model was defined for each participant’s functional run that 
included a boxcar regressor for each epoch of interest (e.g., decision phase) and convolved 
with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). The duration of epochs in which 
participants submitted a response was modeled using the participant’s reaction time. Regressors 
were defined separately for equality and inequality choices made in each of the three inequality 
conditions and analyzed separately for includers and excluders. This model consisted of 12 
decision-related regressors (i.e., inequality condition [3] × recipient [2] × choice [2]), a regressor 
indicating missed trials, and a covariate for each run to control for run effects (3), resulting in 
a General Linear Model (GLM) with a total of 16 predictors and contained a basic set of 
cosine functions that high-pass-filtered the data. The least-squares parameter estimates of the 
height of the best-fitting canonical HRF for each condition separately were used in pair-wise 
contrasts at the subject level. The resulting contrast images were submitted to group analyses 
where participants were treated as a random effect. Subsequently, we performed one-tailed 
t-tests of which results were considered significant at an uncorrected threshold of p < .001 with 
a minimum cluster size of 10 contiguous voxels to balance between Type 1 and Type 2 errors 
(Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009). Consistent with prior work (Will et al., 2014), punishment 
was operationalized as the average of beneficial and non-costly unequal distributions chosen for 
the excluders minus those chosen for includers (Excluders inequality > Includers inequality). 
Forgiveness was operationalized as the average of equality offers for excluders minus equality 
towards includes in the beneficial and non-costly inequality conditions (Excluders equality > 
Includers equality). For group comparisons, contrast images were entered into separate second-
level analyses for each contrast of interest, where peer status history (chronically rejected vs. 
stably accepted) was the between-subjects variable in independent samples t-tests. We used 
the MarsBaR toolbox (Brett et al., 2002; http://marsbar.sourceforce.net/) to extract activity in 
functional regions of interest.
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4.3 RESULTS
To investigate punishment and forgiveness behavior toward excluders, we performed a 
repeated measures ANOVA with recipient (2 levels: includers vs. excluders) and inequality 
condition (3 levels: beneficial inequality, non-costly inequality and prosocial inequality) as 
within-subjects factors and peer status history (2 levels: chronically rejected vs. stably accepted) 
as a between-subjects factor for the percentage of unequal offers in the Dictator Game. This 
analysis yielded main effects of recipient, F(1, 41) = 30.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .43, inequality 
condition, F(2, 82) = 35.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .47, and a recipient × inequality condition interaction, 
F(2, 82) = 34.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .46. Participants chose the inequality distribution more often 
for the excluders than for the includers in the beneficial and non-costly inequality conditions 
(both ps < .001; see Figure 4.2). In contrast, they chose the inequality distribution more often 
for the includers than for excluders in the prosocial inequality condition (p = .031). Neither 
interaction effects with peer status history, nor a main effect of peer status history were found. 
Thus, both stably accepted and chronically rejected adolescents punished the excluders by 
choosing unequal distributions of money for the excluders and they did this to a similar extent.
Reaction times were faster in the beneficial inequality condition (M = 1591 ms; SD = 69 
ms) than in non-costly inequality (M  = 1744 ms; SD = 76) and prosocial inequality (M = 1798 
ms; SD = 74) conditions, but did not differ between recipients and the two groups, all ps > .09. 
Chronically rejected adolescents (M = 44.8) had more parent-reported behavioral regulation 
difficulties than stably accepted adolescents (M = 34.8), t = 2.55, p < .05, also after controlling 
for gender and ADHD diagnosis. Self-reported perspective-taking skills did not differ between 
groups (p = .11). Punishment behavior (inequality offers for excluders – inequality for includers 
in the BI and NCI conditions) was not correlated with behavioral regulation difficulties (p = 
.39) or perspective taking (p = .19). 
Neuroimaging results
Punishment and forgiveness across the sample
Before we examined differences in brain responses between chronically rejected and stably 
accepted adolescents, we first investigated the neural correlates of punishment and forgiveness 
across the whole sample. The punishment contrast (Excluders inequality > Includers inequality) 
resulted in activation in bilateral ventral striatum bilateral ventral striatum (peaks at -12, 20, 
7 and 9, 20, 4), right dlPFC (36, 29, 37) and bilateral parietal cortex (peaks at 30, -58, 61 and 
-45, -45, 52) (Figure 4.3A). The forgiveness contrast (Excluders equality > Includers equality) 
contrast resulted in activation only in the dmPFC (peak at 6, 47, 22; Figure 4.3B).

















Chronically rejected Stably accepted 
Figure 4.2 Percentage of inequality offers chosen for includers and excluders in the three inequality conditions of 
the Dictator Game as a function of prior childhood peer status history. Unequal distributions were pitted against 
an equal distribution of money (five coins for the participant/five coins for the recipient). BI, beneficial inequality 
(8/2); NCI, non-costly inequality (5/2); PI, prosocial inequality (4/6).
Excluders Inequality > Includers Inequality 
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Figure 4.3 (A) Both groups of adolescents showed 
increased activity in bilateral ventral striatum 
(peaks at -12, 20, 7 and 9, 20, 4), right dlPFC 
(36, 29, 37) and bilateral parietal cortex (peaks 
at 30, -58, 61 and -45, -45, 52) when punishing 
the excluders (Excluders inequality > Includers 
inequality) and (B) Both groups of adolescents 
showed increased activity in dmPFC (peak at 6, 
47, 22) when forgiving the excluders (Excluders 
equality > Includers equality)
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Individual differences associated with chronic peer group rejection, perspective-tak-
ing skills and behavioral regulation problems
To examine how neural processes involved in punishment and forgiveness of exclusion varied 
as a function of childhood peer rejection, we compared the two groups using two-sample t-tests 
on both contrasts outlined above. A two-sample t-test on the punishment contrast (Excluders 
inequality > Includers inequality) showed that chronically rejected and stably accepted 
adolescents showed no differential brain activity during punishment of excluders. However, 
during forgiveness of excluders (Excluders equality > Includers equality), chronically rejected 
adolescents showed enhanced activity in lPFC (peak at 36, 44, 4) and dorsal striatum (peak at 9, 
11, 10) (Figure 4.4). No regions showed higher levels of activity in stably accepted adolescents 
compared to chronically rejected adolescents during either punishment or forgiveness.
To explore how individual differences in perspective taking and executive control were 
associated with punishment and forgiveness behavior and neural activity during forgiveness, 
we ran two whole-brain regression analyses on the forgiveness contrast (Excluders equality 
> Includers equality) with self-reported trait perspective-taking skills or parent-reported 
behavioral regulation problems as predictors. Participants with higher levels of perspective 
taking showed higher levels of activity in a region of the dmPFC (peak at -3, 50, 37) during 
forgiveness, which overlapped with the cluster of activation obtained in the main forgiveness 
contrast (Figure 4.5A). Participants with more behavioral regulation problems showed more 
activity in the right dorsal AI (peak at 37, 17, 10) and the pre-SMA/ACC (peak at 3, 11, 55) 
when they forgave the excluders  (Figure 4.5B)
x = 9 y = 11  
Chronically rejected adolescents > Stably accepted adolescents 
Group Differences during Forgiveness 
3.6 
4.4 
Figure 4.4 Chronically rejected adolescents showed enhanced activity in lPFC (peak at 36, 44, 4) and dorsal 
striatum (peak at 9, 11, 10) compared to stably accepted adolescents during forgiveness of excluders. Subject-level 
contrast values in lPFC were extracted and plotted to facilitate interpretation.
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Figure 4.5 (A) A whole brain regression analysis on the ‘Excluders equality > Includers equality’ contrast with 
self-reported perspective-taking skills as a predictor resulted in activation in an overlapping region of dmPFC 
(peak at -3, 50, 37); (B) A whole brain regression analysis on the ‘Excluders equality > Includers equality’ contrast 
with parent-reported behavioral regulation problems as a predictor resulted in activation in the pre-SMA/ACC 
(peak at 3, 11, 55) and in the right dorsal AI (peak at 37, 17, 10). C.V. = contrast value.
4.4 DISCUSSION
This study examined the neural processes involved in punishment and forgiveness 
of excluders and how these processes vary as a function of chronic peer rejection. The first 
main finding was that both chronically rejected and stably accepted adolescents punished the 
excluders by selectively decreasing their monetary outcomes; both when punishment resulted in 
gains and when punishment had no monetary benefits. Social exclusion thus elicits a tendency 
to retaliate against the sources of exclusion even when this does not result in material gain, 
which is not modulated by exposure to high levels of peer rejection.
Whole-Brain Regression Analyses Forgiveness 
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The second main finding was that punishment was associated with heightened activity in 
the ventral striatum, the dlPFC and parietal cortex in both groups of adolescents. The ventral 
striatum has previously been shown to be involved in processing both primary (e.g. food) 
and social rewards, including punishment of unfair interaction partners (Singer et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, ventral striatum activation during punishment has been shown to correlate with 
the self-reported desire for revenge and has therefore been suggested to code for the rewarding 
aspect of retaliation. Activation in the dlPFC has been linked to punishing criminal intent 
(Buckholtz et al., 2008) and economic unfairness (Güroğlu et al., 2011). The dlPFC - in concert 
with the parietal cortex - has been proposed to integrate different value signals and execute a 
punishment response among competing response options (Buckholtz & Marois, 2012). 
Contrary to our hypotheses, chronically rejected adolescents did not show lower levels 
of forgiveness than stably accepted adolescents. Nonetheless, despite both groups displaying 
similar levels of forgiveness behavior, meaningful differences emerged on a neural level. To be 
specific, the third main finding was that chronically rejected adolescents, compared to stably 
accepted adolescents, displayed higher levels of activity in the dorsal striatum and the lPFC 
when they forgave the excluders. The dorsal striatum is strongly connected with a dorsal fronto-
parietal network that plays a vital role executive control (Haber & Knutson, 2010; van den Bos, 
Rodriguez, Schweitzer, & McClure, 2014). Together with the chronically rejected adolescents’ 
higher levels of behavioral regulation difficulties (indexing problems in inhibition, shifting 
and emotional control), heightened activity in this dorsal fronto-striatal network suggests that 
chronically rejected adolescents have to exert greater levels of control in order to act prosocial 
toward those who previously excluded them. This dovetails with findings showing that executive 
control skills are positively related to displays of prosocial behavior, social competence, and peer 
acceptance (Eisenberg, Vaughan, & Hofer, 2009; Spinrad et al., 2006). 
The fourth main finding was that analyses of individual differences yielded insights into 
cognitive processes underlying refraining from punishment. Two mechanisms have been shown 
to be involved in succeeding or failing to refrain from retaliation after being excluded: i) the 
ability to take other people’s perspectives (Will et al., 2014) and ii) the ability to cognitively 
control impulses (Chester et al., 2013).  Our findings show that these two mechanisms are 
associated with activity in functionally separable neural networks. That is, during forgiveness, 
perspective-taking skills scaled with activity in the dmPFC, which is a hub in the theory of 
mind network (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013) and behavioral regulation problems correlated 
positively with activity in the pre-SMA/ACC and dorsal AI. A meta-analysis has shown that 
the dorsal AI (overlapping with the cluster in our study) is strongly connected to the pre-
SMA/ACC and dlPFC and is implicated in executive control functions, including inhibition 
and switching (Chang et al., 2013). Taken together, these findings show that individual 
differences in cognitive functions can be reliably linked to activity in functionally separable 
neural networks supporting social cognition (e.g. dmPFC) or executive control (e.g. ACC and 
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dorsal AI) and they underscore the importance of examining individual differences in neural 
processes underlying prosocial reactions to social exclusion.
Several limitations of this study deserve to be mentioned. First, the data do not speak to 
the causal question whether observed differences in forgiveness-related neural activity were 
caused by chronic peer rejection, or whether they reflect a propensity that was already present 
before the emergence of a rejected peer status. Future longitudinal studies should investigate 
whether adolescents that end up with a rejected status already show these differences earlier in 
development. Second, differences between the two groups could both be the result of greater 
exposure to negative peer interactions in the rejected group or greater exposure to positive 
peer interactions in the accepted group. Future studies should compare rejected adolescents 
to adolescents with a so-called ‘average’ social status to disentangle the influence of positive 
and negative experiences in the peer group on neural processing involved in social behavior. 
Third, our sample of chronically rejected adolescents was relatively small. Rejected adolescents 
form a heterogeneous group consisting of aggressive and non-aggressive subtypes (Ladd, 2006). 
Future research with larger samples could test whether the absence of behavioral differences 
between the two groups in our study could be due to heterogeneity in the rejected group. 
In conclusion, our results show that punishment and forgiveness of excluders rely on distinct 
neural networks implicated in emotional and cognitive processes involved in social decision-
making. Although chronically rejected adolescents were equally likely to forgive excluders as 
stably accepted adolescents, they displayed enhanced recruitment of the dorsal striatum and 
lPFC when forgiving excluders, suggesting that they might have to exert greater levels of 
executive control in order act prosocial toward peers who excluded them. Consequently, our 
results have implications for understanding the processes through which peer rejection’s adverse 
effects are transmitted across development. 
A greater demand on executive control functions might entail greater difficulties controlling 
retaliatory responses to negative treatment in the heat of the moment of their everyday 
interactions with peers. In turn, retaliatory responses are likely to provoke excluders, which 
could elicit renewed instances of exclusion and thereby further consolidate a rejected status 
in the peer group (Sandstrom, 2004). A priority for future research is therefore to further 
examine longitudinal associations between behavioral reactions to social exclusion, peer status, 
and different subcomponents of cognitive control (e.g. inhibition, shifting, emotion regulation 
tasks) to get a better understanding of which executive functions might underlie prosocial 
reactions to exclusion. Such endeavors can inform research that could test whether training 
of executive functions might facilitate adaptive social responses to exclusion, which ultimately 
could lead to greater acceptance among peers.
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4.5 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Table S4.1 Participant characteristics.
aAll p-values obtained using t tests except for race and gender (Chi-square tests).









Mean Social Preferenceb  
(selection variable)
-1.59 (0.52) 1.17 (0.18) < .001
Gender (% Male) 72 52 .18
Age 14.0 (0.78) 14.1 (0.57) .64
Pubertal status (PDS)
   0 Males









Race/Ethnicity (% Caucasian) 100% 96% .39
IQ (WISC Similarities and Block 
Design)
95 (12.32) 101 (10.23) .13
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CHAPTER 5
ACTING ON OBSERVED SOCIAL EXCLUSION: 
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
PUNISHMENT OF EXCLUDERS AND 
COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS
This chapter is published as: 
Will, G.-J., Crone, E. A., van den Bos, W., & Güroğlu, B. (2013). Acting on observed social exclusion: 
Developmental perspectives on punishment of excluders and compensation of victims. Developmental 
Psychology, 49, 2236–2244.
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ABSTRACT
This study examined punishment of excluders and compensation of victims after observing 
an instance of social exclusion at various phases of adolescent development. Participants (n 
= 183; age 9 to 22 years) were first included in a virtual ball-tossing game, Cyberball, and 
then observed the exclusion of a peer. Subsequently, they played economic games in which 
they divided money between themselves and the including players, the excluders, and the 
victim. The results demonstrate a gradual age-related increase in money given to the victim 
from age 9 to 22 and a gradual decrease in money allocated to the excluders from age 9 to 16 
with an increase in 22-year-olds. Affective perspective-taking predicted both compensation 
of the victim and punishment of the excluders. Taken together these results show that across 
adolescence individuals sacrifice an increasingly bigger share of their own resources to punish 
excluders and to compensate victims and that taking the perspective of the victim enhances 
these decisions.
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Adolescence is a developmental period characterized by a social reorientation away from 
primary caregivers and toward the peer group (Brown, 2004). In the transition from childhood 
to adolescence, youths spend more time with peers and become increasingly concerned about 
integration within the peer group (O’Brien & Bierman, 1988; Steinberg & Morris, 2001). 
As concerns about peer acceptance rise, social exclusion becomes a dominant form of peer 
victimization during early adolescence (Brown, 1990). Social exclusion has been linked to a 
variety of negative outcomes, such as loneliness, depression, and poor academic achievement 
( Juvonen, Nishina, & Graham, 2000; Rigby, 2000). Even witnessing peer harassment, including 
social exclusion, has been associated with negative consequences for psychosocial well-being 
(Nishina & Juvonen, 2005).
Observing the exclusion of another person elicits negative affect similar to the distress 
caused by self-experienced exclusion (Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011; Wesselmann, 
Bagg, & Williams, 2009). When people are asked to take the targeted person’s perspective 
and “imagine themselves in their shoes” their own distress is even exacerbated (Wesselmann et 
al., 2009). People are likely to engage in prosocial acts toward the victim of exclusion, such as 
such as helping, sharing, and comforting. These behaviors are possibly motivated by an affective 
response congruent with the perceived distress of the victim (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997). 
Indeed, increased activation in brain regions sensitive to ‘social pain’ during the observation of 
social exclusion has been associated with increased prosocial concern toward the victim, both 
in adults (Masten et al., 2011b) and in adolescents (Masten, Eisenberger, Pfeifer, & Dapretto, 
2010). 
Prior research has demonstrated that during adolescence social interactions become 
progressively more prosocial and that these changes are related to an increased capacity for 
perspective taking (Eisenberg, Carlo, & Murphy, 1995; Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, & 
Shea, 1991). Core components of perspective taking, such as a ‘theory of mind,’ mature before 
adolescence as children acquire the ability to understand that other people’s mental states 
might differ from their own (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). However, more advanced 
forms of perspective taking, such as affective perspective-taking, undergo crucial developmental 
changes during adolescence (Hoffman, 2000; Selman, 1980). Affective perspective-taking can 
be defined as the ability to put oneself in the shoes of another person in order to infer what the 
other is feeling without explicit emotional cues. Given the importance of affective perspective-
taking for prosocial behavior (Eisenberg, Cumberland, Guthrie, Murphy, & Shepard, 2005), 
developmental change in understanding the distress in a target of social exclusion would be 
expected to enhance prosocial responding toward such a victim. 
The current study set out to investigate the development of social interactions with victims 
5.1 INTRODUCTION
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and initiators of social exclusion (i.e., the excluders) and how these changes are related to 
developing perspective-taking skills. We hypothesized that developmental changes in 
perspective-taking skills are related to both increased prosocial behavior toward the victim 
and decreased prosocial behavior toward the excluders. These questions were addressed using 
experimental games with real monetary consequences in combination with self-reported trait 
perspective-taking skills and an index of state affective perspective-taking.
Economic games and social development
Studies employing economic paradigms, such as the Ultimatum Game (UG), have proven 
to be effective in examining developmental differences in perspective-taking skills (Güroğlu, 
van den Bos, & Crone, 2009; Takagishi, Kameshima, Schug, Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 2010). The 
UG is a simple two-person economic game in which the first player (i.e., the proposer) proposes 
a division of a certain amount of money (i.e., the stake). The second player (i.e., the responder) 
can then either accept the proposed split and both players are paid accordingly, or decide to 
reject the offer which results in neither player receiving anything (Güth, Schmittberger, & 
Schwarze, 1982). An alternative version of this game is the Dictator Game (DG), in which 
the second player (i.e., the recipient) does not have the possibility to reject (Forsythe et al., 
1994). Offering an equal split in the DG therefore represents costly prosocial behavior, since 
the allocator sacrifices personal gain in order to share half of the money with the recipient. In 
the UG, however, offering half of the stake might also reflect strategic fairness, as self-gain is 
maximized by proposing a fair offer in order to decrease the probability of rejection (Pillutla & 
Murnighan, 1995). 
Basic fairness considerations concerning anonymous others do not undergo considerable 
developmental changes during adolescence (Güroğlu, et al., 2009). This is reflected by the 
notion that 9-year-old children’s DG offers do not differ from DG offers made by adolescents 
and adults. However, with increasing age, adolescents typically show more strategic behavior 
by offering more money in the UG than in the DG (Leman, Keller, Takezawa, & Gummerum, 
2009). Based on this notion, a growing body of research has suggested an age-related increase in 
incorporating the perspective of others in social decision making across adolescence (Güroğlu, 
et al., 2009; Sutter, 2007; van den Bos, Westenberg, Van Dijk, & Crone, 2010). 
Importantly, decisions in these economic games are strongly influenced by prior experiences 
with, and social knowledge about, the people these games are played with (Delgado, Frank, & 
Phelps, 2005; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). For instance, people differ in their DG allocations 
toward players who previously included or excluded them (Gunther Moor, et al., 2012). That 
is, both adolescents and young adults offer an equal split of the stake to players who previously 
included them in a virtual ball-tossing game, but selectively punish excluders by offering them 
less than half of the stake. Notably, early- and mid-adolescents have been shown to opt for a 
more severe punishment than young adults by offering the excluders even less money (Gunther 
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Moor, et al., 2012). The question then arises whether this propensity to punish excluders 
develops in a similar manner when participants witness the exclusion of a peer and thus are not 
a victim themselves (Gunther Moor, et al., 2012). 
Previous research has shown that when uninvolved bystanders witness social exclusion 
from a third-party perspective they direct prosocial behavior toward the victim (Masten et 
al., 2011b). Furthermore, adults display a tendency for altruistic punishment (i.e., voluntarily 
incurring costs to punish others who violated social norms), even when they are not part of 
the interaction themselves (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Could there be 
a similar motivation to punish excluders? And is the willingness to sacrifice rewards in order 
to compensate victims or to punish excluders the same across development? Acting based on 
third-party observations of peers’ behavior is crucial for the development of adolescents’ peer 
relationships, as they often infer through these observations whether they want to interact 
with a specific peer. Thus, considering the continued development of perspective-taking skills 
involved in making such inferences about peers’ behavior (Hoffman, 2000; Selman, 1980), 
we hypothesized that both prosocial behavior displayed toward the victim and third-party 
punishment of the excluders would differ at various phases of adolescent development.
The present study
The aim of the present study was to investigate developmental differences in interactions 
with victims and excluders after observing an instance of social exclusion and its relation with 
perspective taking. Accordingly, participants in distinct phases of adolescent development in 
the age range of 9–22 years (pre-adolescence to young adulthood) were first included in a 
virtual ball-tossing game (i.e., Cyberball) and then observed the exclusion of a peer in the same 
game. Subsequently, they played one-shot versions of two different economic games in which 
they could divide money between themselves and the including players, the excluders, and the 
victim from the Cyberball interactions. 
The first goal of the study was to examine developmental differences in how another 
person’s prior behavior during an observed episode of social exclusion (i.e., whether he or she 
was a victim or a perpetrator) impacts prosocial behavior toward these excluders and victims in 
a DG. DG offers reflect generosity and a preference for fairness, because the recipient has no 
influence on how the stake is split. Thus, each amount of money transferred to the recipient is 
a form of costly prosocial behavior. 
The second goal was to examine whether individuals are also willing to pay to punish 
excluders in an Altruistic Punishment/ Compensation Game (APCG; Leliveld, van Dijk, & 
van Beest, 2012). In this game, participants can either do nothing or invest some money, which 
is then multiplied by 3 and either added to (compensation) or subtracted from (punishment) 
the other player’s total. In the DG compensation is costly, but punishment (i.e., withholding 
money) also leads to maximization of one’s own outcomes. Furthermore, in the DG, an equal 
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split (5/5) can be offered as a form of compensation but can also be offered to avoid an unequal 
distribution of money (inequity aversion). In the APCG the least costly option (not investing 
any points at all) results in an equal allocation. Thus, by employing two different games we 
aimed to disentangle motivations to punish excluders from selfmaximization (maximizing one’s 
own outcomes) and motivations to compensate the victim from inequity aversion. We predicted 
that with increasing age, participants would differentiate more between recipients based on 
prior experiences with these peers. Accordingly, we expected an age-related increase in money 
allocated to the victim and an age-related decrease in money allocated to the excluders.
The third goal of the current study was to explore the relationship between perspective 
taking and the age-related changes in these punishment and compensation behaviors. 
Accordingly, we obtained a self-report measure of the ability to take someone else’s perspective 
(trait) and a state measure of affective perspective-taking, in which participants were probed 
for inferences about the distress of the victim of exclusion. ‘Trait’ measures reflect people’s 
stable dispositions that may generalize to different types of situations, but ‘state’ measures are 
more directly linked to a specific situation. We predicted age-related increases in both trait 
perspective-taking and state affective perspective-taking. We expected the latter to result in 
an increased understanding of the affective state of the victim (e.g., mood) with age, such that 
older participants were expected to perceive the mood of the victim to be lower than their own 
mood. Given the positive relationship between prosocial behavior and both dispositional and 
situationally induced perspective-taking (Eisenberg et al., 2005), we examined how both forms 
of perspective-taking were related to developmental and individual differences in compensation 
of the victim and punishment of the excluders.
5.2 METHOD
Participants
 One hundred and ninety-two participants were recruited from local schools in urban 
and suburban areas in the west of the Netherlands. Nine participants (five 9-year-olds and 
four 11-year-olds) who failed to write down the IDs of the other Cyberball players (which 
were necessary to identify each player in the economic games) during at least one of the two 
Cyberball games were excluded from the analyses. The total of 183 participants included in 
the analyses were subdivided into five age groups: 9-year-olds (n = 27, M age = 9.0, SD = 
0.49, 17 girls), 11-year-olds (n = 44, M age = 10.7, SD = 0.70, 21 girls), 14-year-olds (n = 46, 
M age = 13.7 years, SD = 0.66, 22 girls), 16-year olds (n = 42, M age = 16.4, SD = 0.58, 18 
girls) and 22-year-olds (n = 24, M age = 22.1, SD = 2.45, 15 women). Nine and 11-year-olds 
attended primary schools; 14- and 16-year-old participants attended college-preparatory high 
schools and the 22-year-olds were college students. Gender distributions did not differ across 
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the five age groups, χ²(4) = 4.2, p = .38. Sixty participants only played the DG and thus 132 
participants played the DG and the APCG. The distribution for the participants who also 
played the APCG into five age groups was as follows: 9-year-olds (n = 27, M age = 9.0, SD = 
0.49, 17 girls), 11-year-olds (n = 28, M age = 11.1, SD = 0.61, 11 girls), 14-year-olds (n = 23, M 
age = 14.1 years, SD = 0.41, 11 girls), 16-year olds (n = 21, M age = 16.4, SD = 0.51, 10 girls) 
and 22-year-olds (n = 24, M age = 22.1, SD = 2.45, 15 females). Gender distributions did not 
differ across the five age groups, χ²(4) = 4.50, p = .34.
No data were collected about the children and adolescents’ ethnicity. School records 
indicated that the ethnic composition was as follows: 60.6% of the children and 42.7% of 
the adolescents had two parents with a Dutch background, and 39.4% of the children and 
56.2% of the adolescents had either one or two parents who belonged to ethnic minorities (e.g., 
Surinamese, Antillean, Moroccan, Turkish) or were born in another country. The majority of 
the 22-year-olds (79.2 %) had two Dutch parents; 12.5 % had at least one non-Dutch parent; 
8.3% had missing data on ethnicity. No information was collected about the language(s) spoken 
in the home and family socioeconomic status. 
Materials
Cyberball
Participants played a modified version of the virtual ball-tossing game called ‘Cyberball’ 
(Williams et al., 2000). At the start of the experiment participants were told that they were 
about to play an online ball-tossing game with unfamiliar, anonymous peers at another school 
with whom they were connected through the Internet. In reality, all throws by the other players 
were preprogrammed. Furthermore, it was explained that all players would receive a point for 
every time that he or she would catch the ball. Additionally, it was emphasized that points 
were valuable and would be converted into money, which participants would receive upon 
completion of the experiment. In order to avoid possible influence of familiarity with the names 
on decisions in the economic games, players in the Cyberball game were given player IDs (e.g., 
player 421). Participants carried out the two Cyberball games in a fixed order (i.e., first the 
‘inclusion condition’ followed by the ‘observed exclusion condition’) based on prior research 
that employed a within-subject design (Gunther Moor, et al., 2012; Masten et al., 2011b). By 
doing so, participants had a feeling for how the game worked and were familiarized with the 
social nature of the game and the possible consequences of exclusion. In the inclusion condition 
participants played with two players (includers) where each of the three players received the ball 
an equal number of times (10 out of 30 trials). Participants could throw the ball to either one of 
the players by a mouse click on the player’s ID. Next, participants played the observed exclusion 
condition during which they witnessed the exclusion of an unfamiliar peer by two novel players 
(excluders). Both excluders and the excluded player (victim) were novel players with unique 
player IDs. In this game, the victim received the ball once at the start of the game and did not 
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receive the ball on any of the following 28 trials. Following the standard cover story used in the 
Cyberball experiments, participants were instructed to imagine what the other players looked 
like, what kind of personalities they would have and how the game would be played in real life 
(Williams, 2007). In the current study, to keep the participants further engaged in the task, 
they were asked to keep track of the number of times each player received the ball during both 
Cyberball games. They could write down the IDs of each player on a form with a depiction 
of the characters in the game and score each player’s ball possession. The player IDs were of 
use during the economic games and other questions about the Cyberball players later in the 
experiment. Participants were omitted from further analyses when they failed to write down 
these IDs.
Economic games
Following the two games of Cyberball, participants played one-shot version of economic 
games with each player (i.e., the two includers, two excluders and the victim). Participants were 
informed that they would be allocators and that the other players would be recipients. It was 
emphasized that their decisions determined both their own payoffs and those of the recipients. 
Furthermore, the economic games were introduced as the final games of the experiment. 
Consequently, it was clear to the participants that their allocations would have no consequences 
for possible future interactions, and the allocations were therefore not confounded by strategic 
motivations.
Dictator Game.
In the Dictator Game the participants were asked to divide a set of 10 points between 
themselves and each recipient. Participants could choose from seven fixed divisions, namely: 10 
points for themselves, 0 for the other player (10/0); 8 for themselves, and 2 for the other player 
(8/2); 6 for themselves, 4 for the other player (6/4); 5 for themselves, 5 for the other player (5/5); 
4 for themselves, 6 for the other player (6/4); 2 for themselves, 8 for the other player (2/8); or 0 
for themselves, 10 for the other player (0/10). These divisions were depicted by numbers on the 
computer screen from left to right with the 5/5 option in the middle of the screen.  
Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game. 
The Altruistic Punishment/Compensation Game (APCG) is based on classic altruistic 
punishment studies, where a third-party individual (C) can invest money in order to punish 
a violator (A) of economic fairness norms in an exchange with B (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). 
For each point used to punish, A’s outcomes are reduced by 3 points. In the modified version 
introduced by Leliveld et al. (2012), there is also an altruistic compensation condition where 
participants can choose to compensate the victim of inequality (B) by increasing B’s outcomes 
by 3 points for each point paid. In the current experiment, participants were given 10 points, of 
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which they could invest 0, 1, 2, or 3 points to either compensate or punish each player (the two 
includers, two excluders and the victim). For each point invested, three points would be either 
added to (compensation) or subtracted from (punishment) the outcome of the recipient. To 
make the task clear to participants of all ages and to keep the number of decision-moments to a 
minimum, participants could choose from seven fixed divisions: three compensation options (7 
points for themselves and 19 for the other player [7/19], 8 for themselves and 16 for the other 
player [8/16], 9 for themselves and 13 for the other player [9/13]), one equitable option (10 for 
themselves, 10 for the other player [10/10]), and 3 punishment options (9 for themselves and 7 
for the other player [9/7], 8 for themselves and 4 for the other player [8/4], or 7 for themselves 
and 1 for the other player [7/1]). These divisions were depicted by numbers on the computer 
screen from left to right with the 10/10 option in the middle of the screen.
Mood reports and state affective perspective-taking
Mood ratings were taken at three time points: (i) at baseline prior to playing the first 
Cyberball game, (ii) after inclusion, and (iii) after the observed exclusion condition. Besides 
reporting their own mood, participants were asked to give an estimate of the victim’s mood. 
This perceived mood of the victim was used to calculate an index of state affective perspective-
taking, defined as the discrimination between mood of the self and perceived mood of the 
victim (mood self–mood victim). The mood questionnaire consisted of eight mood items 
(feeling good, bad, happy, sad, relaxed, tense, friendly and unfriendly; see also Gunther Moor, et 
al., 2012). All of the mood items were rated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) and 
negative mood items (bad, sad, tense, unfriendly) were recoded. Internal consistency of the scale 
proved to be adequate (Cronbach’s α >.69 at each time point). Therefore, all eight items were 
averaged to calculate a composite score for mood.
Trait perspective-taking
Participants completed the perspective taking subscale (six items) of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) to assess dispositional perspective taking, i.e., the tendency 
to adopt another person’s point of view (e.g., “I sometimes try to understand my friends better 
by imagining how things look from their perspective”; “When I get mad at someone, I try to 
imagine what they might be thinking”). All items were rated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(very much). Internal consistency of the subscale was adequate (Cronbach’s α = .67) resulting in 
all six items to be averaged to a composite score of self-reported trait perspective-taking.
Procedure
First, permission was obtained from teachers and school authorities. Next, informed consent 
was acquired from the parents of all participating children and adolescents. Children and 
adolescents filled out the perspective taking subscale of the IRI in their classroom, while their 
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teacher and two researchers were present. Subsequently, participants were taken to separate 
quiet testing rooms in their school where they completed the Cyberball games, mood ratings 
and economic games on a laptop in approximately 30–45 min. At the end of the experiment, 
the participants were fully debriefed in their classroom. They were told that total profits in their 
class ranged from €1.70 - 2.30 and that each participant would be paid €2. Adults were recruited 
through flyers and the university’s course credits system. After signing consent forms, they were 
tested in separate testing booths in a lab at the university. They were debriefed immediately 
after the experiment. Finally, adult subjects could opt either for course credit or an endowment 
of money (€6.50), in addition to the amount they earned during the game. The procedure was 
approved by the local ethics committee.
Data-analysis
Points that were allocated to the two includers and the two excluders were averaged 
separately and submitted to a within-subject analysis of point transfer to the includers, excluders 
and the victim. Since DG and APCG allocations were not distributed normally, the data were 
analyzed using comparable nonparametric tests as well. These analyses yielded the same results 
as the parametric tests. In case Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated, the degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity.
5.3 RESULTS
Age differences in fairness considerations following observed social 
exclusion
The first question that was tested was whether fairness considerations toward includers, 
excluders and the victim differ at various phases of adolescent development. To this end, a 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed with recipient (3 levels: includers vs. excluders vs. 
victim) as the within-subjects factor and age group (5 levels: 9-, 11-, 14-, 16- and 22-years) as 
the between-subjects factor for number of points transferred in the DG. There was a significant 
main effect of recipient, F(2, 356) = 48.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .22, and a significant interaction effect 
between recipient and age group, F(8, 356) = 5.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. There was no main effect 
of age group, F(4,178) = 1.63, p = .17, ηp2 = .04.
Post hoc repeated measures ANOVAs were performed for each age group separately to 
further examine the interaction effect. These analyses demonstrated that there was a significant 
effect of recipient for 11-, 14-, 16-, and 22-year-olds (all ps < .01, all ηp2 > .14), but not for 
9-year-olds, F(2, 52) = 1.44, p = .247 , ηp2 = . 05. These analyses further revealed that: (i) 11-year-
olds transferred more points to the victim as opposed to the other recipients (both ps < .01), 
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there was no difference between points allocated to the includers and the excluders (p = .17), 
and (ii) participants in the three older age groups allocated most points to the victim, fewer to 
the includers and fewest to the excluders (all ps < .05; see Figure 5.1). 
Regression analyses with age as a predictor for each recipient separately confirmed that 
there was an age-related linear increase in points allocated to the victim, F(1,181) = 6.34, p 
< .05, r = .18, and no age difference in points allocated to the includers, F(1,181) = 1.63, p = 
.20, r = .09. With respect to the excluders there was no significant linear decrease with age, 
F(1,181) = 0.38, p = .54, r = .05, but a significant quadratic trend, F(2,180) = 3.75, p < .05, 
r = .20. Examination of this quadratic trend indicated a gradual decrease in points allocated 
to the excluders with age across adolescence with a negative peak around age 16, followed 
by an increase in young adults. Taken together, these findings indicate that with increasing 





























Includers Excluders Victim 
Figure 5.1 Mean points transferred in the Dictator Game to the three different recipients previously encoun-
tered in the Cyberball games displayed for each age group (error bars represent standard errors of the mean).
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Age differences in altruistic punishment of excluders and compensation of 
the victim
To investigate developmental differences in altruistic punishment of excluders and
compensation of victims, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed with recipient (3 lev-
els: includers vs. excluders vs. victim) as the within-subjects factor and age group (5 levels: 9-, 
11-, 14-, 16- and 22-years) as the between-subjects factor and the number of points allocated 
in the APCG as the dependent variable. There was a significant main effect of recipient, F(2, 
236) = 63.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .35 and a significant interaction effect between recipient and age 
group, F(8, 236) = 4.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. There was no main effect of age group, F(4,118) = 
0.46, p = .77, ηp2 = .02.
Post hoc repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed for each age group separately 
to further investigate the interaction effect. These analyses demonstrated that there was a 
significant effect of recipient for all age-groups (all ps < .05, all ηp2 > .12), except for 11-year-
olds, F(2, 54) = 2.81, p = .087, ηp2 = .09. These analyses further revealed that: (i) 9-year-old 
children transferred more points to the victim as opposed to the other recipients (both ps < 
.05), but there was no difference between points awarded to the includers and the excluders (p 
= .74), and (ii) 14-year-olds significantly awarded less points to the excluders (p < .01 compared 
to the includers and victim), but did not significantly differentiate between the victim and the 
includers (p = .50); and iii) participants in the two older age groups granted most points to the 
victim, fewer to the includers and fewest to the excluders (all ps < .01; see Figure 5.2). 
Regression analyses with age as a predictor for each recipient separately demonstrated that 
there were no age-related changes in points granted to the victim and to the includers (all 
F(1,121) < 1.98, p > .16). With respect to the excluders, however, we found a quadratic trend, 
F(2,120) = 5.27, p < .01, which indicated a gradual decrease in the number of points granted 
to the excluders with age across adolescence with a peak at 16 years, followed by an increase in 
the young adults. 
Mood and state affective perspective-taking
To investigate the influence of observing social exclusion on mood, a repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed with time point (4 levels: baseline, inclusion, exclusion, and victim) 
as the within-subjects factor and age group (5 levels: 9-, 11-, 14-, 16- and 22-years) as the 
between-subjects factor for overall mood scores. There was a significant main effect of time 
point, F(3, 531) = 235.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .57 and a significant interaction effect between time 
point and age group, F(12, 531) = 2.43, p < .05, ηp2 = .05. There was no main effect of age group, 
F(4,177) = 1.52, p = .20, ηp2 = .03.
Post hoc repeated measures ANOVAs showed that there was no significant difference in 
mood between baseline and inclusion (p = .14). However, mood scores significantly dropped 
following observed exclusion (p < .001) and this did not differ between age groups (p = .87). 
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Thus, participants in each age group reported lower mood after observing the exclusion of a peer. 
Furthermore, these analyses revealed developmental differences in state affective perspective-
taking, such that 9-year-olds did not report a difference between their own mood and the mood 
of the victim (p = .32), while participants of the other age groups perceived the mood of the 
victim to be lower than their own mood (all ps < .001; see Figure 5.3). 
Perspective taking and exchange behavior
The two measures of perspective taking were not significantly correlated, r = -.07, p = .38, 
indicating that these measures reflect independent aspects of perspective-taking skills. The 
analyses examining the relation between perspective-taking and allocations in the DG toward 
the victim and the excluder were thus performed separately for our self-report measure of 
trait perspective-taking and state affective perspective-taking. Affective perspective-taking 
correlated positively with age (r = .16, p < .05). A multiple regression analysis with affective 
perspective-taking and age as predictors significantly predicted compensation of the victim 
(DG allocation victim – DG allocation includers), R2 = .04, F(2, 179) = 3.95, p < .05. However, 







































Includers Excluders Victim 
Figure 5.2 Mean points allocated in the Altruistic Punishment/ Compensation Game to the three different 
recipients previously encountered in the Cyberball games displayed for each age group (error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean).
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.166, t(179) = 2.24, p < .05, whereas age was not, β = .098, t(179) = 1.32, p = .19. With respect 
to punishment of the excluders (DG allocation excluders – DG allocation includers) we found 
a similar effect, R2 = .04, F(2, 179) = 3.43, p < .05. Again, age was not a significant predictor, β 
= - 0.097, t(179) = -1.31, p = .19, but affective perspective-taking was, β = -0.15, t(179) = -2.03, 
p < .05. Thus, individual differences in estimating the mood of the victim to be lower than one’s 
own mood were related to an increase in point transfer in the DG toward the victim and a 
decrease toward excluders, when controlling for age. 
Self-reported trait perspective-taking scores as measured by the IRI subscale also correlated 
with age (r = .20, p < .01). A multiple regression analysis with trait perspective-taking and age as 
predictors did not predict compensation of the victim (DG allocation victim – DG allocation 
includers), R2 = 0.03, F(2, 175) = 2.46, p = .09. Neither trait perspective-taking, β = -.112, t(175) 
= -1.48, p = .14, nor age, β = .146, t(175) = 1.91, p = .06, were significant predictors in this 
model. Also punishment of the excluders (DG allocation excluders – DG allocation includers) 
could not be predicted by trait perspective-taking, R2 = .02, F(2, 175) = 1.48, p = .23. Again, IRI 












Baseline Inclusion Observed exclusion Estimate of victim 
Figure 5.3 Overall mood ratings for each of the five age groups at different time points: at baseline, after being 
included, after observing the exclusion of a peer, and a mood estimate for the victim of exclusion (error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean).
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was age in this model, β = - 0.108, t(175) = -1.41, p = .16.  
5.4 DISCUSSION
The current study set out to investigate punishment of excluders and compensation of victims 
after observing an instance of social exclusion at various phases of adolescent development. 
The results make four significant contributions to the literature on the development of social 
decision making with peers and perspective taking. First, observers of social exclusion show 
age-related differential treatment of victims and excluders when making decisions about 
fairness. Second, altruistic punishment of the excluders displayed a protracted developmental 
pattern compared to altruistic compensation of the victim. Third, we obtained evidence of 
developmental differences between late childhood and early adolescence in a state measure 
of affective perspective-taking, defined as the discrimination between mood of the self and 
perceived mood of the victim. Fourth, individual differences in affective perspective-taking 
predicted both more pronounced compensation of the victim and stronger punishment of the 
excluders.
Fairness considerations following observed social exclusion
The first main finding is that fairness considerations toward victims and excluders differ 
at various points of adolescent development. With increasing age, participants shared more 
of their money with the victim and less with the excluders, compared to the includers. This 
result adds to the growing body of evidence that during adolescence fairness considerations 
become less strictly egalitarian and progressively more complex. That is, adolescents incorporate 
gradually more social information when deciding what is fair or not, e.g., their interaction 
partner’s intentionality (Güroğlu, et al., 2009) or individual contributions to a group effort 
(Almås, Cappelen, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2010). Furthermore, our results show that 9-year-
olds on average shared 40 to 50% of the stake with unfamiliar peers (regardless of the recipient’s 
prior behavior). This supports the notion that a preference for equal outcomes develops as a 
strong motivator in fairness considerations prior to entering adolescence (Blake & McAuliffe, 
2011; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008). Further, while treatment of the victim and the 
excluders differed between age groups, we found no developmental differences in mood levels 
following observed exclusion. This result suggests a crude automatic affective response to the 
social exclusion of another person (Wesselmann et al., 2009), which develops before adolescence.
Punishment of excluders and compensation of the victim
While altruistic punishment and compensation have been shown to be crucial for the 
enforcement of social norms and maintenance of large-scale cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 
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2002; Yamagishi, 1986), its developmental trajectory has remained largely overlooked (but see 
Kenward & Dahl, 2011; Kenward & Östh, 2012). Here, we show that third-party decision 
making (e.g., altruistic punishment and compensation) in a setting of observed social exclusion 
differs at various points across adolescent development. Moreover, altruistic punishment 
and compensation were shown to have differential developmental patterns. With respect to 
compensation of the victims, the results of the two games show slightly different patterns. In 
the DG, participants allocated progressively more points to the victim compared to the other 
players, with increasing age. This suggests an increased concern for the excluded peer and more 
compensation behavior at the expense of the participants’ own gain. However, when comparing 
the two games, the 9-year-olds displayed more compensation behavior in the APCG than in 
the DG. It could be that 9-year-olds give more precedence to norms of distributive equality, 
which is reflected in their sharing of 40% to 50% of the stake with all recipients. Consequently, 
when offering each recipient an equal split (regardless of prior behavior), compensation of the 
victim would require offering more than 50% of the stake, which could have been regarded 
as too generous. In the APCG on the other hand, compensating the victim was less costly 
(ranging from 10 to 30% of the stake) and yielded a relatively easier way for compensation (as 
three times the offer was given to the recipient). Thus, the context of the game (i.e., the possible 
options) may have guided participants to more compensation in the APCG.
The second important issue was whether children and adolescents exhibit third-party 
punishment of excluders and how this develops across adolescence. Here, we differentiated 
between beneficial punishment (in the DG) and costly or altruistic punishment (in the APCG). 
Results from both games in the present study demonstrate the same slower developmental 
trajectory compared to compensation. Furthermore, analyses also revealed an age-related 
quadratic trend, showing that adults punished less severely than 16-year-olds. This was not 
likely due to an age-related increase in self-maximization after age 16, because the quadratic 
trend was also observed in the DG, where adults allocated more money to the excluders than 
the adolescents. This corroborates previous findings on a developmental decrease between 
late adolescence and early adulthood in punishment severity using a DG (Gunther Moor, et 
al., 2012) and a Costly Punishment Game (van den Bos, van Dijk, & Crone, 2012) when 
participants are victims of a social norm-violation themselves.
What could account for these developmental declines in punishment severity between late 
adolescence and young adulthood? First, while the negative affect associated with witnessing 
social exclusion might be similar for adolescents and adults, adults might punish less severely due 
to increased levels of emotion regulation. Emotions, such as anger, have been associated with an 
increased likelihood of altruistic punishment (Seip, Van Dijk, & Rotteveel, 2009) and age-related 
decreases in costly punishment are mediated by decreases in anger (van den Bos, et al., 2012). 
Other possibilities include developmental differences in social desirability, involvement in the 
situation and social norms. It could be that adolescents view social exclusion as a more critical 
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transgression compared to young adults, which in turn demands more rigorous punishment. 
Indeed, the extent to which adolescents worry about peer acceptance has been found to increase 
during adolescence and to decline around age 17–18 (Kloep, 1999). Furthermore, adolescents 
perceive peer evaluations as crucial determinants of self-worth (O’Brien & Bierman, 1988). 
Nonetheless, this hypersensitivity to rejection in adolescence cannot explain why the 16-year-
olds demonstrated more punishment behavior than the 14-year-olds. In future research it will 
be of considerable interest to examine these different explanations for the developmental trend 
in punishment following observed exclusion.
Punishment, compensation, and perspective taking
The developmental difference between late childhood and early adolescence in affective 
perspective-taking is supported by research demonstrating continued development of affective 
theory of mind during adolescence (Sebastian et al., 2012). Importantly, the index of state 
affective perspective-taking not only predicted increased prosocial behavior toward the victim 
but also decreased prosocial behavior toward the excluders. What could account for the result 
that the state measure of affective perspective-taking is a better predictor of behavior toward 
excluders and the victim than individual differences in dispositional perspective-taking? Perhaps 
it is the specific nature of the situation (e.g., social exclusion) that does not elicit prosocial 
responses in individuals generally high in trait perspective-taking, or conversely, witnessing 
social exclusion might evoke punishment and compensation behavior also in individuals low in 
trait perspective taking. Our findings suggest that people not only have to possess the tendency 
to adopt someone else’s point of view, but actually have to infer the affective state of the victim 
to be lower than their own in order to act more prosocially toward them as a result.
Consequently, we believe that our index of the discrimination between mood of the self 
and perceived mood of the victim could be a valuable measure for assessing state affective 
perspectivetaking. By employing a difference score as opposed to merely using perceived mood 
of the victim we control for personal distress, which might result from the observation of 
exclusion. Personal distress is a self-oriented aversive emotional response to the apprehension 
of another person’s affective state and has been associated with decreases in prosocial behavior 
(Decety & Meyer, 2008). Nonetheless, the findings of the current study do not allow us to 
determine precisely whether the developmental differences in affective perspective-taking 
are due to an inability to inhibit one’s own perspective when asked about another person’s 
perspective or a failure to deduct the victim’s distress (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Decety & Meyer, 
2008). Future research could address this issue and further investigate the links between this 
state measure of affective perspective-taking and measures of dispositional perspective-taking. 
Limitations
Several limitations to the current study should be considered. First, it could be argued 
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that our study was susceptible to demand characteristics, e.g., an artifact that could make 
participants aware of the study’s goals, which possibly could have influenced their behavior. We 
aimed to reduce possible consequences of demand characteristics by using economic games to 
measure social behavior. That is, economic games are anonymous, so concerns about participants 
presenting themselves as more generous, empathic or moral were likely reduced. Moreover, the 
participant’s decisions had actual consequences for their payoffs. 
Second, to make our data comparable to the adult literature on altruistic punishment and 
compensation, we used a version of Cyberball in which ball possession resulted in receiving 
points (van Beest & Williams, 2006). Behavior in the economic games thus reflects other-
regarding preferences aimed at increasing or decreasing another person’s welfare, either 
motivated by a concern for economic fairness or a pure motivation to compensate or punish. 
Future research should test whether a study design where exclusion does not have monetary 
consequences results in different patterns of punishment and compensation behavior. 
Third, future studies should examine the developmental trends in punishment and 
compensation behavior longitudinally using comparable paradigms in order to rule out the role 
of possible cohort differences and to further study the role of participant characteristics that 
might be associated with the developmental effects.
Conclusions and future directions
The current findings revealed developmental differences across adolescence in treatment 
of victims and initiators of social exclusion. With increasing age, adolescents sacrificed an 
increasingly bigger share of their own resources to compensate victims of social exclusion and 
to punish excluders. Our results confirm the hypothesis that affective perspective taking is 
important for acting prosocially in situations where the victim’s feelings need to be inferred 
without explicit emotional cues. Independent of age, people who perceived the mood of the 
victim to be lower than their own, showed increased prosocial behavior toward the victim and 
punished the excluders. 
To conclude, a better understanding of the development of the cognitive and affective 
mechanisms underlying social decision-making processes is indispensible for the study of 
social and moral development across adolescence. While elucidating developmental differences 
is a crucial first step, future research should investigate individual differences in children and 
adolescents’ reactions to social exclusion and other forms of victimization. Individual differences 
related to peer status, pubertal development, or rejection sensitivity are highly relevant and 
might be particularly crucial in identifying those children and adolescents who are at risk for 
developing psychosocial problems.
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ABSTRACT
In this chapter we review evidence for the hypothesis that developmental changes in the abil-
ities to control impulses and to take other people’s perspective are crucial in understanding 
age-related changes in social behavior. Studies that have examined the developmental roots 
of prosocial behavior and (strategic) fairness using experimental economic games show that 
other-oriented concern and a preference for fairness emerge early in development. Continued 
development of intentionality understanding and strategic behavior in bargaining situations 
suggest that perspective taking and cognitive control undergo extended development and con-
tinue to contribute to changes in social behavior well into adolescence. Furthermore, functional 
developmental neuroimaging studies have shown that these behavioral changes are accompa-
nied by an increased recruitment of brain regions implicated in impulse control (e.g. dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex) and perspective taking (e.g. temporo-parietal junction). Together these 
studies show that developmental changes in impulse control and perspective taking and their 
underlying neural circuitry are associated with progressively more strategic thinking and an 
increased incorporation of other’s perspectives into social decision-making across development.
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Beginning early in ontogeny humans show levels of sociality that surpass those of other 
species (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). For example, 1-year-old toddlers help others to achieve 
a goal by pointing toward, or picking up, objects that are needed to successfully complete an 
action without any explicit request or reward (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Despite the 
early emergence of key social tendencies, social behavior continues to develop and grow in 
complexity across childhood and adolescence. Children expand their behavioral repertoire 
with social tactics, such as teasing and deception, and they increasingly learn to take other 
people’s feelings into account in their social responses (Burnett & Blakemore, 2009a). For 
instance, whereas preschoolers mainly use deception to their own benefit, school-aged children 
increasingly start to use deception to protect other’s feelings (e.g. telling ‘white lies’) (Talwar, 
Murphy, & Lee, 2007). 
Developmental changes in social behavior are thought to be supported by developmental 
changes in general cognitive functions like impulse control and specific social cognitive functions 
such as the ability to adopt another person’s perspective (e.g. perspective taking). Controlling 
impulses is of crucial importance for the regulation of social behavior and continues to develop 
across childhood and adolescence (Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; Rueda, 
Rothbart, McCandliss, Saccomanno, & Posner, 2005). Children acquire a core component of 
perspective taking when they develop an understanding that other people’s mental states might 
differ from their own (Wellman et al., 2001). Even though this ‘theory of mind’ emerges before 
adolescence, more advanced forms of perspective taking needed to act on the understanding of 
other people’s mental states continue to develop during adolescence (Dumontheil, Apperly, & 
Blakemore, 2010; Selman, 1980). This rather protracted development of both impulse control 
and perspective taking is likely to contribute to developmental changes in social behavior across 
adolescence and into adulthood. This implication is central in the neurobiological models of 
social development which posit that continued structural development of the brain is associated 
with functional changes in brain networks implicated in cognitive control and social cognition, 
which in turn contribute to developmental changes in social behavior (Blakemore, 2008; Crone 
& Dahl, 2012; Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005). 
In this chapter we review evidence for the hypothesis that the gradual development of 
impulse control and perspective-taking skills are associated with progressively more strategic 
thinking and an increased incorporation of other’s intentions in social decision-making. In the 
following sections, we first describe why paradigms from behavioral economics provide valuable 
tools to study developmental changes in social behavior and its underlying mechanisms (6.2). 
Subsequently, we describe the age-related behavioral changes in these games (6.3), followed 
by evidence linking these behavioral changes to children’s developing abilities to control 
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selfish impulses and to take other people’s perspective (6.4). Next, we focus on functional 
neuroimaging studies showing that social decision-making in adults relies on separable, 
but interacting, networks in the brain (6.5). Finally, we review recent neuroimaging studies 
demonstrating differential development of the brain networks involved in social decision-
making (6.6), supporting the proposition that increased intentionality understanding and 
strategic motivations in social decision-making are associated with developmental changes in 
these networks. 
6.2 WHY USE ECONOMIC GAMES TO 
STUDY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT?
To investigate the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying social decision-
making, psychologists and neuroscientists have turned to game theoretical paradigms derived 
from behavioral economics (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). These paradigms offer a context of social 
interactions where the decisions people make have actual consequences for their own and their 
interaction partner’s outcomes. Two of these games, namely the Ultimatum Game and the 
Dictator Game, have proven to be valuable tools to study concerns about fairness. In these two-
player exchange games one player (i.e., the proposer) is given a set of valuable rewards, such as 
money, candy or stickers and is given the opportunity to propose a split of the rewards between 
themselves and a second player. In the Ultimatum Game the second player (i.e., the responder) 
can either accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal is accepted, both players receive their 
part of the stake as proposed. In case of rejection, neither of the players receives anything (Güth 
et al., 1982). The Dictator Game is different in the sense that the responder (i.e., the recipient in 
this case) does not have the power to reject the proposal and thus passively receives the amount 
of rewards that the first player transfers (Forsythe et al., 1994). 
Game theoretical models assume that humans are rational decision-makers who act to 
maximize personal outcomes (Camerer, 2003). Accordingly, game theory predicts that 
Ultimatum Game proposers would make the smallest offer possible and that responders would 
accept any offer greater than zero. However, findings show that (adult) proposers and responders 
do not follow the game theoretical predictions: proposers offer most often an equal split and 
responders usually reject offers smaller than 20% of the stake (Camerer, 2003). In the Dictator 
Game, there is no possibility for reciprocation or retribution for the recipient, so game theory 
would predict that proposers would keep the entire set of rewards to themselves. Interestingly, 
proposers in the Dictator Game rarely act in accordance with these predictions. Adult humans 
transfer on average 20 to 30% of the stake to anonymous others with 50% of the stake typically 
being one of the most frequently occurring offers (Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoffman, Mccabe, 
Shachat, & Smith, 1994). These deviations from the game theoretical predictions suggest that 
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people not only have an interest in maximizing their own payoffs but also have a concern for the 
other person’s outcomes. Importantly, whereas the positive offers in the Dictator Game reflect 
other-regarding concern, the comparatively larger offers in the Ultimatum Game suggest that 
strategic considerations aimed at reducing the possibility of rejection also play a role in decisions 
about fairness. In addition, the consistently found rejections of unfair Ultimatum Game offers 
suggest an aversive response to receiving less than the proposer (known as ‘disadvantageous 
inequity aversion’) and rejection of the offer possibly provides the responder with a way of 
correcting such inequity (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
Using these games for developmental research offers several advantages (Gummerum, 
Hanoch, & Keller, 2008). First, an important advantage is that the same paradigm can be used 
across a wide age range (from children as young as 3 years old to adults), enabling meaningful 
comparisons between different age groups. Second, the structured nature of the games makes 
it possible to quantify complex social behavior, which makes them useful for neuroimaging 
research. Third, these games allow for experimental manipulations where subcomponents of 
social decision-making, such as understanding another person’s intentions and controlling 
selfish impulses, can be disentangled. Such subcomponents of decision-making might be 
differentially sensitive to developmental change. For example, emotional reactions to unfairness 
might mature earlier than an understanding of an interaction partner’s intentions, which 
might depend on slowly developing cognitive functions. Psychological and neural mechanisms 
underlying such sub processes can further be investigated by relating age-related and age-
independent individual differences in behavior and neural activation to external measures 
of cognitive control (e.g. inhibition tasks) or perspective taking (e.g. theory of mind tasks). 
By doing so, one can examine how different cognitive functions and their underlying neural 
substrates are involved in developmental changes in social behavior. 
6.3 DEVELOPMENT OF A PREFERENCE FOR 
FAIRNESS
Concern for another person’s wellbeing has strong developmental roots and emerges at 
very young ages. Twelve- to 18-month old infants willingly engage in instrumental helping 
of an adult who has dropped (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) or misplaced (Liszkowski, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008) an object that is needed to complete an action and during the 
second year of life toddlers start to comfort others in distress (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, 
Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). Nonetheless, infants and toddlers are much more reluctant to 
show prosocial behavior when it is costly, i.e. when they have to give up some of their own 
possessions to benefit another person (Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010). Developmental 
studies employing the Dictator Game have shown that although children tend to keep most of 
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the resources to themselves, the size of their donations increase with age between the ages of 
3 and 8 (Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 2007; Blake & Rand, 2010; Smith, Blake, & Harris, 
2013) and no longer differs from donations made by adults after age 9 (Gummerum, Keller, 
Takezawa, & Mata, 2008; Güroğlu et al., 2009; Steinbeis et al., 2012). 
Interestingly, this developmental increase in costly sharing is not due to developmental 
differences in explicit knowledge about what constitutes a fair (i.e., in most cases equal) 
distribution of resources. Infants as young as 15 months already expect resources to be 
distributed equally as indicated by prolonged eye gazes in situations when resources are 
distributed unequally between two recipients compared to situations where both recipients 
receive an equal amount of resources (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Sloane, Baillargeon, & 
Premack, 2012). A recent study showed that, although 3 year-olds do not differ from 8-year-
olds in their judgments about what constitutes an equal division of rewards, they still tend to 
keep more than half of the rewards to themselves in a Dictator Game and the willingness to give 
away half of the rewards increases between the ages of 3 to 8 (Smith et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
converging evidence from developmental investigations of rejections of unequal distributions 
confirms that the willingness to incur costs to avoid unequal outcomes (“I’d rather receive 
nothing than less than the other”) increases between age 3 and 8 (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011). 
Also when distributing resources, 8-year-olds appear not to choose a distribution that favors a 
peer; even when this has no consequences for their own outcomes (Fehr et al., 2008; Shaw et 
al., 2013; Shaw & Olson, 2012). Taken together, these findings suggest that a developing sense 
of fairness makes children increasingly enforce equality when this is costly, but that it does not 
make them necessarily more generous or tolerant of higher outcomes for a peer.
Investigations of proposer behavior in the Ultimatum Game show that not only a prosocial 
concern about the other person’s profits or equal outcomes plays a role in fairness considerations, 
but also that strategic considerations aimed at reducing the possibility of rejection come into 
play. That is, adults tend to offer higher shares of the stake (closer to an equal split of the rewards) 
when the second player can punish unfair offers (e.g. by rejecting them in an Ultimatum Game) 
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b; Spitzer, Fischbacher, Herrnberger, Grön, & Fehr, 2007). As such, 
the difference in Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game offers provides a measure of strategic 
social behavior. During late childhood (age 7-10), children start making higher Ultimatum 
Game proposals compared to Dictator Game allocations, but their Ultimatum Game proposals 
are still smaller than those proposed by adults (Harbaugh, 2003). During adolescence, the 
difference between Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game offers becomes progressively greater, 
suggesting a developmental increase in strategic behavior across adolescence (Güroğlu et al., 
2009; Leman et al., 2009). The results from these studies also demonstrate that the increasing 
discrepancy between Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game offers is driven by increasingly 
higher Ultimatum Game offers and that Dictator Game offers made by children in late 
childhood do not differ from adult Dictator Game offers (Güroğlu et al., 2009; Steinbeis et 
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al., 2012). Taken together these studies show that a prosocial tendency to share resources with 
another person emerges early in development, but social behavior seems to become increasingly 
strategic across childhood and adolescence. 
6.4 IMPULSE CONTROL AND PERSPECTIVE 
TAKING 
Strategic bargaining depends on the notion that unfair Ultimatum Game proposals can 
be punished, while Dictator Game proposals cannot. Recently, it was demonstrated that 
strategic bargaining assessed as the difference between Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game 
Figure 6.1 Age-related changes in strategic behavior and recruitment of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC): (A) Strategic behavior (Ultimatum Game (UG) proposals – Dictator Game (DG) proposals) in-
creased with age; (B) More strategic behavior was associated with better performance on a measure of impulse 
control (lower stop-signal reaction times [SSRTs] represent enhanced impulse control); (C) Older children 
recruited the left dlPFC to a larger extent when making offers in the UG compared to the DG; (D) More stra-
tegic behavior was associated with higher activation in left dlPFC when making offers in the UG compared to 
the DG; (E) Higher levels of impulse control were associated with higher activation levels in left dlPFC when 




offers is associated with the developing capacity to control impulses (Steinbeis et al., 2012). 
The difference between the number of rewards transferred in the Ultimatum Game and in 
the Dictator Game increased between the ages of 6 and 14 (see Figure 6.1A). Furthermore, 
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irrespective of age, children and adults who were better at controlling a prepotent motor response 
in a stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) task, also showed more strategic behavior (see Figure 
6.1B). These findings suggest that strategic social behavior relies on the capacity to implement 
behavioral control over a selfish impulse of keeping all resources to oneself in situations where 
selfish behavior can be punished.
In addition, it has been argued that proposers have to take the responder’s perspective in 
order to infer what kind of offers is likely to be rejected (Singer, 2006; Singer & Fehr, 2005). 
Indeed, 4-5 year old children who passed a false-belief task (a task to probe the acquisition of 
a theory of mind), more often proposed a fair offer in the Ultimatum Game than same-aged 
peers who failed to pass this task (Takagishi et al., 2010). Furthermore, children with deficits in 
perspective taking such as children with autism spectrum disorders tend to propose self-serving 
unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game (Sally & Hill, 2006). Interestingly, a prosocial tendency 
to share at least some part of one’s resources with a peer in a Dictator Game is no different 
in children with autism spectrum disorders, suggesting that perspective-taking abilities are 
especially important when social interactions have a strategic component. 
Further evidence for a role of perspective taking in decisions about fairness comes from 
studies that have shown that identical unfair Ultimatum Game offers (in terms of monetary 
outcomes) are rejected at different rates, depending on the alternative offer that was available 
to the proposer (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2003). Specifically, an unfair offer is less often 
rejected when the proposer had no better alternative (e.g., a less unfair distribution of the 
stake) compared to cases where the proposer indeed had a fair alternative to share the stake 
equally. This suggests that responders not only judge the fairness of an offer by its absolute 
value or the relative profits in comparison with the proposer’s profits, but also in terms of 
the proposer’s intentions behind an unfair offer. Several studies examining developmental 
differences in responses to unfair Ultimatum Game offers with varying alternative options 
indeed showed interesting age differences in such intentionality understanding in fairness 
considerations (Güroğlu et al., 2009; Sutter, 2007). A comparison of four age groups in distinct 
phases of development (9 year-old pre-adolescents, 12 year-old early adolescents, 15 year-olds 
mid-adolescents and 18-year-old late adolescents/young adults) showed that rejection rates of 
an unfair offer where the proposer had no other alternative decreased between the ages of 9 and 
18. Furthermore, 9-year-olds rejected monetarily identical unfair offers regardless of whether 
the proposer had a fair alternative, no alternative or an even more unfair alternative. With 
increasing age, adolescent proposers and responders flexibly adapted their bargaining behavior 
in accordance with the alternative that is available to an unfair distribution, suggesting an age-
related increase in the incorporation of the proposer’s intentionality behind an unfair offer (“it 
is unfair, but there was no better alternative”) into the decision-making process (Güroğlu et al., 
2009).
The role of perspective taking in social decision-making has also been investigated using 
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another economic game called the Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In the 
Trust Game the first player (the trustor) is given the choice of either splitting the stake with 
a second player (the trustee) or transferring the entire endowment to the trustee and let the 
trustee split the stake. When the trustor decides to trust the trustee by transferring everything, 
the stake is multiplied (usually by 3 or 4). The trustee can reciprocate trust by sharing this higher 
stake equally, or defect trust and keep all the money. Developmental studies have shown that 
the frequency of trusting the second player continues to increase during adolescence (Sutter 
& Kocher, 2007; van den Bos et al., 2010). Furthermore, young adults and older adolescents 
show higher levels of reciprocity than early adolescents and children (van den Bos et al., 2010). 
Moreover, these age differences are most pronounced in situations where the trustor takes a 
larger risk of losing money by trusting the second player (van den Bos et al., 2010). Trust-
decisions become riskier when the amount of money that can be lost in case of defection 
increases. In adults, riskier trust-decisions are met by higher levels of reciprocity, which possibly 
reflects a recognition of the trustor’s positive intentions and an appreciation of the risk the 
trustor took by investing in the trustee (Malhotra, 2004; Pillutla, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 
2003). Van den Bos and colleagues (2010) showed that 9-year-olds did not reciprocate more 
when the trustor took a larger risk than when he/she took a relatively lower risk. This ‘risk-
dependent’ reciprocity gradually increased across adolescence, again suggesting a continuing 
increase in the sensitivity to other people’s intentions well into adulthood.  
Taken together, behavioral studies employing different economic exchange paradigms 
consistently show that cognitive development related to both impulse control and perspective 
taking play a crucial role in understanding age-related changes in social behavior. In the 
following sections, we will review results from neuroimaging studies that provide converging 
evidence for the role of impulse control and perspective taking in social decision-making. 
6.5 NEURAL NETWORKS INVOLVED IN SOCIAL 
DECISION-MAKING
Neuroimaging studies have elucidated a role for three distinct, but interacting, brain networks 
in social decision-making: a basic affective network, a cognitive regulatory network, and a 
mentalizing network (see Figure 6.2) (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). We will first briefly summarize 
findings that provide support for the notion that these three networks contribute to social 
decision-making. Subsequently, we will review the evidence from developmental functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies that show that these networks are differentially 
sensitive to developmental change. Findings from these studies support the hypothesis that 
asynchronous development of these systems is associated with age-related increases in strategic 
social behavior and intentionality understanding in social interactions.
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First, neural structures implicated in the processing of basic positive and negative affect, 
such as the anterior insula (AI) (Sanfey et al., 2003), ventral striatum (Tabibnia, Satpute, & 
Lieberman, 2008) and the amygdala (Haruno & Frith, 2010) are involved in biasing social 
decisions, i.e. whether certain social stimuli should be approached (associated with a positive 
emotional signal) or avoided (associated with a negative emotional signal). For example, 
increased activation of the AI, a brain region that is involved in encoding representations of 
the physiological state of the body and negative affect such as disgust, anger and sadness, has 
been associated with unreciprocated trust (Rilling et al., 2008) and receiving unfair offers in 
an Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al., 2003). Interestingly, the AI is activated not only when 
people receive unfair offers, but also when people observe someone else receiving an unfair 
offer (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013) and when people have to divide resources unequally 
themselves (Hsu, Anen, & Quartz, 2008). In contrast, activation of the ventral striatum, a 
region important for processing rewards, has been associated with mutual cooperation in a 
prisoner’s dilemma (Rilling et al., 2002; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004b) 
and receiving an equal split of the stake in the Ultimatum Game (Tabibnia et al., 2008). Based 
on such findings, it has been argued that brain structures involved in basic emotion processing 
might play a role in signaling pleasantness (ventral striatum) and unpleasantness (AI) of social 
interactions and consequently might give rise to the maintenance or elimination of such 
interactions.  
Figure 6.2. Schematic representation of brain networks involved in social decision-making: basic affective net-
work (pink), cognitive-regulatory network (blue), and mentalizing network (green). TPJ = temporo-parietal 
junction; STS = Superior Temporal Sulcus; TP = temporal pole; dlPFC = dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex; vlPFC 
= ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex; ACC = Anterior Cingulate Cortex; dmPFC = dorsomedial Prefrontal Cor-
tex; vmPFC = ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex.
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Second, brain regions that are involved in the processing of basic positive and negative 
affect interact with a cognitive regulatory network including the dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex (dACC) and regions in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), such as the ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex (vlPFC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). 
Activation in this cognitive regulatory network has been associated with cognitive control over 
selfish impulses and allows individuals to act in a goal-directed manner when there is a conflict 
between self-interest and social norms (Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey et al., 2003). For example, 
activation in lateral regions of the PFC has been associated with strategic bargaining (Spitzer 
et al., 2007) and temporarily disrupting activity in the dlPFC using repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation decreases rejection rates of unfair offers in an Ultimatum Game, while 
leaving explicit fairness judgments unaffected (Knoch et al., 2006). These findings suggest that 
control-related brain regions are of crucial importance for the regulation of (strategic) social 
behavior.
Third, when making social decisions, affective and cognitive regulatory regions interact with 
a third system, namely the mentalizing network. The mentalizing network includes the left and 
right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), superior temporal sulci, ventral and dorsal regions of the 
medial PFC and the temporal poles (Frith & Frith, 2010; Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004). 
Regions in this network are consistently identified in tasks that probe reasoning about other 
people’s mental states (i.e., mental state reasoning or mentalizing), for instance when people 
have to infer other people’s thoughts, beliefs or desires (Blakemore, den Ouden, Choudhury, & 
Frith, 2007; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). Moreover, taking other people’s perspective in economic 
exchange has repeatedly been associated with activation in regions of the mentalizing network, 
such as the TPJ (Güroğlu et al., 2010) and the dorsomedial PFC (Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004a; van den Bos et al., 2009).
6.6 UNDERSTANDING CHANGING SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR FROM A DEVELOPMENTAL 
NEUROSCIENCE PERSPECTIVE
Longitudinal research examining changes in brain structure over time has shown that 
different brain regions reach maturity at different ages (Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 
2004; Shaw et al., 2008; Sowell et al., 2003). That is, sensorimotor regions in the occipital and 
parietal lobes reach maturity first, followed by other parts of the cortex in a posterior to anterior 
direction. In particular, the dlPFC and the TPJ are among the brain regions latest to fully 
mature, developing well into early adulthood, which in turn might (partially) explain a similar 
protracted developmental pattern in their associated functions, such as impulse control (dlFPC) 
and perspective taking (TPJ). Indeed, models of functional brain development have posited 
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that structural brain development might underlie emerging contributions of late maturing 
brain networks to social behavior (Blakemore, 2008; Crone & Dahl, 2012). Importantly, 
whereas affective networks including subcortical brain structures might reach maturity during 
childhood or puberty, regions of the cognitive regulatory network and the mentalizing network 
show continued structural changes well into the second and third decades of life (Goddings et 
al., 2013; Mills, Lalonde, Clasen, Giedd, & Blakemore, 2012). This interplay between structural 
and functional brain development could underlie a developmental asynchrony between earlier 
maturing affective reactions to unfairness (associated with activity in basic affective network) 
and continued development of strategic considerations and intentionality understanding in 
social decision-making (associated with later maturing cognitive regulatory and mentalizing 
networks).
To investigate developmental changes in the neural networks involved in fairness-
related decision-making Güroğlu and colleagues (2011) examined the neural correlates of 
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Figure 6.3 Age-related changes in intentionality understanding in fairness are mediated by age-related increas-
es in recruitment of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ): (A) 
Rejection rates of unfair offers when the proposer could not make a fair offer decrease with age; (B) Rejection 
of unfair offers when the proposer could not make a fair offer is associated with increased recruitment of the 
dlPFC (B) and TPJ (C); the age-related changes in behavior are mediated by neural activation in these regions. 
Adapted from Güroğlu et al. (2011) reprinted with permission.
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intentionality understanding in reactions to unfairness in four phases of development: 10 year-
olds, 13 year-olds, 16 year-olds and a young adults aged 20. Their results showed that age was 
positively associated with TPJ and dlPFC activity when participants were confronted with 
an unfair offer where the proposer had no alternative to making an unfair offer (see Figure 
6.3A). Rejection rates of such unfair offers decreased across adolescence, which again suggests 
that with age, adolescents become increasingly sensitive to the proposer’s intentions behind an 
unfair proposal. Furthermore, mediation analyses showed that age-related decreases in rejection 
rates in this ‘no alternative’ condition were fully mediated by activation in the dlPFC (Figure 
6.3B) and the TPJ (Figure 6.3C). Moreover, no developmental differences were observed in 
dACC and bilateral AI activation during reactions to unfair proposals. Together these findings 
suggest that the detection of violations of fairness norms and underlying neural responses in 
the AI and dACC mature prior to entering adolescence and that the continued development 
of intentionality understanding in decisions about fairness across adolescence is accompanied 
an age-related increase in neural activity in brain regions important for perspective taking (i.e., 
TPJ) and impulse control (i.e., dlPFC). 
The importance of the emerging contribution of dlPFC to the development of strategic 
social behavior was elegantly demonstrated by Steinbeis and colleagues (2012) in a study where 
they asked children (ages 6-13) to be a proposer in both the Ultimatum Game (where unfair 
offers can be punished) and a Dictator Game (where there is no sanction to unfair offers). They 
showed that activity in both left and right dlPFC when making Ultimatum Game proposals 
compared to Dictator Game proposals correlates positively with two measures of strategic 
behavior: 1) the difference between Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game offers (Figure 
6.1D) and 2) the difference between Ultimatum Game offers and the proposers’ beliefs about 
the smallest acceptable offer to the responder. Moreover, they also showed that activity in the 
left dlPFC when making Ultimatum Game proposals compared to Dictator Game proposals 
increases between the ages of 6 and 13 (Figure 6.1C). 
The involvement of brain regions in both the cognitive regulatory network (e.g. dlPFC) and 
the mentalizing network (e.g. the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the TPJ) in perspective 
taking in social interactions has also been studied using the Trust Game. Neuroimaging studies 
with adult participants have demonstrated the involvement of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 
(dmPFC) in decisions to trust (Rilling et al., 2004a), as well as in decisions to defect (McCabe, 
Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001; van den Bos et al., 2009). Given the importance of the 
dmPFC in for self-referential thinking (Amodio & Frith, 2006), it has been suggested that 
these findings reflect an increased attention to one’s own outcomes because both decisions 
involve maximization of payoffs (i.e., trust decisions lead to a multiplication of the stake and 
defect decisions lead to sure gains). Decisions to trust another person have also been shown 
to coincide with TPJ activation, which increases with age into adulthood (Fett, Gromann, 
Giampietro, Shergill, & Krabbendam, 2013).  In addition, TPJ activity has also been associated 
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with receiving trust, in particular in situations in which people received trust from a trustor who 
took a larger risk by trusting them (van den Bos et al., 2009), suggesting that the TPJ is involved 
in shifting attention to the trustor’s perspective when evaluating the risk he/she took.
To investigate the development of the neural correlates of reciprocity and the role of 
perspective taking herein, van den Bos and colleagues (2011) examined trustee behavior in 
three different age groups (early adolescents aged 12–14 years; mid adolescents aged 15–17 
years; and young adults aged 18–22 years). They showed that receiving trust (compared to 
receiving no trust) was associated with increased activation in the left TPJ and right dlPFC 
and that activation in these regions increased linearly with age. Importantly, higher levels of 
risk taken by the trustor were associated with higher levels of activation of the TPJ and the 
dlFPC during reciprocity choices. Moreover, they showed that participants of all ages activated 
the dmPFC during defection, but that early adolescents also activated the dmPFC when 
they reciprocated trust. This latter result corroborates findings from developmental functional 
neuroimaging studies that show an age-related decrease in dmPFC activity during mentalizing 
in theory of mind tasks across adolescence (Blakemore et al., 2007; Moriguchi, Ohnishi, Mori, 
Matsuda, & Komaki, 2007) and an age-related increase in functional specificity of the TPJ 
to processing information about people’s mental states compared to other forms of social 
information (Gweon, Dodell-Feder, Bedny, & Saxe, 2012; Saxe, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Scholz, 
& Pelphrey, 2009). It has been suggested that the age-related shift in the relative contributions 
of the dmPFC and the TPJ to social reasoning might tip early adolescents toward more self-
oriented choices (associated with higher mPFC activation) and late adolescents toward more 
other-oriented choices (associated with higher TPJ activation) (Crone, 2013).
6.7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this chapter we reviewed evidence for the notion that the abilities to control impulses 
and to take others’ perspectives when making social decisions undergo extended development, 
and that these behavioral changes can be traced to brain networks involved in social decision-
making developing at different rates. Much of this evidence comes from studies employing 
experimental paradigms with economic games, which have proven to be valuable tools for 
studying the development of social behavior and in particular for successfully dissecting sub 
processes involved in social decision-making. Behavioral studies show that other-oriented 
concern and a preference for fairness have strong developmental roots. Greater sensitivity to 
others’ intentions and more strategic behavior in bargaining situations provide evidence that 
continued development in perspective taking and impulse control contribute to changes in 
social behavior that occur across adolescence. Finally, these behavioral changes are accompanied 
by an increased recruitment of regions involved in impulse control (e.g. dlPFC) and perspective 
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taking (e.g. TPJ) in decisions where perspectives of interaction partners have to be effectively 
weighed against self-interest and social norms. 
While elucidating developmental differences in recruitment of the dlPFC and TPJ and 
their involvement in social decision-making is a crucial first step, many fundamental questions 
remain unanswered. First, it is important not only to understand how the different brain regions 
(such as the TPJ or the dlPFC) are differentially recruited across development, but also how 
these regions interact and communicate with one another. For example, increased functional 
connectivity between regions of the mentalizing network (e.g. pSTS/TPJ) and brain structures 
implicated in the computation of reward (e.g. ventral MPFC) has been associated with higher 
levels of prosocial behavior in adults (Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, & Rangel, 2010). Functional 
connectivity in the cognitive regulatory network (Fair et al., 2008) and the mentalizing network 
(Burnett & Blakemore, 2009b; Klapwijk et al., 2013) changes across adolescence, suggesting 
that developmental changes in functional connectivity may further contribute to changes in 
social behavior. 
Second, the majority of developmental functional neuroimaging studies are based on cross-
sectional data sets with participants of different ages. Although cross-sectional studies are an 
excellent first step to demonstrate developmental differences, there is a great need for longitudinal 
studies of social brain development. Longitudinal designs rule out the role of possible cohort 
differences and can give us insight on actual developmental changes within participants. One 
of the major questions in the field of developmental neuroimaging centers around the specific 
contributions of maturational processes relative to environmental or societal influences on 
the development of (social) behavior. For example, children who are accepted by their peers 
during childhood express higher levels of prosocial behavior and show advanced development 
of empathy and theory of mind compared to children who are rejected by their peers (Slaughter 
et al., 2002). Longitudinal studies can provide insights on how developmental trajectories of 
individual characteristics (such as long-term peer acceptance or rejection by peers) are related 
to social cognitive development and how they relate to developmental trajectories of both 
brain structure and function. An increased understanding of this intricate interplay between a 
dynamic social context and a maturing brain will be crucial for developing interventions that 
can help children and adolescents in navigating their increasingly complex social worlds.

CHAPTER 7
NEURAL CORRELATES OF ADVANTAGEOUS 
AND DISADVANTAGEOUS INEQUITY IN 
SHARING DECISIONS
This chapter is published as: 
Güroğlu, B.*, Will, G.-J.*, & Crone, E. A. (2014). Neural correlates of advantageous and disadvantageous 
inequity in sharing decisions. PLoS ONE, 9, e107996.  *Shared first authorship
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ABSTRACT
Humans have a strong preference for fair distributions of resources. Neuroimaging studies have 
shown that being treated unfairly coincides with activation in brain regions involved in sig-
naling conflict and negative affect. Less is known about neural responses involved in violating 
a fairness norm ourselves. Here, we investigated the neural patterns associated with inequity, 
where participants were asked to choose between an equal split of money and an unequal split 
that could either maximize their own (advantageous inequity) or another person’s (disadvanta-
geous inequity) earnings. Choosing to divide money unequally, irrespective who benefited from 
the unequal distribution, was associated with activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, 
anterior insula and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Inequity choices that maximized another 
person’s profits were further associated with activity in the ventral striatum and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex. Taken together, our findings show evidence of a common neural pattern 
associated with both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity in sharing decisions and ad-
ditional recruitment of neural circuitry previously linked to the computation of subjective value 
and reward when violating a fairness norm at the benefit of someone else.
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Although economic models assume that the maximization of personal gains is the main 
motivation when distributing resources, investigations of actual decision-making have shown 
that fairness concerns play an important role in social interactions (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
Indeed, the evidence is overwhelming: people have a preference for fair outcomes and, all else 
being equal, acting fairly is generally the expected social norm (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a; ; 
Henrich et al., 2005; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Tabibnia & Lieberman, 2007) and 
equality is often used as a cognitive heuristic in decision-making (Civai, Rumiati, & Rustichini, 
2013). In search of proximate mechanisms it has been shown that equal distributions are 
perceived as rewarding, both indicated by self-reported ratings of fair divisions of resources 
as well as reward-related neural activation patterns associated with these choices (Tabibnia, 
Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008; Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer, & O’Doherty, 2010; Turillo, Folger, 
Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002). Further, being treated unfairly leads to anger (Srivastava, 
Espinoza, & Fedorikhin, 2009) and has been associated with activation of neural networks 
involved in conflict and negative affect (Güroğlu, van den Bos, Rombouts, & Crone, 2010; 
Güroğlu, van den Bos, van Dijk, Rombouts & Crone, 2011, Sanfey et al., 2003). Finally, when 
confronted with unfair treatment and given the power to retaliate, people generally reject 
inequitable distributions of resources, even when this is costly for them (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; 
Güth et al., 1982; Straub & Murnighan, 1995).
Despite this strong preference for equity and the aversion toward inequity, people often 
make inequity choices, such as when inequity is more advantageous for the self. For example, 
people aim to increase relative advantage over others (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) and when a 
high social position is experimentally induced they become more selfish and display higher 
levels of immoral behavior, such as cheating and lying (Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, 
& Keltner, 2012). It is thus crucial to gain a better understanding of the neural mechanisms 
underlying inequity decisions in order to better understand when and why we decide to divide 
resources in an unequal fashion. The current study aimed to investigate the neural responses 
associated with inequity in sharing decisions when maximization of outcomes for the self or 
another person is in conflict with the equity norm. 
Using allocation tasks such as the ‘Dictator Game’ where participants divide a certain 
amount of rewards (i.e., the stake) between themselves and another player without sanctions 
or reputation-related consequences, many studies have shown that people often give away a 
nontrivial amount of the stake to anonymous others, with an equitable 50-50 split being the 
most frequent allocation (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Fehr et al., 2008; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; 
Forsythe et al., 1994; Raihani & McAuliffe, 2012). Nonetheless, such a preference for fairness is 
highly sensitive to different aspects of the (social) context in which they occur (Bardsley, 2008; 
Fehr et al., 2008; Güroğlu, van den Bos, & Crone, 2009; Koch & Normann, 2008; Steinbeis 
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& Singer, 2013). For example, a preference for equity decreases when the costs of establishing 
equal outcomes increase, supporting the crucial role of self-outcome maximization in fairness 
considerations. Furthermore, people seem to be less tolerant to receiving less than other people 
(i.e., disadvantageous inequity) compared to receiving more than others (i.e., advantageous 
inequity) (Fehr et al., 2008; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Güroğlu et al., 2010; Güroğlu et al., 2011; 
Blake & McAuliffe, 2011). In other words, fairness considerations are not solely shaped by 
other-regarding preferences and prosocial intentions, but also by self-outcome maximization 
and aversion to disadvantageous inequity (Güroğlu et al., 2009; Steinbeis & Singer, 2013).
Studies investigating the neural mechanisms associated with inequity have predominantly 
focused on the perception and receipt of unfair treatment (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; 
Güroğlu et al., 2010; Güroğlu et al., 2011; Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008; Wright et 
al., 2011). These studies have consistently shown involvement of the dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex (dACC) and the anterior insula (AI) in perceiving unfairness. Interestingly, studies have 
shown heightened AI activity when people themselves are the target of unfair treatment (Sanfey 
et al., 2003) and when they see someone else receiving an unfair offer (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et 
al., 2013). Based on the AI’s domain general role in providing anticipatory emotional signals 
in decision-making (Dosenbach et al., 2006; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005) and the dACC and 
AI’s involvement in neural representations of bodily arousal states (Craig, 2003; Critchley, 
2005), it has been argued that the dACC and AI play an important role in guiding our social 
behavior to follow social norms (Rilling & sanfey, 2011). Behaviors in response to unfairness 
have been consistently associated with activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), 
which has been suggested to reflect increased regulation of a default prepotent reaction to 
unfair offers (Güroğlu et al., 2010; Knoch, Gianotti, Baumgartner, & Fehr, 2010; Knoch et 
al., 2007; Knoch et al., 2006; Spitzer et al., 2007; Steinbeis et al., 2012; van’t Wout, Kahn, 
Sanfey, & Aleman, 2005; Wright et al., 2011). Although these findings overall support the idea 
that equity is perceived as a social norm, fewer studies have investigated how neural responses 
to unfairness might be different when making inequity decisions. Two studies investigating 
allocation of resources to others who had previously excluded the participants from a social 
interaction have shown the involvement of the dACC – AI network when sharing unequally 
with those excluders (Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Will et al., 2014). In the current study, we 
aimed to investigate whether inequity choices are processed differently than equity choices and 
how this depends on the benefit for the self and the other. For this purpose, we investigated 
inequity choices in different experimental conditions that aimed to disentangle inequity that is 
advantageous for the self from inequity that is advantageous for another person (while leaving 
the decision-maker’s own outcome unaffected). 
First, based on previous findings, we expected higher AI and dACC activity when making 
inequity choices in general (Hsu, Anen, & Quartz, 2008; Zaki & Mitchell, 2011). A central 
question was whether the AI and dACC response subseries a general role through acting as 
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a ‘social alarm system’ that is activated in response to both advantageous and disadvantageous 
inequity, i.e. regardless of whether the participants themselves or another person benefits from 
the inequity. If equity were perceived as the social norm, we would expect higher levels of AI 
and dACC activity in making inequity choices across different conditions that differ in relative 
outcomes for self and other. However, if other-regarding (prosocial) outcomes were perceived 
as the social norm, we would expect increased levels of activation in this network when making 
choices that ensure equity, but also lead to less optimal outcomes for others.
Second, we tested the hypothesis that inequity choices that lead to benefit of others is 
associated with activation in neural circuitry previously linked to reward-processing. This 
hypothesis is based on prior studies wherein participants were the allocators of resources and 
that showed that neural regions implicated in the computation of subjective value and reward 
play an important role in resource distribution (Hsu et al., 2008; Zaki & Mitchell, 2011). 
Although the paradigms used in these studies differed considerably, these prior studies showed 
that reward-related brains regions (e.g. the striatum and ventromedial PFC [vmPFC]) were 
associated with choosing outcomes that maximized the amount of joint resources. However, 
paradigms in these studies did not investigate two core processes of fairness considerations, 
namely, choices that incur costs to the self (Hsu et al., 2008) and a fair alternative to making 
inequity choices (Zaki & Mitchell, 2011). In the current study, we included similar experimental 
conditions that involved a fair alternative to inequity and that also differed in respective 
possible costs and benefits for the self and the other. We expected that choices indicating other-
regarding preferences through a maximization of the other’s outcomes would result in increased 
activation in reward-related brain regions, such as the striatum and the vmPFC.
7.2 METHODS
Participants and procedure
Twenty-eight young adults (M = 20.7 years, SD = 1.91; 11 male) were recruited through local 
advertisements. All participants were right-handed and did not report any contraindications 
for fMRI. Before scanning participants were familiarized with the scanner environment using 
a mock scanner. After scanning, they filled out a battery of questionnaires, and received €25 
for their participation and an additional amount of money, which was told to be determined by 
their decisions in the allocation games. In reality everyone received an additional €2. The current 
study was conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the American Psychological 
Association as expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants provided written 
informed consent for the study. The study was approved by the Leiden University Medical 
Center (LUMC) ethics committee. A radiologist reviewed all anatomical scans; no anomalies 
were reported.
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fMRI task description
Participants played the role of the allocator in a set of three modified dictator games (Fehr 
et al., 2008). In each game the participants were asked to distribute coins between themselves 
and an anonymous other player based on preset dichotomous choices. One of the two options 
was always a fair (equal) distribution of coins, i.e. one coin for the self and one coin for the 
other (1/1). The alternative distribution in the three games were as follows: (i) one coin for 
the self and zero coins for the other (i.e., 1/0) in the advantageous competitive inequity game, 
where the inequity choice maximized the difference between self and other without gains 
relative to the equity choice, (ii) two coins for the self and zero coins for the other (i.e., 2/0) 
in the advantageous self-maximizing inequity game, where the inequity choice maximized 
outcomes for the self, and (iii) one coin for the self and two coins for the other (i.e., 1/2) in the 
disadvantageous prosocial inequity game, where the inequity choice signified other-regarding 
(i.e., prosocial) concerns. 
Each trial started with a jittered fixation cross (mean = 1540 ms, min = 550 ms, max = 4950 
ms; optimized with Opt-Seq2, Dale, 1999;  surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/). On the left 
hand side of this screen, participants were also presented with the name of the other player 
(see Figure 7.1A). This was followed by the decision screen where participants were presented 
with two distributions (i.e., two buckets with coins in them) they could choose between. In 
each distribution coins for the self were indicated in red and coins for the other were indicated 
in blue. Participants had 4000ms to make a choice. Upon making a choice, the bucket of their 
choice was encircled in red and this was displayed until the end of 5000 ms in total. In case of 
no response within the 4000 ms period, participants were presented a screen with “Too late!” 
for the duration of 1000 ms. Trials without a response consisted of less than 1% of all trials 
and were excluded from further analyses. Prior to scanning participants were provided with 
instructions (see Supplementary material) and practiced the game (6 trials) on a computer. 
During the scanning session participants played a total of 60 trials, with 20 trials of each game, 
in randomized order. The location of the equal distribution was counterbalanced across trials. 
All trials were presented in one block lasting about 8 minutes.
On each trial, the first name and the first letter of the surname of both the participant and 
the recipient were displayed on screen to ensure anonymity, but also to emphasize the notion 
that participants would play each trial with a new player (see Figure 7.1A). Participants were 
told that random trials would be selected and their choices on these trials would determine 
their final earnings in the task. Prior to the experiment, participants were explained that the 
recipients were participants in the study and it was also emphasized that their decisions would 
have consequences for the other players’ earnings. None of the participants reported disbelief in 
the cover story that their offers influenced other players’ outcomes.
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Figure 7.1 Visual display of the fMRI task and frequency of inequity choices. (A) Visual display of events 
presented in the one trial of the fMRI task. Each trial started with a jittered fixation cross lasting 550-4950 
ms. The following screen displayed the name of the participant in red (here ‘Participant’) and the name of the re-
cipient (here ‘Amanda Y.’). This screen also presented the available choice options for distributing the coins (here 
advantageous self-maximizing inequity game; 1/1 vs 2/0) with red and blue coins indicating the share for the 
participant and the recipient, respectively. The participant had a maximum response time of 4000ms to make a 
choice. Upon response, the chosen distribution was encircled in red (here 1/1) until the end of the 5000 ms. (B) 
Percentage of inequity choices made in each of the three games. **p < .001, *p < .05. (C) Percentage of inequity 
choices made by each participant in each of the three games.
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fMRI data acquisition
Scanning was carried out at the University Medical Centre using a 3.0 T Philips Achieva. 
The scanning procedure included: (i) a localizer scan, (ii) T2*-weighted whole-brain echo 
planar images (EPI) measuring the bold-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal (TR = 2.2 s, 
TE = 30 ms, slice matrix = 80 × 80, slice thickness = 2.75 ms, slice gap = 0.28 mm, field of view 
(FOV) = 220 mm), (iii) high-resolution T1- and T2- weighted matched bandwidth anatomical 
images with the same slice prescriptions as the EPIs. Functional data were acquired in a single 
functional run of 210 volumes; the first two volumes were discarded to allow for equilibration 
of T1 saturation effects. The task was programmed in E-prime and was projected onto a screen 
that was viewed through a mirror fastened upon the head coil assembly. Head movement was 
restricted by the use of foam inserts around the head.
fMRI data analysis
Image pre-processing and analysis was conducted using SPM8 software (Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London). Pre-processing included slice-
time correction, realignment, spatial normalization to EPI templates, and smoothing with a 
Gaussian filter of 8 mm full-width at half maximum.  Movement parameters in all directions 
were below 1.08 mm for all participants and all scans. The fMRI time series were modeled 
by a series of events convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). The 
data were modeled at stimulus onset of the decision screen with zero duration and based on 
the game (3 levels: advantageous competitive inequity, advantageous self-maximizing inequity 
and disadvantageous prosocial inequity) and participant’s choice (2 levels: equity or inequity), 
resulting in a 3 × 2 full factorial model that included six regressors. The participant-specific 
contrast images were obtained at the subject level and were then submitted to group level 
analyses at the second level, where participants served as a random effect in a repeated measures 
ANOVA. The full-factorial ANOVA has an unbalanced design because not all participants 
made all choices and thus the number of observations included in each cell of the design 
differed. For this reason we also conducted follow-up analyses examining the t-contrasts of 
Inequity > Equity for each game separately. Mean percentage of inequity offers in each game 
was used in regression analyses to test for brain-behavior relations in a GLM model based on 
the game (collapsed across choices; 3 levels: advantageous competitive inequity, advantageous 
self-maximizing inequity and disadvantageous prosocial inequity). The fMRI analyses were 
conducted at the threshold of p < .001 uncorrected with a voxel threshold of 10 functional 
voxels to balance between Type 1 and Type 2 errors (Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009). 
Regions of interest (ROI) analyses were further conducted on the regions obtained from the 
whole-brain analyses using the MarsBaR toolbox in SPM8 (Brett et al., 2002; http://marsbar.
sourceforce.net/). All results are reported in the MNI305 (Montreal Neurological Institute) 
stereotactic space.
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7.3 RESULTS
Behavioral results 
An examination of response patterns of the participants showed that they had strong 
preferences for equity or inequity choices, which depended on the costs for self and other 
(see Table 7.1). A detailed overview of these choices per participant can be seen in Figure 
7.1C. Percentage of inequity choices across the three conditions was compared using a repeated 
measure ANOVA, which yielded a significant main effect of game, F(2,54)= 8.4, p = .001, ηp2 = 
.24 (Figure 7.1B). Participants chose the inequity distribution more often in the advantageous 
self-maximizing inequity condition (M = .60, SD = .43) than in the disadvantageous prosocial 
inequity condition (M = .39, SD = .44; F[1, 27] = 4.90, p < .05, ηp2 = .15) and in the advantageous 
competitive inequity condition (M = .18, SD = .33; F[1, 27] = 21.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .45). Inequity 
choices in the latter two conditions did not differ significantly from each other (p = .09). There 
was also a significant correlation between inequity choices in the disadvantageous prosocial 
inequity and the advantageous competitive inequity conditions, r = -.41, p < .05.
Table 7.1 Frequency (and percentage) of participants making 100% equity, 100% inequity or both choices across 
the trials per game.
Neuroimaging results
In order to examine the neural correlates of equity and inequity choices, we examined 
the 'Inequity > Equity' and reverse contrasts within the 3 (game) × 2 (choice) ANOVA. The 
'Inequity > Equity' t-contrast revealed a network of regions comprising bilateral AI (peaks at 
-30, 21, -12; 19 and 27, 24, -9), right inferior frontal gyrus (peak at 54, 21, 18), dACC (peaks at 
6, 39, 21 and 0, 24, 36), and dorsolateral (peak at 27, 45, 36) and ventrolateral PFC (peak at 30, 
54, -3) Activation levels obtained from ROI analyses in right AI is plotted for demonstration 
purposes in a bar graph of activation per game and offer (Figure 7.2). The reverse contrast 
(Equity > Inequity) did not yield any clusters of activation and the game by choice interaction 
also did not result in significant activation. Thus, AI, dACC and dlPFC were activated in 
response to choosing an unequal distribution of resources, regardless of the consequences of 
this distribution for self or other in terms of maximizing outcomes or costs.
Game 100% Equity 100% Inequity Both
Disadvantageous prosocial inequity (1/2) 10 (37.5%) 8 (28.6%) 10 (37.5%)
Advantageous competitive inequity (1/0) 17 (60.7%) 3 (10.7%) 8 (28.6%)
Advantageous self-maximizing inequity (2/0) 6 (21.4%) 9 (32.1%) 13 (46.4%)
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Figure 7.2 Brain regions from the 'Inequity > Equity' contrast in the 3 (game) × 2 (choice) full factorial 
ANOVA. Bar graph displays contrast estimates obtained from ROI analysis in right AI (peak at 27, 24, 29) for 
inequity and equity choices in the three conditions. Error bars indicate SEM.
Next, in order to examine inequity related neural responses in more depth, we focused on 
the 'Inequity > Equity' and reverse contrasts in the context of each of the three games separately 
using t-tests. The 'Equity > Inequity' contrast did not yield activation in any of the three games. 
We also did not detect any regions for the 'Inequity > Equity' contrasts in the advantageous 
competitive (n = 8) and the Advantageous Self-maximizing (n = 13) games at the chosen 
threshold, but note that the effects reported above are partially replicated at a more lenient 
threshold1. 
The 'Inequity > Equity' contrast in the disadvantageous prosocial inequity condition (n 
=10) yielded increased activation in the vmPFC (peak at 6, 48, 0), ventral striatum (peak at 12, 
1 See Supplementary Table S7.1 for an overview of the regions of activation in the 'Inequity > Equity' contrasts 
per condition at the p < .005, minimum 10 voxel threshold.
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21, 0), and right AI (peak at 45, 15, -6) during inequity choices than equity choices (Figure 7.3; 
activation levels obtained from ROI analyses in ventral striatum and vmPFC are plotted for 
demonstration purposes in a bar graph of activation per game and offer). Importantly, here the 
inequity choices were not only disadvantageous for the self relative to the other player, but also 
beneficial for the other player. Post hoc ROI analyses showed that higher activation in these 
regions during inequity than equity was specific for the disadvantageous prosocial inequity 
game; inequity and equity related activity in the advantageous competitive and advantageous 
self-maximizing inequity games did not differ significantly in any of the regions (all ps > .25).
Finally, we examined brain-behavior relations by conducting whole-brain regressions 
where inequity choice frequency was included as a regressor in activations involved in the 
'disadvantageous prosocial inequity game (collapsed across choices) – null contrast' (n = 28). 
This approach enabled us to examine the relation between frequency of inequity choices and 
brain activation across the complete sample of 28 participants, whereas the previously reported 
inequity vs. equity and reverse contrasts could be examined only among the 10 participants 
who had made both equity and inequity choices in the disadvantageous prosocial inequity 
condition. This analysis resulted in a set of regions in which activation correlated positively with 
inequity choices, including the precuneus (peak at -9, -57, -48), vmPFC (peak at 15, 45, 0), and 
dlPFC (peak at 24, 39, 42) (Figure 7.4; the relation between dlPFC activation and frequency 
of inequity offers is demonstrated in a scatterplot). There was no activation in brain regions of 
interest in the brain-behavior correlations for the other two games (see Supplementary Table 
S7.2).
7.4 DISCUSSION
The current study set out to investigate the common and distinct neural responses associated 
with inequity decisions involved in maximizing outcomes for the self or another person. Our 
behavioral results demonstrate that participants more often chose unequal distributions in 
situations where their own profits could be maximized relative to alternatives where they could 
maximize the other person’s profits. The neuroimaging findings showed that choosing inequity 
regardless of whether it entails benefits for the other is associated with increased activation in 
the AI, dACC and dlPFC. In addition, decisions to distribute resources unequally, but in a 
way that benefits another person’s profits additionally coincided with increased activation in 
ventral striatum, vmPFC, precuneus and dlPFC. Taken together, our findings show that there 
is a common neural response to making advantageous and disadvantageous inequity choices, 
which resembles the pattern of neural activity previously associated with being treated unfairly 
(Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Güroğlu et al., 2010; Güroğlu et al., 2011; Sanfey et al., 
2003). Furthermore, we show a distinct neural response associated with prosocial inequity, 
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Figure 7.3 Ventral striatum (peak at 12, 21, 0) and vmPFC (peak at 6, 48, 0) from the 'Inequity > Equity' 
contrast in the disadvantageous prosocial inequity condition. Bar graphs display contrast estimates obtained 
from ROI analyses for inequity and equity choices in the three conditions. Error bars indicate SEM.
which suggests that violating a fairness norm in order to increase another person’s outcomes is 
processed differently on a neural level compared to selfish violations of a fairness norm.
Our behavioral findings show that participants adjusted their behavior depending on the 
available alternatives to an equal split. In doing so, it seems that different principles interact to 
guide decision-making when distributing resources: a social norm of equity, (possible) costs for 
the self, and a concern for outcomes of others relative to the self. Whereas an equal distribution 
was the most preferred option when it did not involve possible costs to the allocator (i.e., the 
participant), equal distributions became less preferred when it was costly to establish them. 
This finding is in line with previous studies on fairness preferences, which show that, although 
an equal split is used as a cognitive heuristic, contextual factors related to the relevance of self-
interest systematically shifts preferences away from an equal split (Civai et al., 2013). Preference 
for an equal distribution was not only influenced by absolute costs, as in the Advantageous 
Self-maximizing Inequity condition, but also in terms of relative costs compared to the other 
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Figure 7.4 (A) A whole-brain regression analysis showed that neural activity during the disadvantageous proso-
cial inequity game was positively associated with the frequency of inequity choices in the vmPFC (peak at 15, 45, 
0), precuneus (peak at - 9, -57, -48), and dlPFC (peak at 24, 39, 42. (B) Scatter plot displays contrast estimates 
for the disadvantageous prosocial inequity condition on the y-axis and behavior (% inequity) on the x-axis (N 
= 28).
player, as in the Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity condition. This latter finding demonstrates 
that a preference for equal outcomes does not necessarily have to be grounded in a prosocial 
motivation, but might also result from the desire to avoid receiving lower payoffs than another 
person (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).   
Neuroimaging results further show that there is a common neural response in dACC, 
bilateral AI and dlPFC to both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity. This suggests that a 
general neural mechanism is implicated in signaling deviations from a fairness norm in sharing 
decisions, regardless of who benefits from the unequal distribution of goods. Our findings 
corroborate previous findings showing that both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity 
were associated with AI activity (Yu, Calder, & Mobbs, 2014) and a heightened medial frontal 
negativity (Wu, Hu, van Dijk, Leliveld, & Zhou, 2012), which has been interpreted as suggesting 
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the involvement of the dACC-AI network in norm and associated expectancy violations. The 
dACC and the AI are part of a ‘salience network’ that serves an important domain general role in 
integrating cognitive and emotional signals when processing motivationally salient information 
(Botvinick et al., 2004; Chang et al., 2013). Activation in this network has been associated with 
error processing (de Bruijn, de Lange, Von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2009), uncertainty (Singer 
et al., 2009), conflict (Shenhav et al., 2013) and violations of a social norms (Chang et al., 2013; 
Civai, Crescentini, Rustichini, & Rumiati, 2012; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Klucharev, 
Hytonen, Rijpkema, Smidts, & Fernandez, 2009; Montague & Lohrenz, 2007).We extend 
previous research by showing that the AI and dACC are also activated when creating inequity 
in choices that involve possible costs to the self and a fair alternative to inequity, both of which 
are core components of fairness considerations previously not investigated using fMRI. 
Increased dlPFC activity during both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity choices 
relative to equity choices fits with findings from a recent study showing dlPFC involvement in 
both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity in a game in which participants received less 
or more money than another person after performing a perceptual task (Fliessbach et al., 2012). 
Based on its role in cognitive control and goal-directed behavior it has been argued that dlPFC 
activity in social decision-making tasks reflects increased control over prepotent responses that 
are aimed to maximize self-gain (Knoch et al., 2006; Spitzer et al., 2007; Steinbeis et al., 2012; 
Wright et al., 2011). Our results suggest that dlPFC activity might reflect higher levels of 
executive control required to violate a salient social norm regardless of whether this maximizes 
gains for the self or someone else. The notion that this is not restricted to maximizing outcomes 
for the self was supported by our individual differences analyses that showed that participants 
who more often chose outcomes that maximize the profits of the other over an equal distribution 
recruit the dlPFC to a greater extent when doing so. 
In addition to a common neural pattern associated with inequity, we also found that violations 
of a fairness norm in the Disadvantageous Prosocial Inequity condition were associated with 
activation in the striatum and the vmPFC. Activation in these regions associated with such 
prosocial behavior that leads to better outcomes for another person is in line with prior findings 
showing that the striatum not only responds to primary rewards, but also to social rewards such 
as charitable donations (Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007), maximizing another person’s 
outcomes (Zaki & Mitchell, 2011), and mutual cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma paradigm 
(Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004b). Moreover, individual differences analyses 
showed that the more frequent people showed this other-outcome maximizing behavior, the 
more they activated the vmPFC and the precuneus. The vmPFC is not only important for the 
encoding the subjective value of rewards (Levy & Glimcher, 2012; Rangel & Hare, 2010), 
but is also part of a network, including the precuneus, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the 
temporo-parietal junction (Saxe et al., 2004; Saxe, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Scholz, & Pelphrey, 
2009) important for mental state-reasoning (Blakemore et al., 2007; Moriguchi et al., 2007) and 
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perspective taking (Lamm et al., 2007). Moreover activation in the mPFC has been shown to 
be associated with processing one’s own and other people’s actions and intentions in economic 
games (Halko, Hlushchuk, Hari, & Schürmann, 2009; Rilling et al., 2004a). Acting in a way 
that does not necessarily benefit outcomes for the self, but is beneficial to another person’s gains 
might thus possibly require increased levels of perspective taking. It would be recommended 
for future studies to assess self-reported subjective value associated with individuals’ choices of 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequity in order to be able to examine how experience of 
reward is related to the neural signal associated with these choices.
Several limitations of the current study should be noted. One of the main challenges of the 
current research design is related to individual differences in observed behavior. As indicated 
by the behavioral patterns (see Figure 7.1C), the majority of participants were consistent in 
their choices within a certain condition, which might be considered desired given that this 
consistency reflects stable individual preferences and implies that participants did not choose 
randomly. However, this resulted in relatively small numbers of observations in several 
neuroimaging analyses where choice-related neural activation was examined based on contrasts 
of inequity versus equity choices per condition. For example, although there was a main effect 
of the 'Inequity > Equity' contrast across conditions, these effects could not be observed when 
this contrast was examined per condition separately at the chosen threshold, but was only 
evident at more lenient threshold levels. In addition, the results may represent the neural activity 
of individuals who are ambiguous about equity choices, and in future research it should be 
examined whether these also represent choices of individuals with strict equity norms. Previous 
behavioral studies using the three allocation games have also examined profiles of individual 
behavior patterns (Fehr et al., 2008; Steinbeis & Singer, 2013). In the current study, our sample 
size did not allow us to examine the neural correlates of individual behavioral profiles. Future 
studies employing larger sample sizes should aim to examine individual differences in neural 
activation related to profiles of behavior. 
The individual differences in observed behavior also resulted in an unbalanced design in our 
fMRI analysis. In other words, due to the fact that not all participants made all choices in each 
game, it was not possible to conduct a balanced full-factorial analysis with the same number of 
observations in each cell of the design. Future studies can aim to manipulate the study design 
in order to obtain a more balanced response pattern or, as indicated above, aim for larger sample 
sizes that will enable to examine individual differences based on choice profiles. Furthermore, 
the current study did not employ self-report explicit measures about cognitive and affective 
processes related to making (inequity) choices. Future research should include measures about 
beliefs on fairness norms, affect related to inequity choices or autonomic measurements, such 
as heart rate, which can provide the researchers with additional measures in interpreting 
behavioral and neural findings.
The current results offer a number of avenues for future research. For example, our current 
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design did not allow for a dissociation between joint-outcome maximization and maximization 
of another person’s outcomes in the disadvantageous inequity (1/2) choices. Future studies 
could include a condition where the 1/1 option is pitted against a 2/1 distribution, in which the 
latter choice would both be self- and joint outcome maximization (Meuwese, Crone, de Rooij, 
& Güroğlu, 2014). A contrast between the 2/1 and 1/2 choices could disentangle joint outcome 
maximization from person-specific (self vs. other) outcome maximization. Furthermore, using 
the same set of three allocation tasks (Fehr et al., 2008; Steinbeis & Singer, 2013) and other 
paradigms (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Shaw & Olson, 2012) it has been shown that across 
development children and adolescents increasingly start enforcing equality between the ages of 
3 and 13. Recent developmental work has shown that developmental changes in late maturing 
brain regions such as regions of the mentalizing network and the lateral PFC are associated 
with developmental increases in intentionality understanding and strategic considerations in 
fairness decisions (Güroğlu et al., 2011; Steinbeis et al., 2012). It would be of great interest to 
relate behavioral changes in both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity choices to brain 
development, because taking a developmental perspective has the potential to enhance not 
only our understanding of social development, but could also provide insights into adult social 
decision-making and its underlying mechanisms. 
Taken together, the current results further inform our understanding of an important aspect 
of human social behavior, that is, when and why we decide to divide resources unequally. We 
show that violations of an equity norm, both with selfish (i.e., advantageous) and prosocial 
(i.e., disadvantageous) outcomes, are associated with a common neural response in the salience 
network. Furthermore, prosocial violations of a simple fairness norm were associated with 
activation in brain regions that code for primary and more complex social rewards (Hsu et al., 
2008; Zaki & Mitchell, 2011) and switching attention to another person’s perspective (Halko 
et al., 2009; Lamm et al., 2007; Rilling et al., 2004a). These findings show that neural networks 
implicated in social cognition, domain general cognitive functions and emotional processes are 
important for both following social norms and for violating such norms when these violations 
serve a more prosocial purpose than the norm itself.
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7.5 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Table S7.1 Regions of neural activation from the 'Inequity > Equity' contrast per allocation game at the thresh-
old of p < .005 uncorrected, > 10 voxels.
Brain region L/R Voxels z MNI coordinates
x y z
Disadvantageous prosocial inequity condition: Inequity > Equity
Dorsolateral Prefrontal cortex L 24 3.49 -30 36 36
R 28 3.47 27 42 36
Lateral Prefrontal cortex R 10 2.94 45 39 18
Ventromedial Prefrontal cortex - 238 3.99 6 48 0
Anterior Insula R 209 3.69 45 15 -6
Striatum 3.63 12 21 0
L 111 3.37 -18 -3 -6 
Precuneus L 33 3.53 6 -42 45
- 52 3.10 -6 -72 33
Inferior Frontal gyrus L 15 3.46 -54 15 18
R 35 3.24 33 21 30
Temporoparietal junction R 36 3.29 48 -36 45
L 18 3.03 -51 -54 42
Posterior Temporal gyrus L 20 3.44 -57 -51 0
Advantageous self-maximizing inequity condition: Inequity > Equity
Pallidum R 34 3.46 24 -6 3
Ventrolateral Prefrontal cortex R 24 3.06 36 45 -3
Advantageous competitive inequity condition: Inequity > Equity
Dorsal Anterior Cingulate cortex - 49 3.39 9 39 21
Somatosensory cortex R 17 3.12 36 -3 27
Note. L/R=Left/Right; k=cluster size in 3×3×3mm voxels; z=z-score; MNI coordinates =xyz voxel coor-
dinates in MNI space of the peak voxel. 
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Table S7.2 Regions of neural activation from whole-brain regression analyses with frequency of inequity choices 
per game as a regressor.
Brain region L/R Voxels z MNI coordinates
x y z
Positive correlation with frequency inequity choices
Advantageous self-maximizing inequity – null contrast
Posterior Cingulate cortex - 17 3.71 -3 27 36
Dorsolateral Prefrontal cortex R 10 3.47 27 42 36
Advantageous competitive inequity – null contrast
Cuneus L 27 3.86 36 21 15
Negative correlation with frequency inequity choices
Advantageous competitive inequity – null contrast
Cuneus R 18 3.91 18 -78 27
Putamen R 12 3.26 30 9 0
Note. L/R=Left/Right; k=cluster size in 3×3×3mm voxels; z=z-score; MNI coordinates =xyz voxel 
coordinates in MNI space of the peak voxel.
Task instructions for the allocation game
In this ‘allocation game’ you may decide how coins will be divided between you and another 
player. You can always choose between two options to divide the coins. This is what the game 
looks like (display is shown with an example of two buckets with red and blue coins in each). 
The red coins are for you and the blue coins are for the other player. In this example you see 
on the left side a bucket with one red coin. You receive one coin and the other player receives 
no coins. On the right side you see a bucket with one red and one blue coin. You receive one 
coin and the other player also receives one coin. Here is another example: on the left side you 
see a bucket with one red and one blue coin. You receive one coin and the other player receives 
one coin. On the right side you see a bucket with one red and two blue coins. You receive one 
coin and the other player receives two coins. You may choose how the coins will be distributed. 
Press the button number 1 using your right index finger to choose the left option and button 
number 2 using your right middle finger for the option on the right. Be careful: you have five 
seconds to make a decision. At the end of the game the computer will choose several random 
trials to determine how much each player has earned. These trials determine what you earn, but 
also how much the other players will earn. In other words, your choices have consequences on 
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how much everyone will earn at the end of the game. Once you have made a choice, your choice 
will be encircled in red on the screen. In this example, the right option is chosen (slide showing 
right bucket with one red and two blue coins being encircled in red). So in that case you would 
earn one coin and the other player would earn two coins. You will play each round with another 
anonymous player. These players are not present today and have agreed to participate in the 
experiment on a future testing day. On each trial you see your name in red above on the left; 
the name of the other player will appear in blue below on the left side. If you have questions, 
you may ask them now. If you don’t have any other questions, you will now play several practice 
trials with no human participant as the second player, but a computer.

CHAPTER 8
LONGITUDINAL LINKS BETWEEN CHILDHOOD 
PEER ACCEPTANCE AND THE NEURAL 
CORRELATES OF SHARING
This chapter is submitted as: 
Will, G.-J., Crone, E. A., van Lier, P. A. C.,  & Güroğlu, B. (submitted). Longitudinal links between 
childhood peer acceptance and the neural correlates of sharing.
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ABSTRACT
Childhood peer acceptance is associated with high levels of prosocial behavior and advanced 
perspective taking skills. Yet, little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying 
these associations. To address this question, this functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging study 
examined the neural correlates of sharing decisions in a group of adolescents who had a stable 
accepted status (n = 27) and a group who had a chronic rejected status (n = 19) across six ele-
mentary school grades. Both groups of adolescents played three allocation games in which they 
could share money equally or unequally with varying costs and profits to them and unknown 
others. Stably accepted adolescents were more likely to share their money with unknown oth-
ers than chronically rejected adolescents when sharing was not costly. Neuroimaging analyses 
showed that the stably accepted group, compared to the chronically rejected group, showed 
higher levels of activation in the temporo-parietal junction, temporal pole, pre-supplemen-
tary motor area and anterior insula during costly compared to non-costly sharing decisions. 
These findings demonstrate that a stable accepted status across childhood is associated with 
heightened activity in brain regions previously linked to perspective taking and the detection 
of social norm-violations when making decisions about fairness, and thereby provide insight 
in the interconnections between peer acceptance and the neural processes underlying prosocial 
behavior.
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A basic prosocial tendency to share resources with another person is present early in human 
development (Blake, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014; Brownell, Svetlova, & Nichols, 2009; 
Svetlova et al., 2010), but prosocial behavior continues to grow in complexity across childhood 
and adolescence (Banerjee, Watling, & Caputi, 2011; Brownell, Ramani, & Zerwas, 2006). 
This increasing complexity of prosocial behavior is accompanied by developmental changes in 
the ability to take other people’s perspective (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Eisenberg et al., 1991). 
Crucially, prosocial behavior and perspective-taking ability have important consequences for 
acceptance among peers and psychosocial adjustment. That is to say, children who show more 
prosocial behavior and who have better perspective taking skills are more accepted by their 
peers (Fink et al., 2014; Slaughter et al., 2002). Given that peer acceptance is an important 
predictor of later mental health and academic success (DeRosier et al., 1994; Ladd & Troop-
Gordon, 2003; Sturaro et al., 2011), it is important to gain a mechanistic understanding of links 
between acceptance among peers and the development of prosocial behavior. 
Developmental changes in prosocial behavior have been linked to developmental changes 
in activity in brain regions implicated in perspective taking and ‘theory of mind’ in the medial 
frontal and temporo-parietal cortex (Fett et al., 2013; Güroğlu et al., 2011; van den Bos et al., 
2011), suggesting that more advanced forms of prosocial behavior are associated with increased 
activity in brain regions supporting social cognition. Yet, how neural processes involved in 
prosocial behavior and perspective-taking relate to individual differences in exposure to peer 
acceptance remains an open question. Therefore, we examined how sustained exposure to either 
high or low levels of peer acceptance across childhood is associated with prosocial behavior 
when sharing valuable resources and its neural correlates in adolescence.
Prosocial behavior has strong developmental roots, which is evident from displays of helping 
and sharing behavior in infancy (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; Warneken & Tomasello, 
2006). However, infants are much more reluctant to display prosocial behavior when it is costly, 
that is, when they have to give up some of their own possessions to act prosocial (Svetlova et 
al., 2010). Costly prosocial behavior has often been studied using economic exchange games in 
which one person  (i.e., the allocator) is given a set of valuable rewards, such as money, candy 
or stickers and can then decide how much he/she would like to share with a second player (i.e., 
the recipient). Using economic games that we will refer to as ‘equity games’, prior studies have 
shown that the willingness to give up a reward to share equally differs in various phases of 
childhood and adolescence (Fehr et al., 2008; Fehr, Glätzle-Rützler, & Sutter, 2013; Meuwese 
et al., 2014; Steinbeis & Singer, 2013). 
In these games, participants are given the opportunity to choose between either an equal 
split of resources (equity) or an alternative unequal distribution (inequity), which could benefit 
8.1 INTRODUCTION
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either themselves (advantageous inequity) or the other player (disadvantageous inequity). 
Between the ages of 3 and 8 years, children increasingly start to distribute resources in a way 
that ensures equal pay-offs for both players (Fehr et al., 2008). That is, whereas three-year 
olds are more likely to choose inequity that favors themselves, 7- and 8-year olds are more 
likely to choose the equity option, even when this requires them to give up a reward (i.e., they 
show advantageous inequity aversion). Eight year-olds are also more likely than 3-year-olds 
to choose the equity option when inequity results in a higher outcome for a peer (i.e., they 
show disadvantageous inequity aversion), even when this has no consequences for their own 
profits (Fehr et al., 2008). These findings show that although children are increasingly willing 
to pay a cost to distribute resources in a way that ensures equal pay-offs for everyone involved, 
their developing sense of fairness does not make them necessarily more generous or tolerant 
of higher outcomes for a peer. Between the ages 8 and 18, adolescents become less strict in 
choosing the equity option and they are progressively more likely to maximize other people’s 
outcomes (by choosing a prosocial disadvantageous inequity option), but also to maximize their 
own outcomes (by choosing a self-maximizing advantageous inequity distribution) (Almås et 
al., 2010; Fehr et al., 2013; Meuwese et al., 2014). Taken together, these findings show that 
strict adherence to a fairness norm of equality first increases across childhood and then declines 
across adolescence. However, how such sharing decisions might differ as a function of peer 
acceptance or individual differences in perspective-taking abilities has not been studied yet.  
Neuroimaging studies that combined economic exchange games with functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI), two distinct, but interacting, networks of brain regions involved in 
decisions about fairness have been identified (Rilling & sanfey, 2011). First, a ‘salience network’ 
consisting of the pre-supplementary motor area/anterior cingulate cortex (pre-SMA/ACC) 
and anterior insula (AI) has been found to be important for detecting norm violations (e.g. 
violations of fairness norms) in social decisions. For example, heightened pre-SMA/ACC and 
AI activity has been observed in people when they are treated unfairly (Sanfey et al., 2003), 
when they see somebody else being treated unfairly (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013) and also 
when they divide resources in an unfair manner themselves (Güroğlu, Will, & Crone, 2014).
Second, a ‘mentalizing network’ consisting of regions in the medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC), temporal-parietal junction (TPJ), posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), 
and temporal poles has been shown to be involved in switching attention to other people’s 
perspective in social exchange (Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Güroğlu et al., 2011; van den Bos 
et al., 2011). This mentalizing network is consistently identified in tasks that probe reasoning 
about other people’s mental states (e.g. feelings, intentions and desires) (Blakemore et al., 
2007; Saxe et al., 2009) and in tasks in which participants are asked to take other people’s 
perspective (Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012; Pfeifer et al., 2009) or where they do 
this spontaneously (Wagner, Kelley, & Heatherton, 2011). Prior work has demonstrated that 
these two networks are differentially sensitive to developmental change (Güroğlu et al., 2011; 
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van den Bos et al., 2011). That is, pre-SMA/ACC and insula responses to fairness violations 
do not differ in various phases of adolescent development. In contrast, activity in mentalizing 
regions continues to increase across adolescence (Blakemore & Mills, 2014; Burnett, Sebastian, 
Cohen Kadosh, & Blakemore, 2011). That is, developmental increases in the recruitment of the 
TPJ have been associated with developmental increases in prosocial behavior, predominantly 
in situations that require higher levels of perspective taking (Güroğlu et al., 2011; van den Bos 
et al., 2011). The current study addressed the question whether activity in these circuits varies 
with individual histories of socialization experiences in the peer context (i.e. stable histories of 
peer acceptance or rejection). 
For the present study we scanned two groups of adolescents who participated in an ongoing 
longitudinal study (Menting, Van Lier, & Koot, 2011; Sturaro et al., 2011; van Lier & Koot, 
2010). Based on longitudinal assessments of acceptance and rejection by peers across six 
elementary school grades, we selected participants who were highly liked by their peers and 
who were almost never disliked (i.e., adolescents with a history of stable peer acceptance) and 
participants who were highly disliked and were almost never liked (i.e., adolescents with a 
history of chronic peer rejection). In an MRI scanner, both groups played three equity games 
(Fehr et al., 2008; Güroğlu, Will, & Crone, 2014) in which they could choose to share money 
equally or unequally with unknown others over a sequence of trials. An equal distribution of 
money could bear no costs (i.e. non-costly sharing in the ‘advantageous competitive inequity’ 
game), could be costly for the participants themselves (costly sharing in the ‘advantageous self-
maximizing inequity’ game), or could decrease the outcomes of the recipient (envious sharing 
in the ‘disadvantageous prosocial inequity’ game).
Based on widely established links between an accepted peer status and higher levels of 
prosocial behavior (Newcomb et al., 1993), we expected that the stably accepted group would 
more often choose the prosocial option in the equity games than the chronically rejected group 
(i.e. choosing the option that maximized the other person’s profits). We hypothesized that stably 
accepted adolescents would report higher levels of perspective taking than chronically rejected 
adolescents (Fink et al., 2014; Slaughter et al., 2002) and we predicted that individual differences 
in perspective taking would correlate with higher levels of prosocial behavior (Eisenberg et 
al., 1995). We further expected that stably accepted adolescents would show higher levels of 
activity in brain regions implicated in perspective taking in social decision-making (e.g. mPFC, 
pSTS, TPJ, temporal poles). We expected this to be most pronounced in decisions in which 
self-interest conflicts the most with the other person’s interest (i.e. when sharing was costly), 
given that such decisions require higher levels of perspective taking (Güroğlu, van den Bos, & 
Crone, 2014). 
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8.2 METHOD
Participants and recruitment procedure
Participants were recruited from a longitudinal study (N = 1,189), which investigated the 
impact of social experiences on behavioral, emotional and academic outcomes between age 6 
and 12 years. From first to sixth grade of elementary school, participants annually nominated the 
classmates they liked most and liked least (unlimited nominations). Using those nominations, 
an average social preference score (liked most – liked least nominations) across the six waves 
was calculated to index stable histories of acceptance and rejection. That is, adolescents from 
the lower (chronically rejected) and upper (stably accepted) 10th percentile of the average social 
preference score were selected for the fMRI study. 
Based on these criteria, suitability for participation in an fMRI study and availability 
of recent contact information, 131 adolescents were asked to participate in the fMRI study. 
Twenty adolescents were excluded because they were left-handed (n = 4), had an autism 
spectrum disorder (n = 1) or had braces (n = 15). Seven adolescents could not be reached. Of 
the remaining 104 candidate participants, 47 adolescents and their parents agreed to participate 
in the current fMRI study. Those who chose not to participate in the fMRI study (n = 57) did 
not differ from those who were scanned with respect to average social preference, age, or gender 
(all ps > .25).
All participants indicated to be healthy and reported no contraindications for MRI (e.g. no 
head injuries, no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders), except for four participants 
with a history of rejection who were diagnosed with Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD). Of those, three participants with ADHD were on a stable dose of methylphenidates, 
but were medication-free on the day of scanning and the preceding day. A radiologist reviewed 
all anatomical scans after which one participant was excluded from the analyses due to an 
anomaly. 
The final sample consisted of 46 adolescents of which 27 had a history of stable peer 
acceptance (M age = 14.0; SD = .77; 14 male) and 19 had a history of chronic peer rejection 
(M age = 14.0; SD = 0.61; 13 male). Stably accepted and chronically rejected adolescents did 
not differ in age, pubertal status, gender, age, pubertal status, ethnicity, or IQ (all ps > .15; see 
Supplementary Table S8.1; see 8.5). All participants and their parents gave informed consent 
for the study. The recruitment procedure was blind, such that experimenters were not informed 
about individual participants’ peer status history. Both the longitudinal study and the fMRI 
study were approved by the medical ethical committees of the respective universities. 
Experimental procedure
Participants were first familiarized with imaging procedures using an MRI mock scanner. 
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Next, they received instructions about the games they would be playing in the scanner and 
practiced 10 trials of the task before entering the scanner. Participants were informed that 
during practice trials their decisions had no consequences for their earnings and there was no 
recipient. After scanning, participants first filled out a battery of questionnaires before being 
debriefed and receiving financial compensation for participating in the study. 
Neuroimaging task: Equity games
Participants played three economic games, which have previously been used to assess equity 
preferences in children and adolescents (Fehr et al., 2008; Güroğlu, van den Bos, & Crone, 
2014; Meuwese et al., 2014; Steinbeis & Singer, 2013). They were asked to distribute valuable 
coins between themselves and a recipient. They could choose between an equal distribution of 
coins (1 for self; 1 for the recipient) and an unequal distribution, which varied in each game (see 
Figure 8.1). In the advantageous competitive inequity game, the alternative distribution yielded 
the participants 1 coin, but left nothing for the recipient (1-0). Choosing the equity condition 
was therefore a non-costly sharing decision. In the advantageous self-maximizing inequity 
game participants, the alternative distribution yielded the participant 2 coins, but left nothing 
for the recipient (2-0). Choosing the equity condition was therefore a costly sharing decision, 
because participants had to forego one coin to share equally. In the disadvantageous prosocial 
inequity game the alternative distribution yielded the participant 1 coin and resulted in 2 coins 
for the recipient. Choosing the equity option would result in an outcome for the recipient that 
is lower than what he/she could have received (2 coins instead of 1) had the participant chosen 
for the alternative distribution. The equity option in the disadvantageous prosocial inequity 
game was therefore not the most prosocial option and choosing the equity option reflects 
disadvantageous inequity aversion. Instructions emphasized that the participants’ decisions had 
consequences for both their own monetary profits and those of the recipients, who were told 
to be other participants in the study. The participants were told that after the experiment one 
choice would be randomly selected to be paid out to them as well as to the recipients. In reality, 
each participant received 2 Euros after completion of the task. 
The neuroimaging task consisted of 60 trials (20 trials per game). Each trial started with 
a jittered fixation cross (mean = 1540 ms, min = 550 ms, max = 4950 ms; optimized with 
Opt-Seq2, Dale, 1999;  surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/). Subsequently, participants were 
presented with a screen with the two distributions of coins they could choose from and the 
name (first name with first letter of last name) of a same-gender peer who was the recipient on 
that particular trial (see Figure 8.1). Each trial was accompanied by a different name, indicating 
that each choice was for a different recipient. The position of the equal distribution (left or 
right) was counterbalanced. Responses could be made by a button press with the index finger 
(left side alternative) or middle finger (right side alternative) of the right hand. At the moment 
that the participants made their choice, a red rectangle appeared around the distribution of 
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their choice until 6 s after trial onset. If participants had not responded within 5 s, a screen was 
presented with “Too late!” for the duration of 1 s. Trials without a response consisted of less 
than 1% of all trials and were excluded from further analyses. 
550-4950 ms 
Jittered fixation screen Decision screen Response visualization 
6000 ms - RT RT (max 5000 ms) 
Figure 8.1  Visual display of events presented in the one trial of the fMRI task. Each trial started with a fixa-
tion cross with a jittered duration (550–4950 ms). Subsequently, participants were presented a decision screen 
containing: the name of the participant in red, the name of the recipient in blue and the two distributions of coins 
the participant could choose from. Coins for the participant were displayed in red and coins for the recipient were 
displayed in blue. Participants were given 5000 ms to respond. After responding, a red rectangle appeared around 
the distribution of their choice until 6000 ms after trial onset.
Perspective-taking questionnaire
The tendency to take other people’s perspective was assessed using the perspective-taking 
subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). All items were rated on a 
scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) and averaged to a mean score. The questionnaire was 
administered after the scanning session and took approximately 5 minutes to complete. 
fMRI data acquisition
Scans were acquired using a 3T Philips Achieva MRI system at the University Medical 
Center with a standard whole-head coil. After obtaining a localizer scan, we obtained T2*-
weighted Echo-Planar Images (EPI) (repetition time (TR)= 2.2 sec, echo time (TE)= 30ms, 
slice matrix = 80 × 80 matrix, slice thickness = 2.75 mm, slice gap = 0.28 mm gap, field of view 
(FOV) = 220 mm) during a single functional run of 210 volumes (lasting 7.7 minutes). The first 
two volumes of the functional run were discarded from further analysis to allow for equilibration 
of T1 saturation effects. After the functional images, we obtained a high-resolution 3D T1-Fast 
Field Echo scan for anatomical reference (TR = 9.760 ms; TE = 4.59 ms, flip angle = 8 degrees, 
140 slices, 0.875 × 0.875 × 1.2 mm3 voxels, field of view = 224 × 168 × 177 mm3). Stimuli were 
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presented using E-Prime software onto a screen in the magnet bore, which participants could 
see through a mirror attached to the head coil. Participants could give their responses by using 
a fiber optic response box. During scanning foam inserts restricted head motion. 
fMRI data analysis
Preprocessing and analysis of the MRI data was carried out using SPM8 statistical parametric 
mapping image analysis software (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University 
College London). Images were slice-time corrected, realigned, spatially smoothed using an 
8-mm FWHM Gaussian filter, and spatially normalized to each participant’s anatomical T1 
scan. Translational movement parameters never exceeded 1 voxel (<3 mm) in any direction for 
any participant or scan. The normalization algorithm resampled the volumes to 3mm cubic 
voxels using a 12-parameter affine transformation and a nonlinear transformation involving 
cosine basic functions. All results are reported in MNI305 stereotactic space.
A first-level GLM was defined for each participant’s functional run that included regressors 
for each decision in each game separately (equity game [3] × choice [2]). The fMRI time series 
were modeled by a series of events with zero duration at the onset of stimulus presentation 
and were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). The GLM also 
contained a basic set of cosine functions that high-pass-filtered the data, a regressor indicating 
missed trials, and a covariate to control for run effects. The participant-specific contrast 
images were obtained at the subject level and were then submitted to group level analyses 
at the second level, where participants served as a random effect in a full factorial analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with equity game as a within-subjects factor and peer status history as 
a between-subjects factor. Given that choice-patterns showed little variation within subjects, 
but varied considerably between subjects, modeling the data based on the participants’ choices 
would result in an unbalanced design with varying amounts of trials per cell (see Güroğlu, 
Will, & Crone, 2014). Because our hypotheses focused on the individual differences in neural 
processes associated with varying costs associated with fairness, we collapsed across choices 
and focused on the main effect of equity game and the equity game × peer status history 
interaction consistent with prior work (Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Steinbeis et al., 2012). 
Consequently, our analyses were based on a balanced design with the same amount of trials for 
each participant (20 per game; 60 in total). 
For group analyses, contrast maps of each decision in each game relative to a low-level 
visual baseline (i.e. fixation cross) were entered in a factorial 3 × 2 ANOVA with equity game 
(advantageous self-maximizing inequity-fixation, advantageous competitive inequity-fixation 
and disadvantageous prosocial inequity-fixation) as a within-subjects factor and peer status 
history (stably accepted vs. chronically rejected adolescents) as a between-subjects factor. We 
examined the main effect of equity game and the equity game × peer status history interaction; 
results were considered significant at an uncorrected threshold of p < .001 with a minimum 
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cluster size of 10 contiguous voxels to balance between Type 1 and Type 2 errors (Lieberman 
& Cunningham, 2009). We followed up the main effect of game and the equity game × peer 
status history interaction by planned t-contrasts to examine differences between the games 
and groups. We used the MarsBaR toolbox (Brett et al., 2002; http://marsbar.sourceforce.net/) 
to extract activity in functional regions of interest. For each ROI, the blood oxygenation level 
dependent (BOLD) signal across functional clusters of voxels was averaged and the center of 
mass is reported.   
8.3 RESULTS
Behavioral results
Equity choices and peer status history
To examine associations between peer status history and equity choices in the three equity 
games, we performed a random effects logistic regression model with equity as the dependent 
variable (0: inequity offer; 1: equity offer) and peer status history (0: stably accepted; 1: 
chronically rejected), dummy-coded variables for each equity game, trial number, peer status 
history × equity game and equity game × trial number two-way interactions, and a equity game 
× trial × peer status history three-way interaction term as predictor variables. We included 
trial number as a predictor to explore the possibility that prosocial behavior could change as 
a function of time given that it was assessed through repeated exposure to multiple one-shot 
games. The logistic regression model yielded a main effect of advantageous self-maximizing 
inequity game (ß = -1.28, SE = 0.33, Wald = -3.92, p < .001), a two-way interaction between 
advantageous competitive inequity game and status (ß = -1.32, SE = 0.48, Wald = -2.72, p = 
.006), and a three-way interaction between advantageous competitive inequity game, status and 
trial number (ß = 0.06, SE = 0.03, Wald = 2.12, p = .034). 
Follow-up contrasts showed that both stably accepted and chronically rejected participants 
chose the equity distribution less often in the advantageous self-maximizing inequity Game 
(M = 45%) than in the disadvantageous prosocial inequity Game (M = 70%; p < .001) and the 
advantageous competitive inequity Game (M = 70%; p < .001), indicating that participants 
were less likely to share equally when this was costly. Equity choices in the latter two games 
did not differ significantly from each other (p = 1). In the advantageous competitive inequity 
game, stably accepted adolescents chose the equity distribution more often (M = 76%) than 
the chronically rejected adolescents (M = 62%; ß = -2.83, SE = 1.08, Wald = -2.16, p = 
.009), demonstrating that the stably accepted adolescents were more likely to share equally 
than the chronically rejected adolescents, but only when this was non-costly. The three-way 
interaction showed that the difference between the two peer status history groups in the 
advantageous competitive inequity game diminished as the scanning session progressed (see 
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Figure 8.2). There were no group differences in the advantageous self-maximizing inequity 
game (chronically rejected adolescents: M = 40%; stably accepted adolescents: M = 49%, p = 
.75) or the disadvantageous prosocial inequity game (chronically rejected adolescents: M = 
70%; stably accepted adolescents: M = 70%; p = .67). Reaction times (RTs) were slower in the 
disadvantageous prosocial inequity game (M = 1394 ms; SD = 21 ms) than in the advantageous 
self-maximizing inequity game (M = 1245 ms; SD = 21 ms) and advantageous competitive 
inequity game (M = 1265 ms; SD = 22 ms). Reaction times did not differ between the two 
groups (main effect and interactions between game and peer status history, all ps > .09).  
Equity choices and perspective taking
Stably accepted adolescents (M = 3.70; SD = 0.84) reported marginally higher levels of 
perspective taking than chronically rejected adolescents (M = 3.24; SD = 0.73), t(44) = 1.97, p = 
.056. To examine associations between equity choices, peer status history and perspective taking, 
we ran three random effects logistic regression models with equity as the dependent variable 
(0: inequity offer; 1: equity offer) and peer status history (0: stably accepted; 1: chronically 
rejected), self-reported perspective-taking, and a status × perspective taking (mean-centered) 
two-way interaction term as predictor variables. These regression analyses showed that self-
reported perspective taking interacted with peer status history to predict equity choices in 
the advantageous self-maximizing inequity game (ß = 3.61, SE = 1.38, Wald = 2.62, p = .009), 
but not in the disadvantageous prosocial inequity game (ß = -0.92, SE = 1.04, Wald = -0.88, 
p = .377). The interaction between peer status history and perspective taking was a marginally 
significant predictor in the advantageous competitive inequity game (ß = 2.22, SE = 1.26, Wald 
= 1.76, p = .079). Follow-up correlations between percentage of equity choices and perspective 
taking in each group separately showed that in the chronically rejected group, self-reported 
perspective-taking correlated with equity choices in the advantageous competitive inequity 
game (r = .62, p = .004) and the advantageous self-maximizing inequity game (r = .74, p < .001; 
see Figure 8.3). In the stably accepted group perspective taking did not correlate with equity 
choices (all ps > .23; see Figure 8.3). Taken together, these findings demonstrate that chronically 
rejected adolescents who reported higher levels of perspective taking were more likely to share 
equally when this was costly (advantageous self-maximizing inequity game) and when equity 
carried no costs (advantageous competitive inequity game). However, they were not more likely 
to allocate more money to unknown peers than to themselves in the disadvantageous prosocial 
inequity game. 
To examine associations between RTs, peer status history and perspective taking, we ran 
three similar random effects regression models with RT as the dependent variable and peer 
status history (0: stably accepted; 1: chronically rejected), self-reported perspective-taking a and 
two-way interaction terms as predictor variables. Self-reported perspective-taking correlated 
negatively with RTs when deciding to share equally in each equity game (advantageous 
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Figure 8.2 Percentage of equity offers chosen by stably accepted and chronically rejected adolescents in each of the 
three equity games plotted as a function of trial number. The equity offer (which was always 1 coin for the partici-
pant and 1 coin for the recipient) was pitted against an alternative offer, which is graphically depicted in the right 
bottom corner of each graph (red coins represent coins for the participant and blue coins those for the recipient).
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competitive inequity game: r = -.45, p = .002; advantageous self-maximizing inequity game: r 
= -.44, p = .008; disadvantageous prosocial inequity game: r = -.43, p = .004) and with sharing 
unequally (choosing 1-2) in the disadvantageous prosocial inequity game (r = -.45, p = .006). PT 
did not correlate with RT when deciding to share unequally in the advantageous competitive 
inequity and advantageous self-maximizing inequity game (both ps > .28). Self-reported 
perspective-taking did not interact with status to predict RTs. Thus, individual differences in 
perspective taking predicted higher RTs (i.e., slower reactions) for equity choices in all games 
and for maximizing the other person’s outcomes in the disadvantageous prosocial inequity 
game, but not for selfish choices.
Neuroimaging results
Whole-brain ANOVA results
To identify brain regions that were differentially involved in the equity games and interactions 
with peer status history, we first conducted a whole-brain ANOVA with equity game as within-
subject factor (three levels: advantageous self-maximizing inequity, advantageous competitive 
inequity game, disadvantageous prosocial inequity) and peer status history as a between-subject 
Figure 8.3 Chronically rejected participants who reported higher levels of perspective taking were more likely to 
give up a reward to share equally (choosing 1-1 instead of 2-0 in the advantageous self-maximizing inequity 
Game). In the stably accepted group, no relation between perspective taking and prosocial behavior was observed. 
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factor (two levels: stably accepted vs. chronically rejected). The ANOVA revealed a main effect 
of equity game in bilateral striatum (peaks at 9, 14, 7 and -6, 17, 4), pre-SMA (peak at 12, 20, 
58) and right TPJ (peak at 60, -55, 16) and an interaction effect between equity game and peer 
status history in left TPJ (peak at -45, -52, 7), right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)/AI (peak at 
27, 23, -14) and right Temporal pole (peak at 45, 17, -17) (see Supplementary Table S8.2 for a 
complete list of activations; 8.5). 
Follow-up whole-brain t-contrasts
To further examine the nature of the main effect of game and the game × peer status 
history interaction, we followed these F-contrasts up with planned t-contrasts. First, to 
investigate the main effect of game, we contrasted each game with the other two games. The 
contrast examining heightened activity in the advantageous self-maximizing inequity game 
relative to the two other games (Advantageous self-maximizing inequity > [Advantageous 
competitive inequity + disadvantageous prosocial inequity]) resulted in activation in bilateral 
striatum (peaks at 9, 14, 7 and -6, 17, 4), vmPFC (peak at -6, 44, -2), Pre-SMA (peak at 6, 
20, 58), dACC (peak at 9, 29, 19) and rTPJ (peak at 63, -49, 13; see Figure 8.4). The contrast 
examining heightened activity in the advantageous competitive inequity game relative to 
the two other games (Advantageous competitive inequity > [Advantageous self-maximizing 
inequity + disadvantageous prosocial inequity]) resulted in no significant clusters of activation. 
The contrast examining heightened activity in the disadvantageous prosocial inequity game 
relative to the other two games (Disadvantageous prosocial inequity > [Advantageous self-
maximizing inequity + advantageous competitive inequity]), resulted in heightened activity in 
bilateral middle occipital gyrus (peaks at -24, -94, 4 and 27, -91, 7) (see Supplementary Table 
S8.3 for a complete list of activations; 8.5). 
To further examine the equity game × peer status history interaction, we followed the 
F-contrasts reported above up with whole-brain t-contrasts comparing the two peer status 
history groups on all three contrasts outlined above. These analyses showed that stably accepted 
adolescents exhibited heightened activity in left TPJ (peak at -45, -52, 7), right temporal pole 
(peak at 45, 17, -17), pre-SMA (peak at -3, 23, 55), and right IFG/AI (peak at 27, 23, -14), 
compared to chronically rejected adolescents in the advantageous self-maximizing inequity 
game relative to the other two games Stably accepted adolescents > Chronically rejected 
adolescents (Advantageous self-maximizing inequity game > [Advantageous competitive 
inequity game + disadvantageous prosocial inequity game]). No brain regions showed higher 
1 Although the current paper focused on the question how neural processes during sharing decisions vary as a 
function of peer status history, we also tested whether our prior findings on the neural correlates of inequity 
choices replicated (Güroğlu, Will, & Crone, 2014). The results of this analyses are reported in the Supplementary 
material and show that our prior findings partially replicate (see 8.5).
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levels of activity in the stably accepted adolescents in the other two contrasts. Furthermore, no 
brain regions showed higher levels of activity in the chronically rejected adolescents compared 
to stably accepted adolescents in any of the three equity games (see Supplementary Table S8.4 
for a complete list of activations; 8.5).
8.4 DISCUSSION
The present study examined links between peer acceptance during childhood and perspective 
taking, sharing decisions and the neural correlates of sharing decisions in adolescence. 
Adolescents with a history of stable peer acceptance and adolescents with a history of chronic 
peer rejection made a series of anonymous sharing choices that differed in the extent to which 
an equal distribution of money incurred no costs (i.e. non-costly sharing), was costly for the 
participants themselves (costly sharing), or decreased the recipient’s potential earnings (envious 
sharing). Two main findings distinguished the stably accepted group from the chronically 
rejected group. First, stably accepted adolescents were more likely to share equally than 
chronically rejected adolescents when resources could be shared equally without costs to the 
decision-maker. Second, when considering a choice option where equal sharing was costly, 
stably accepted adolescents showed greater activation in left TPJ/pSTS, right temporal pole, 
right IFG/AI, and pre-SMA than chronically rejected adolescents. These findings have several 
Costly equity game vs Non-costly equity games 
ASI Game > (ACI Game + DPI Game) 
3.2 
4.8 
Figure 8.4 Both groups of adolescents showed increased activity in bilateral striatum (peaks at 9, 14, 7 and -6, 
17, 4), vmPFC (peak at -6, 44, -2), Pre-SMA (peak at 6, 20, 58), dACC (peak at 9, 29, 19) and rTPJ (peak at 
63, -49, 13) when making decisions in the advantageous self-maximizing inequity game in which fairness was 
costly relative to the other games where fairness could be established without costs (Advantageous self-maximizing 
inequity > [Advantageous competitive inequity + disadvantageous prosocial inequity]).
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Stably accepted adolescents > Chronically rejected adolescents 
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Figure 8.5 Stably accepted adolescents exhibited heightened activity in left pSTS/TPJ (peak at -45, -52, 7), right 
IFG/AI (peak at 27, 23, -14), right Temporal pole (peak at 45, 17, -17) and pre-SMA (peak at -3, 23, 55) com-
pared to chronically rejected adolescents in the advantageous self-maximizing inequity game relative to the other 
two games (Stably accepted adolescents > Chronically rejected adolescents [Advantageous self-maximizing inequi-
ty game > {Advantageous competitive inequity game + disadvantageous prosocial inequity game}]). Subject-level 
contrast values in left pSTS/TPJ and right Temporal pole were extracted for decisions in each game separately 
and plotted to facilitate interpretation. ACI = advantageous competitive inequity game; DPI = disadvantageous 
prosocial inequity game; ASI = advantageous self-maximizing inequity game.
implications for understanding the mechanisms underlying longitudinal links between peer 
acceptance and the development of prosocial behavior.
Associations between peer status history, sharing, and perspective taking 
The current findings add to a growing body of work examining the role of aversion to 
advantageous inequity (i.e. receiving more than another person) and disadvantageous inequity 
(i.e. receiving less than the other person) in the development of sharing. Behaviors reflecting 
both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity aversion seems to peak around age 8 (Blake 
& McAuliffe, 2011; Fehr et al., 2008; McAuliffe, Blake, Kim, Wrangham, & Warneken, 2013) 
and decline progressively across adolescence (Meuwese et al., 2014). The current findings show 
that advantageous inequity aversion does not only vary with age, but also with adolescents’ peer 
status history. Adolescents with a history of stable peer acceptance were more likely to avoid 
advantageous inequity through sharing equally than adolescents with a history of chronic peer 
rejection, but only when equity could be established without costs. Differences between the two 
groups were most pronounced during the first trials of the game.  
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Furthermore, perspective-taking skills moderated associations between childhood peer 
status and (costly) sharing behavior. It has been widely established that children who are more 
accepted by their peers have more advanced theory of mind skills (Fink et al., 2014; Slaughter et 
al., 2002), and exhibit higher levels of prosocial behavior than children who are rejected by their 
peers according to their parents, peers, teachers and trained observers (Eisenberg et al., 1993; 
Ladd, Price, & Hart, 1988; Newcomb et al., 1993). Our results showed no relations between 
perspective taking and prosocial choice in the stably accepted group. However, chronically 
rejected adolescents who reported higher levels of perspective taking equally shared more 
often with the recipients than chronically rejected adolescents who reported lower levels of 
perspective-taking; both when this was costly and when this was non-costly. Prosocial choices 
that maximized the recipient’s profits, but at the same time resulted disadvantageous inequity 
(choosing 1-2 in the disadvantageous prosocial inequity game), were neither associated with 
perspective taking nor with peer status history. 
Taken together, our findings indicate that stably accepted adolescents and chronically 
rejected adolescents who report higher levels of perspective taking are more likely to share 
equally, but they are not more tolerant of higher outcomes in a peer. These results suggest 
that advantageous inequity aversion is modulated by individual differences in peer acceptance 
during childhood and individual differences in perspective taking, whereas disadvantageous 
inequity aversion does not vary with either of these variables.
Individual differences in perspective taking also predicted slower reaction times for prosocial 
choices (equity choices in the advantageous competitive inequity game and advantageous self-
maximizing inequity game and maximizing the other person’s outcomes in the disadvantageous 
prosocial inequity game), but not for selfish choices, across all participants. These findings 
suggest that perspective taking in the context of fairness decisions is a deliberative process, 
which could reflect several mechanisms. For example, the longer reaction times might 
reflect increased levels of attention allocated to the perspective of the recipient or a greater 
switching between the perspective of the self and the perspective of the recipient. They could 
also reflect increased conflict between several competing motivations, e.g. increased conflict 
between a selfish motivation to maximize personal outcomes and an other-oriented motivation. 
Perspective taking as deliberative process could also explain why group differences in non-costly 
prosocial behavior were most pronounced at the start of the scanning session. Speculatively, 
repeated exposure to the same decisions allowed for more time to overthink decisions. This 
is consistent with prior work that demonstrated that behavioral differences between children 
with an accepted and a rejected status are most pronounced when children are required to 
act spontaneously, but that the differences become less pronounced or even disappear, when 
rejected children are given enough time to think about their decisions (Rabiner et al., 1990).
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Links between childhood peer status and activation of the saliency and 
mentalizing network
When deciding whether or not to pay a cost to share equally, stably accepted adolescents 
showed more activity in left pSTS/TPJ, right temporal pole, pre-SMA, and right IFG/AI 
than chronically rejected adolescents. These regions have previously been implicated in separate 
processes involved in social decision-making. The pre-SMA/ACC and insula have a domain 
general role in encoding representations of the physiological state of the body and affective 
signals that guide decision-making (Chang et al., 2013; Singer et al., 2009). Heightened pre-
SMA/ACC and insula activity has been repeatedly associated with detecting violations of social 
norms, including fairness in social decision-making (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Güroğlu 
et al., 2010; Güroğlu, Will, & Crone, 2014). Heightened pre-SMA and insula activity might 
thus reflect a greater degree of conflict or emotional processing associated with violating the 
equity norm in situations in which fairness is costly, compared to situations in which fairness 
is not costly. 
The pSTS/TPJ and temporal pole have been shown to be involved in mentalizing, i.e. 
thinking about other people’s mental states (Denny et al., 2012; Gweon, Dodell-Feder, Bedny, 
& Saxe, 2012), and social decisions-making in economic games (Gunther Moor et al., 2012; 
Güroğlu et al., 2011; van den Bos et al., 2011). Possibly, heightened activity in mentalizing-
regions during costly sharing decisions, reflects higher levels of orienting toward the other 
person’s outcomes or an increased switching perspectives of the self and the other (Koster-
Hale & Saxe, 2013; Mitchell, 2008; Van Overwalle, 2009). Together, these heightened neural 
responses in the stably accepted adolescents might indicate that they experience greater conflict 
and allocate greater levels of attention to the other person’s outcomes than the chronically 
rejected adolescents. This is in line with studies reporting that children with an accepted 
status engage in more other-oriented thought than children with a rejected status (Fink et 
al., 2014; Slaughter et al., 2002). Together these findings extend prior work by showing that 
separable networks involved in social decision-making are not only differentially sensitive to 
developmental change (Güroğlu et al., 2011; Steinbeis et al., 2012; van den Bos et al., 2011), 
but also that these circuits are differentially sensitive to individual differences in peer acceptance 
during childhood.
 
Limitations and future directions
A couple of limitations warrant consideration. First, our fMRI paradigm was not optimal 
for dissociating neural processes involved in equity vs. inequity choices. Participants were 
consistent in their choices, which proves that they were not choosing randomly and made 
meaningful choices. However, contrasting equity choices with inequity choices within games 
would have resulted in unbalanced analyses (i.e. comparisons based on varying amounts of 
trials) or in a severe loss of power (e.g. through exclusion of participants who consistently 
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chose equity or inequity in a certain game). A strength of the current analyses is that they are 
based on a balanced design in which contrasts were based on a sufficient amount of trials that 
did not vary between participants. Nonetheless, it remains a limitation that heightened neural 
responses in the advantageous self-maximizing inequity game relative to the other games could 
not be attributed to either the selfish (inequity: 2-0) or the prosocial (equity: 1-1) choice.  
Second, our data do not speak to the question whether higher neural responses in the stably 
accepted group (relative to the chronically rejected group) were caused by their stable high status, 
or whether they reflect a propensity that was already present before stably accepted adolescents 
attained their accepted peer status in childhood. Future longitudinal studies should investigate 
whether children who show heightened mentalizing-related activity early in childhood are 
more likely to become accepted by peers when they enter formal schooling. Furthermore, it 
would be interesting to test whether perspective-taking instructions or instructions to allocate 
more attention to the other person’s earnings can increase mentalizing-related activity. Similarly, 
it would be interesting to test whether experimentally heightened activity in the mentalizing 
network translates into more frequent displays of prosocial behavior and whether this could 
have positive consequences for acceptance among peers. 
Conclusions
The current study demonstrates that neural responses during sharing decisions in 
adolescence vary as a function of sustained peer acceptance during childhood. A fundamental 
issue in developmental cognitive neuroscience centers on the question how trajectories of 
neural, cognitive and behavioral development are shaped by complex interactions between 
genetically determined maturational processes, and (social) environmental factors (Crone & 
Dahl, 2012; Will & Güroğlu, in press). This study provides evidence of variation in neural 
processes underlying social decision-making that can be attributed to environmental factors 
(i.e. childhood socialization experiences). Consequently, the current findings lay the foundations 
for future longitudinal neuroimaging studies that can disentangle how internal (e.g. genetic; 
Avinun et al., 2011) and external (e.g. peer status) factors act separately, and jointly, on brain 
development and the development of prosocial behavior.
Furthermore, the results advance our understanding of the mechanisms that might underlie 
the established links between peer acceptance and development of prosocial behavior. Crucially, 
longitudinal studies have shown that displays of prosocial behavior are the strongest predictor of 
peer acceptance across childhood and adolescence (Asher & Coie, 1990; Caprara et al., 2000). 
In turn, peer acceptance is an important predictor of later mental health and academic success 
(DeRosier et al., 1994; Ladd & Troop-Gordon, 2003; Sturaro et al., 2011). A mechanistic 
understanding of bidirectional associations between peer acceptance and the development 
of prosocial behavior can provide valuable insights for designing interventions that can help 
children and adolescents who suffer from mental health or academic problems due to a lack of 
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acceptance among peers.
8.5 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL









Mean Social Preferenceb  
(selection variable)
-1.60 (0.52) 1.16 (0.18) < .001
Gender (% Male) 74.6 51.9 .14
Age 14.0 (0.61) 14.0 (0.77) .91
Pubertal status (PDS)
   0 Males









Race/Ethnicity (% Caucasian) 100% 96.3% .40
IQ (WISC Similarities and Block 
Design)
96 (12.45) 100 (10.25) .20
Current social competence 
(parent reported)
4.56 (0.61) 5.40 (0.57) < .001 
Anxiety during elementary school 
(teacher reported)b
0.40 (0.84) -0.31 (1.01) < .05
Conduct problems during elemen-
tary school (teacher reported)b
0.71 (1.33) -0.67 (0.52) < .001
aAll p-values obtained using t tests except for race and gender (Chi-square tests).
bAverage across 6 years of elementary school, Z-standardized
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Table S8.2 Brain regions revealed by whole-brain analyses full factorial 3 × 2 ANOVA with equity game as a 
within-subjects factor and peer status history as a between-subjects factor testing for peer status history differ-
ences in the equity games (all thresholded p < .001 uncorrected, > 10 voxels).
Brain region L/R Voxels z MNI coordinates
x y z
Main effect of Equity game
Middle Occipital gyrus R 42 4.52 30 -94 4
Posterior Cingulate gyrus R 54 4.30 9 40 31
Middle Occipital gyrus L 15 4.22 -24 -94 4
pSTS/TPJ R 25 3.76 60 -55 16
Pre-supplementary motor area R 19 3.74 12 20 58
Striatum R/L 31 3.61 9 14 7
3.40 -6 17 4
3.35 -9 11 -2
Thalamus L 26 3.57 -3 -7 10
Interaction effect Equity game × Peer status history 
Middle Temporal gyrus R 33 4.39 54 -19 -11
Inferior Frontal gyrus/Anterior Insula R 12 4.01 27 23 -14
Temporal Pole R 21 3.89 45 17 -17
pSTS/TPJ L 10 3.56 -45 -52 7
Note. L/R=Left/Right; k=cluster size in 3×3×3mm voxels; z=z-score; MNI coordinates =xyz voxel coor-
dinates in MNI space of the peak voxel. pSTS = Posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus; TPJ = Temporo-pa-
rietal junction
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Table S8.3 Brain regions revealed by planned whole-brain follow-up t contrasts comparing each equity game 
with the other two equity games (all thresholded p < .001 uncorrected, > 10 voxels). 
Brain region L/R Voxels z MNI coordinates
x y z
Advantageous self-maximizing inequity game > (Advantageous competitive inequity game + Dis-
advantageous prosocial inequity game) 
Posterior Cingulate gyrus R 310 4.67 9 -40 31*
Striatum R/L 344 4.14 9 14 7*
4.01 -3 -16 13*
3.95 -6 17 4*
Pre-supplementary motor area R/L 47 3.94 6 20 58*
3.49 -6 14 64*
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex L/R 57 3.89 -6 44 -2*
3.87 6 44 1*
Fusiform gyrus R 38 3.77 33 -61 14*
pSTS/TPJ L 44 3.75 63 -49 13*
Calcarine gyrus L 18 3.73 0 -94 13*
Middle Temporal gyrus L 18 3.65 57 2 -17*
Supplementary motor area L 16 3.50 15 -4 70*
Inferior Frontal gyrus L 11 3.46 48 23 13*
Anterior Cingulate cortex L 10 3.39 9 29 19*
Advantageous competitive inequity game > (Advantageous self-maximizing inequity game + Dis-
advantageous prosocial inequity game) 
No significant clusters of activation
Disadvantageous prosocial inequity game > (Advantageous self-maximizing inequity +Advanta-
geous competitive inequity game) 
Middle Occipital gyrus L 26 4.15 -24 -94 4
Middle Occipital gyrus R 39 4.10 27 -91 7
Note. L/R=Left/Right; k=cluster size in 3×3×3mm voxels; z=z-score; MNI coordinates =xyz voxel coor-
dinates in MNI space of the peak voxel. pSTS = posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus; TPJ = Temporo-pa-
rietal junction. * = also significant using FDR correction, p < .05, > 10 voxels).
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Table S8.4 Brain regions revealed by planned whole-brain follow-up t contrasts comparing the two peer status 
history groups on the comparison of each equity game with the other two equity games (all thresholded p < .001 
uncorrected, > 10 voxels). 
Brain region L/R Voxels z MNI coordinates
x y z
Stably accepted adolescents > Chronically rejected adolescents (Advantageous self-maximizing 
inequity game > [Advantageous competitive inequity game + disadvantageous prosocial inequity 
game]) 
Middle Temporal gyrus R 135 4.83 54 -19 -11*
Inferior Frontal gyrus/Anterior Insula R 71 4.29 27 23 -14*
Temporal Pole 4.23 45 17 -14
pSTS/TPJ L 179 4.13 -45 -52 7
Middle Temporal gyrus L 10 3.92 -48 -1 20
Calcarine gyrus R 26 3.86 21 -91 1
Superior Occipital gyrus L 41 3.74 -18 -91 1
Precentral gyrus L 38 3.67 -39 -1 58
Pre-supplementary motor area L/R 15 3.44 -3 23 55
Stably accepted adolescents > Chronically rejected adolescents (Advantageous competitive ineq-
uity game > [Advantageous self-maximizing inequity game + disadvantageous prosocial inequity 
game]) 
No significant clusters of activation
Stably accepted adolescents > Chronically rejected adolescents (Disadvantageous prosocial inequi-
ty game > [Advantageous self-maximizing inequity +advantageous competitive inequity game])
No significant clusters of activation
Note. L/R=Left/Right; k=cluster size in 3×3×3mm voxels; z=z-score; MNI coordinates =xyz voxel coor-
dinates in MNI space of the peak voxel. pSTS = Posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus; TPJ = Temporo-pa-
rietal junction. * = also significant using FDR correction, p < .05, > 10 voxels).
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Supplementary analysis
To test whether our prior findings on the neural correlates of advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequity choices replicated, we ran the 2 main whole-brain analyses reported 
in our prior paper (see Güroğlu, Will, & Crone, 2014; Chapter 7). The ‘Inequity > Equity 
choice’ contrast (collapsed across equity games and across peer status history groups) resulted 
in activity in the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, bilateral AI, pre-SMA, and dorsal ACC, which 
replicates our findings in young adults (see Supplementary Figure S8.1 and Supplementary 
Table S8.5). The ‘Inequity > Equity’ contrast within the disadvantageous prosocial inequity 
game (prosocial inequity [1-2] vs. envious equity [1-1]) did not result in significant clusters of 
activation at our chosen threshold. In young adults this contrast resulted in heightened activity 
in the ventral striatum and ventromedial PFC activity.
Figure S8.1 Network of brain regions from the ‘Inequity > Equity’ contrast collapsed across equity games and 
across peer status history groups; p < .001, 10 voxel threshold. Bar graph displays contrast estimates obtained from 
ROI analysis in right AI (MNI 48, 23, -2) for inequity and equity choices in the three equity games. Error bars 
indicate standard error of the mean. ACI = advantageous competitive inequity game; DPI = disadvantageous 
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Table S8.5 Brain regions revealed by planned whole-brain follow-up t contrasts comparing each equity game 
with the other two equity games (all thresholded p < .001 uncorrected, > 10 voxels).
Brain region L/R Voxels z MNI coordinates
x y z
Inequity > Equity (all equity games) 
Inferior frontal gyrus (vlPFC) L 14 4.18 -57 20 13
Inferior frontal gyrus R 45 3.83 48 23 -2
Anterior Insula L 32 3.74 -27 20 -2
Pre-supplementary motor area L/R 61 3.65 -9 8 64
Inferior frontal gyrus/Anterior Insula L 31 3.60 -45 17 -5
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 19 3.48 0 26 16
Note. L/R=Left/Right; k=cluster size in 3×3×3mm voxels; z=z-score; MNI coordinates =xyz voxel coor-
dinates in MNI space of the peak voxel. vlPFC = ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. 
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9.1 INTRODUCTION
The goal of this thesis was to examine the neurocognitive underpinnings of processes that 
play a role in the emergence and maintenance of peer group rejection. Transactional models 
of peer rejection posit that peer group rejection emerges from a consistent display of behaviors 
that are poorly tolerated by the rejected child’s peer group (Coie, 1990). These models further 
propose that once rejection has become stable in the peer group, cognitions and behaviors 
of both the rejected child and the members of the rejected child’s peer group are changed in 
ways that maintain peer group rejection. Drawing on such transactional models, we created a 
simplified model of peer rejection, which guided the empirical studies in this thesis. This model 
distinguished between processes at the level of the individual child (i.e. intra-individual), those 
at the level of social interactions (i.e. interpersonal) and those at the level of the peer group.
At the interpersonal level, we examined retaliatory and prosocial reactions to social exclusion 
and prosocial behavior in the form of resource sharing with strangers. At the intra-individual 
level, we examined subjective (i.e. mood and need satisfaction) and neurocognitive processes 
that underlie behavioral reactions to exclusion and sharing. Furthermore, to gain a better 
understanding of how these intra- and interpersonal processes are influenced by processes at 
the group level, we investigated how these processes varied as function of chronic exposure 
to peer group rejection. Given the crucial role the peer group has in stopping social exclusion 
and alleviating the distress experienced by a victim of exclusion (Sainio et al., 2010; Salmivalli, 
2010), we also examined socio-cognitive processes (intra-individual level) of uninvolved 
bystanders who witnessed the exclusion of a peer and were subsequently given the opportunity 
to help the victim of exclusion and to punish the perpetrators (interaction level).
In this chapter, the findings of the studies in this thesis are summarized and discussed 
within the framework of our working model. First, the main findings of each chapter are 
summarized (9.2). This summary is accompanied by a graphical summary of the neural 
correlates of the intra- and interpersonal processes involved in social decision-making (see 
Figure 9.1). Second, because the findings of each separate study were mainly discussed in a 
(developmental) cognitive neuroscience framework, the general discussion will concentrate 
on how the findings fit into the broader ‘peer relations’ literature and how they relate to the 
mechanisms of emergence and maintenance of peer rejection (9.3-9.6). The final section of this 
thesis is dedicated to the advantages of an integration of developmental cognitive neuroscience 
with traditional peer relations research followed by several directions for future research (9.7) 
and concluding remarks (9.8). 
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9.2 SUMMARY
Chapter 2 examined how subjective and neural responses to social exclusion in adolescence 
vary as function of chronic exposure to peer rejection. We recruited a group of adolescents who 
were chronically rejected by their peers and a group of adolescents who had a stable accepted 
status across six elementary school grades. Participants were first included and subsequently 
excluded in the Cyberball paradigm (Williams et al., 2000) in an MRI scanner. Both groups 
of adolescents reported similar decreases in mood and need satisfaction after being excluded, 
demonstrating that a brief episode of social exclusion is distressing for adolescents irrespective 
of childhood peer status. On a neural level, differences between the two groups emerged. 
Specifically, chronically rejected adolescents, compared with stably accepted adolescents, 
exhibited heightened activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) during social 
exclusion. When incidentally excluded in a social interaction in which they were overall 
included, chronically rejected adolescents showed heightened activity in the dACC and anterior 
prefrontal cortex (aPFC). A heightened neural reactivity to continuous exclusion and incidental 
exclusion could be associated with more pronounced emotional or behavioral reactions to 
negative peer treatment (e.g. lashing out against peers who may or may not have intended to 
exclude them), which instigate further negative peer treatment. Consequently, a heightened 
neural reactivity to negative peer treatment might be a mechanism through which chronically 
rejected adolescents initially became rejected or through which they maintained their rejected 
status across elementary school. 
The main goal of the study reported in Chapter 3 was to examine the neural processes 
underlying retaliatory and prosocial reactions to exclusion in a sample of young adults. 
Participants played a modified Dictator Game in which they could choose to either punish 
(i.e. retaliate against) the excluders by decreasing their monetary outcomes or to refrain from 
punishment and forgive (i.e. act prosocial toward) them by sharing the stake equally with them. 
Additionally, punishment could result in monetary gains, losses, or could have no monetary 
consequences. Participants punished the excluders when this resulted in monetary gains, 
but also when this had no monetary consequences and even when punishment was costly. 
Punishment of excluders was associated with activation in pre-supplementary motor area (pre-
SMA) and bilateral anterior insula (AI; see Figure 9.1). Whereas AI activity was not sensitive 
to monetary consequences when punishing excluders, pre-SMA activity was higher for costly 
punishment relative to punishment that resulted in monetary gains or had no monetary 
consequences. Analyses of individual differences showed that people who were more inclined 
to take other people’s perspectives were more likely to forgive the excluders. Forgiveness was 
associated with increased activation in brain regions supporting perspective taking (temporo-
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Figure 9.1 Summary of the activations in three brain networks involved in social decision-making: basic 
affective network (pink), cognitive-regulatory network (blue) and mentalizing network (green). AI = anterior 
insula, VS = ventral striatum, PC = parietal cortex, lPFC = lateral Prefrontal Cortex, pre-SMA = pre-sup-
plementary motor area, dACC = dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex, TPJ = temporo-parietal junction, STS = 
Superior Temporal Sulcus, TP = temporal pole, dmPFC = dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex, vmPFC = ventrome-
dial Prefrontal Cortex.
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(dACC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [dlPFC]). This suggests that perspective taking and 
cognitive control are two intra-individual processes underlying prosocial reactions to social 
exclusion. These findings laid the foundations for investigating how those neural processes vary 
as a function of childhood peer rejection. 
Accordingly, in Chapter 4, a group of adolescents with a history of chronic peer rejection 
and a group of adolescents with a history of stable peer acceptance were given the opportunity 
to punish or to forgive individuals who excluded them in Cyberball. Similar to adults, 
adolescents punished the excluders by decreasing their monetary outcomes. Punishment of the 
excluders was associated with activity in ventral striatum, dlPFC and parietal cortex. Neither 
punishment behavior nor associated neural activity was modulated by individual differences 
in peer status history, perspective taking or behavioral regulation problems. Despite both 
groups showing similar levels of punishment and forgiveness, chronically rejected adolescents 
exhibited more activity in the dorsal striatum and the lateral PFC (lPFC) during forgiveness 
than stably accepted adolescents. Based the role of the dorsal striatum and lPFC in executive 
control, heightened activity in these regions during forgiveness might indicate that chronically 
rejected adolescents have to exert greater levels of control in order to act prosocial toward 
individuals who previously excluded them. During forgiveness, individual differences in 
perspective taking correlated positively with activity in the dmPFC and individual differences 
in behavioral regulation problems correlated positively with pre-SMA/ACC and AI. These 
findings demonstrate that individual differences in exposure to chronic peer rejection impact 
neural activity during prosocial, but not retaliatory reactions to social exclusion. Together they 
provide insights into several intra-individual processes underlying behavioral reactions that 
could provoke excluders and consequently could play a role in the maintenance of a rejected 
status. 
Chapter 5 examined developmental differences in helping a victim of exclusion and 
punishing excluders after witnessing social exclusion. Participants between the ages of 9 and 22 
were first included by two peers in Cyberball and subsequently witnessed the social exclusion of 
a peer by two excluders in Cyberball. Next, they played two types of economic games in which 
they distributed money between themselves and the peers who included them in the first game 
(i.e. the includers), the victim of exclusion, and the excluders. The results showed that, with 
increasing age participants were more likely to altruistically allocate a share of their rewards to 
the victim. Older adolescents were more likely to punish the excluders than younger adolescents 
and children. Adults were more merciful in their punishment than adolescents. This quadratic 
age-related pattern was found both when punishment was beneficial to the participants’ own 
outcomes and when it was costly. Affective perspective-taking (i.e., discriminating between 
the victim’s mood and one’s own mood after exclusion) continued to develop in emerging 
adolescence. Individual differences in affective perspective-taking predicted higher levels of 
prosocial behavior toward the victim and more pronounced punishment of the excluders, which 
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remained after controlling for age. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that the capacity 
to understand the distress in a victim of exclusion is important for social action in response to 
the negative treatment of a peer, in particular in situations where the victim’s feelings need to 
be inferred without explicit emotional cues.
Chapter 6 reviewed the existing literature on the development of prosocial and strategic 
social behavior from infancy to young adulthood. This review showed that prosocial concern 
and a preference for fairness emerge very early in development. Nonetheless, across childhood 
and adolescence, prosocial behavior increases in complexity evidenced by a greater sensitivity 
to other people’s perspectives and more strategic social behavior. Developmental cognitive 
neuroscience studies showed that developmental increases in the complexity of social behavior 
were associated with developmental changes in impulse control and perspective taking and the 
neural circuitry supporting those capacities. The final two chapters were dedicated to uncovering 
how prosocial behavior in the form of resource sharing and associated neural activity might 
vary as a function of chronic peer rejection or acceptance. 
First, Chapter 7 mapped the neural processes underlying aversion to unequal distributions 
of resources in sharing decisions. Young adults played economic games (‘equity games’) 
in which they could distribute money in an equal manner, or in unequal manner, which 
could be beneficial to their own outcomes or to another person’s outcomes. Neuroimaging 
analyses revealed a common neural response associated with both advantageous and prosocial 
disadvantageous inequity in the dACC, AI and dlPFC, which is a network previously found 
to be implicated in the reception of unfair treatment. Prosocial disadvantageous inequity was 
associated with additional activation in the ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
which are regions implicated in the computation of subjective value and processing both social 
and non-social rewards. These findings laid the foundations for examining whether neural 
processes associated with violations of fairness norms and those associated with perspective 
taking in sharing decisions vary as a function of a history of chronic peer rejection or stable 
peer acceptance.
To test this hypothesis, a group of adolescents with a history of chronic peer rejection and a 
group with a history of stable peer acceptance played the equity games while undergoing fMRI 
(Chapter 8). Behavioral results showed that stably accepted adolescents were more likely to 
share equally than chronically rejected adolescents, but only when this was non-costly. When 
equity was costly, perspective-taking skills moderated the association between peer status 
history and prosocial behavior. Specifically, chronically rejected adolescents who reported 
higher levels of perspective taking shared more often than chronically rejected adolescents who 
reported lower levels of perspective taking. Neuroimaging analyses showed that stably accepted 
adolescents exhibit higher levels of activity in brain regions supporting perspective taking (e.g. 
TPJ/pSTS and temporal pole) and the detection of social norm-violations (pre-SMA and AI) 
than chronically rejected adolescents during choices where equity was costly. These findings 
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provide insights into the mechanisms at the intra-individual level of social complexity, which 
might underlie the often-found heightened propensity for prosocial behavior in accepted 
children and adolescents. 
Chronically rejected adolescents, compared to stably accepted adolescents, showed elevated 
levels of activation in the ACC and aPFC, which they share with people who are more distressed 
by social exclusion (Eisenberger et al., 2003) and people who have anxious expectations about 
interpersonal rejection (DeWall et al., 2012; Masten et al., 2009). Heightened neural responses 
to exclusion might be a correlate of an intra-individual process (e.g. a hypersensitivity to 
exclusion), which could play an important role in attaining or maintaining a rejected status. A 
hypersensitivity to negative peer treatment could account for observations that children with a 
rejected status rapidly reestablish a rejected status when they enter new groups of peers (Coie 
& Kupersmidt, 1983; Hardy et al., 2002). Children with a heightened neural reactivity to social 
exclusion might overreact to negative peer treatment (e.g., social exclusion) in social interactions 
with peers, which could in turn lead to consensual disliking in the new peer group. As such 
a heightened neural reactivity might be a potential mechanism through which chronically 
rejected adolescents initially became rejected or through which they maintained their rejected 
status over time. 
Theories on the development of rejection sensitivity, rooted in attachment theory (Bowlby, 
1973), have proposed that repeated exposure to interpersonal rejection by close others, such as 
parents (Feldman & Downey, 1994), but also peers (London et al., 2007), makes individuals 
more sensitive to interpersonal rejection. Individuals high in rejection sensitivity are more likely 
to defensively expect, readily perceive, and overreact to social rejection (Downey & Feldman, 
1996). Individuals high in rejection sensitivity experience greater levels of rejection by peers 
(London et al., 2007), are more distressed by rejection in the lab, and experience greater 
difficulties in interactions with peers over time (Downey et al., 1998). A greater tendency to 
anxiously or angrily expect rejection thus often leads to maladaptive responses, which could 
elicit further rejection and thereby paradoxically fulfill the anxious expectations about being 
rejected. 
The development of anxious and angry expectations about rejection as a consequence of 
chronic exposure to peer rejection is consistent with social information processing models of 
peer interactions (Crick & Dodge, 1994). These models propose that expectations about social 
interactions are shaped by past experiences with peers. For example, in comparison with accepted 
9.3 DO PEER EXPERIENCES SHAPE NEURAL 
RESPONSES TO SOCIAL EXCLUSION? 
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children, rejected children perceive their peers to be less supportive and trustworthy (Ladd 
et al., 2014), and aggressive-rejected children adolescents are more likely to see provocation 
in ambiguous social situations (De Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002). 
Consistent with both attachment theory and social information processing models, it could be 
that a history of chronic peer rejection has sensitized adolescents to both actual exclusion and to 
cues signaling potential exclusion. Our findings showing that chronically rejected adolescents 
show heightened neural reactivity to incidental exclusion provide preliminary evidence for such 
a notion. 
To conclude, elucidating associations between a history of chronic peer rejection and 
heightened neural responses to social exclusion is a crucial first step toward understanding 
how experiences in the peer group shape neural responses to social exclusion. However, given 
that brain responses were measured at a single time point the question remains: have the group 
differences in neural processing of social exclusion gradually increased over the years due to 
differential exposure to positive and negative interactions with peers? Or is the heightened neural 
reactivity to exclusion a reflection of underlying (dys)functions (e.g. problems in emotional 
regulation), which might have played a role in the emergence of peer group rejection, but 
remained stable across development? To be able to answer those questions, longitudinal designs 
are required to critically test whether the heightened neural responses to social exclusion are 
merely incidental to a rejected status or whether they become greater over time as a function of 
exposure to peer rejection (see 9.7 for a more elaborate discussion of this notion).
9.4 THE ROLE OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS IN 
PROSOCIAL REACTIONS TO SOCIAL 
EXCLUSION
Our studies examining retaliatory and prosocial reactions to exclusion yielded important 
insights into both intra- and inter-personal processes involved in the emergence or maintenance 
of peer rejection. The first main result is that we found evidence of neural signatures of two 
cognitive processes underlying refraining from punishment and acting prosocial toward 
excluders: perspective taking and cognitive control (Chapters 3 and 4). Refraining from 
punishment and acting prosocial toward the excluders was associated with increased activity 
in brain regions supporting perspective taking (e.g. dmPFC and TPJ) and brain regions 
supporting cognitive control (ACC, dorsolateral and ventrolateral PFC). Those who punished 
more often showed greater activation in these regions when decided to forgive the excluders, 
suggesting that people engage in higher levels of perspective taking and effortful control in 
order overcome a (pre-potent) punishing response. Furthermore, individual differences in 
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perspective taking were associated with activity in the mentalizing network (i.e. dmPFC) and 
individual differences in behavioral regulation problems (i.e. problems in inhibition, cognitive 
shifting and emotional regulation) scaled with pre-SMA/ACC and dorsal AI activity during 
forgiveness. 
Crucially, both social cognition (e.g. ‘theory of mind’ abilities) and executive functioning 
are positively associated with displays of prosocial behavior and peer acceptance (Caputi et al., 
2012; Spinrad et al., 2006). Consistent with prior work demonstrating links between executive 
functioning and peer acceptance, chronically rejected adolescents exhibited more behavioral 
regulation problems and they recruited control-related brain regions (e.g. dorsal striatum and 
lateral PFC) to a greater extent than stably accepted adolescents when they acted prosocial 
toward the excluders. A greater demand on neural circuitry implicated in cognitive control 
during prosocial reactions to exclusion could be a correlate these reactions being more effortful 
for adolescents who were chronically rejected. Consequently, in the heat of the moment of their 
daily experiences with peers, they might be more likely to exhibit behaviors that reinforce or 
provoke aggressors, which put them at a greater risk for further peer group rejection. Based on 
the lateral PFC’s domain general role in cognitive control and self-regulation in social decisions 
(Knoch et al., 2006; Strang et al., 2014), it is tempting to interpret heightened lPFC activity 
during forgiveness as a neural correlate of the suppression of a punishing response. However, 
given that another subregion in the lPFC was also more active during punishment of excluders, 
more research is needed to pinpoint what heightened lPFC activity during forgiveness of 
excluders might reflect. 
A promising approach to further investigate this question is using laboratory tasks to assess 
different executive functions (e.g. inhibition, shifting, emotion regulation) and subsequently 
relate performance on those tasks to individual differences in prosocial behavior and peer 
status. Using such an approach, it has been shown that aggressive-rejected children have more 
difficulties in shifting attention away from negative emotions than non-aggressive-accepted 
children (Wilson, 2003). Interestingly, difficulties in shifting attention predicted slower 
reactions in sharing a toy with two other children who had previously excluded the participants 
from a play activity (which parallels sharing of money with peers who previously excluded 
participants from ball-tossing in Cyberball in Chapters 3 and 4). Future work could expand 
this literature by examining longitudinal associations between relevant executive functions and 
behavioral reactions to exclusion and other forms of peer hassles. Such an endeavor can inform 
intervention research that could test whether training executive functions might have positive 
affects on peer acceptance. 
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9.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF AFFECTIVE 
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING FOR REACTIONS TO THE 
EXCLUSION OF A PEER
When observing the exclusion of a peer, affective perspective-taking (actively inferring the 
mood of the victim of exclusion) proved to be an important prerequisite for costly helping of 
a victim and for punishing excluders (Chapter 5). In contrast, cognitive perspective-taking 
(i.e. the ability to adopt another person’s point of view) was not associated with helping and 
punishment behavior. These findings suggest that children and adolescents not only have to 
possess the ability to adopt someone else’s point of view, but also actively have to infer the 
affective state of the victim in order to act prosocial toward them. Although peer rejection is 
not synonymous with peer exclusion, rejected children are excluded more often than accepted 
children and the negative treatment that rejected children receive from peers is likely to further 
cement their rejected status (Boivin & Hymel, 1997; Buhs & Ladd, 2001; Buhs et al., 2006). 
Consequently, elucidating individual and developmental differences in the willingness to help 
victims or to punish excluders may lead to a better understanding of processes at the level of the 
peer group that play a role in the emergence and rejection of peer rejection.
Bullying research has shown that peers play a vital role in stopping social exclusion and 
other forms of bullying (Salmivalli, 2010). Peers can sustain bullying by: i) actively assisting 
bullies during bullying episodes, ii) by reinforcing the bullies’ behavior through giving them 
positive feedback (e.g. laughing or cheering), or iii) through remaining passive bystanders. 
Crucially, peers can also put a stop to bullying by actively defending the victim by taking their 
side, comforting them or by standing up against the bully (Hawkins et al., 2001). Consistent 
with our findings, those who defend victims in real-life bullying episodes report high levels of 
both cognitive components of empathy (e.g. understanding other people’s emotions) as well 
as affective components (e.g. vicarious sharing of emotions) (for a review, see van Noorden, 
Haselager, Cillessen, & Bukowski, 2014). However, not all children who feel empathy for 
their bullied peers choose to intervene in a bullying situation in real-life. There is evidence 
to suggest that high levels of affective empathy only predict standing up for a victim when 
children and adolescents also have a high peer status (Caravita, Di Blasio, & Salmivalli, 2009; 
Pöyhönen, Juvonen, & Salmivalli, 2010). Future studies should incorporate measures of peer 
status as well as roles in bullying situations (e.g. defender, reinforcer, assistant) to gain a better 
understanding of the complex interplay between individual (e.g. empathic abilities) and 
contextual (e.g. peer status) factors involved in prosocial responses to the exclusion of a peer. 
Finally, bullying intervention programs often incorporate perspective-taking instructions, but 
they are not always as effective as they aim to be (van Noorden et al., 2014). One reason could 
be that some forms of perspective taking might not be as efficient as others for interventions in 
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bullying situations. Our results underline the importance of distinguishing between different 
forms of perspective taking (i.e. affective vs. cognitive) and their consequences for social action 
in particular in bullying episodes where victims do not show overt signs of discomfort.
9.6 SHARING IS CARING
A result that consistently emerges from studies across this thesis is that perspective taking 
and underlying neural circuitry are important for prosocial behavior. That is, the capability to 
put oneself into the shoes of another person correlated with a variety of prosocial behaviors, 
including forgiveness of excluders (Chapter 3), helping of a victim of exclusion (Chapter 5), 
and equally sharing resources with strangers (Chapter 8). Furthermore, heightened activity in 
brain regions supporting perspective taking was found during forgiveness (i.e. TPJ and dmPFC; 
Chapter 4), during choices to maximize another person’s profits (precuneus and mPFC; 
Chapter 7) and during decision-making in the equity game where fairness was costly (TPJ 
and temporal pole; Chapter 8) (see Figure 9.1). Taken together, these findings suggest that 
brain regions of the mentalizing network are involved in switching attention to the perspective 
of another person in order to act prosocial toward them (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; Mitchell, 
2008). During costly sharing decisions, stably accepted adolescents exhibited higher activity in 
regions of the mentalizing network (TPJ and temporal pole) compared to chronically rejected 
adolescents, which possibly reflects higher levels of other-oriented thinking during social 
decisions. Lesser engagement of the mentalizing network during social choices might underlie 
a reduced tendency to engage in spontaneous other-oriented thinking which might lead to low 
levels of prosocial behavior. In other words, a child with a rejected status might be less likely 
to spontaneously engage in other-oriented thinking in social interactions, which could be an 
intra-personal process underlying their lower levels of prosocial behavior in interactions with 
peers, which could have played a role in the emergent phase of peer rejection.
On a final note, the maintenance of a rejected status across several years might prevent 
rejected children from developing the skills they need to gain peer acceptance. Recent studies 
have shown that children who have a better understanding of other people’s mental states (i.e. 
theory of mind skills) are better liked now and in the future (Fink et al., 2014; Slaughter et al., 
2002). Importantly, longitudinal links between theory of mind skills and future peer acceptance 
were mediated by prosocial behavior (Caputi et al., 2012). These findings suggest that theory 
of mind skills are shaped in positive interactions with peers and that prosocial behavior toward 
peers seems to give access to those interactions. Rejected children have fewer positive peer 
interactions (Boivin & Hymel, 1997) and relationships (e.g. fewer friendships; Parker & Asher, 
1993). Therefore, they are likely to have fewer opportunities for developing the socio-cognitive 
skills and social behaviors that grant them access to positive interactions with peers, keeping 
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them trapped in a web of rejection. Future prospective longitudinal designs incorporating 
laboratory assessments of theory of mind tasks, assessments of peer status and neuroimaging 
methods can give valuable insights into how the neural circuitry underlying perspective taking 
is shaped by interactions with peers and how functional changes in this neural circuitry are 
associated with changes in peer acceptance. 
The results of the studies described in this thesis show that a neurocognitive approach 
to studying peer relations is successful in providing novel insights into the processes at the 
intra-individual and interactional level of social complexity and their associations with long-
term experiences in the peer group. Hereby we show that an integration of developmental 
cognitive neuroscience of peer interactions with traditional peer relations research can advance 
the understanding of key questions in both fields. The following sections elaborate on the 
advantages of a joint enterprise, which could eventually give way to a neuroscience of peer 
relations. First, we will delineate how the neural systems involved in peer interactions can 
be better understood through the incorporation of key insights from peer relations research. 
Subsequently, we will describe in what way neuroscience can help peer relations researchers 
answer their questions. Finally, we will put forth an integrated research agenda of directions for 
future research. 
How peer relations research may advance neuroscience
First, cognitive neuroscience studies investigating social relations can benefit from a rich 
body of knowledge on multiple aspects of children’s relationships with peers. For example, in 
cognitive neuroscience studies operationalizations of complex relationships like friendships have 
often been rather crude (e.g. friendship as a dichotomous variable: friend or no friend). Through 
intense study of friendships, peer relations researchers have uncovered multiple meaningful 
dimensions of friendship, including positive dimensions such as protection and companionship, 
but also negative dimensions such as conflict (Bukowski, Motzoi, & Meyer, 2009). Whereas 
friendships characterized by high levels of protection or companionship have been linked 
to positive outcomes (e.g. protection from victimization and lower levels of internalizing 
problems; Hodges, Boivin, Vitaro, & Bukowski, 1999), friendships characterized by high levels 
of conflict are related to negative outcomes (e.g. greater risk of being victimized and higher 
levels of internalizing problems; La Greca & Harrison, 2005). Neuroimaging studies, which 
have incorporated such knowledge, have shown that neural responses to winning money for 
9.7 TOWARD A NEUROSCIENCE OF PEER 
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a friend are associated with positive aspects of friendship (e.g. closeness, safety, help), but not 
with negative aspects (e.g. conflict) (Braams, Peters, Peper, Güroğlu, & Crone, 2014). This study 
demonstrates that measuring multiple aspects of friendships yields a nuanced picture of neural 
processes involved in complex social relationships. 
Second, peer relations research has a strong track record in defining different types of 
peer experiences. In cognitive neuroscience, terms such as rejection and exclusion are often 
used interchangeably, despite strong evidence indicating that these are distinct phenomena 
that show unique associations with adjustment outcomes (e.g. exacerbated school adjustment 
difficulties in children who are both rejected and excluded by peers; Buhs & Ladd, 2001; Buhs 
et al., 2006). Theories and hypotheses about neural systems involved in peer interactions can be 
improved through incorporation of theories and definitions from peer relations research.
Third, developmental cognitive neuroscientists have begun examining the development 
of neural processes using longitudinal designs. Peer relations researchers have experience in 
designing complex longitudinal models to establish causal effects. Consequently, cognitive 
neuroscientists could work together with peer relations researchers to better understand 
longitudinal patterns. 
Fourth, neurobiological models of adolescent social interactions are likely to improve as a 
result of a greater understanding of the socialization experiences that help shape a developing 
brain. Neural processes can be better understood through identifying in what way they vary 
with socially relevant factors and in what when they are resistant to such factors (context-
independent). Peer relations research has shown that children’s social behavior is guided by 
their expectations and perceptions of their social world, which are shaped by peer experiences 
(Ladd et al., 2014; Salmivalli & Isaacs, 2005). Crucially, in order for experiences to change 
cognitions and behaviors, they must have an impact on brain structure and functioning. Peer 
researchers and neuroscientists should join forces to develop a theoretical framework of how 
brain and cognition develop as a consequence of bidirectional interactions between a maturing 
brain and (social) experiences.
How neuroscience may advance peer relations research
There are several ways in which a cognitive neuroscience approach can give insights into 
the affective, regulatory, and socio-cognitive processes underlying peer interactions. First, 
neuroscience methods can provide insight into processes that cannot always be observed in 
overt behavior or subjective reports, which are usually assessed after a social interaction has 
happened. 
Second, phenotypically dissimilar behaviors (e.g., aggressive behavior vs. withdrawal from 
social interactions) may result from similar underlying processes (e.g. heightened emotional 
reactivity to negative peer treatment). Neuroscience can help elucidate such common underlying 
phenomena, which could then be targeted in interventions. Likewise, apparently similar looking 
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behaviors might be the product of different underlying processes. 
Third, neuroscience can give insights into the biological mechanisms that mediate the effects 
of social experiences (e.g. stressful events in the peer context) and (mental) health problems 
(e.g. psychosomatic complaints, internalizing, or externalizing problems). For example, it has 
been widely established that positive and lasting relationships with others are associated with 
better physical and mental health (Cacioppo, Hawkley, & Berntson, 2003; Slavich, O’Donovan, 
Epel, & Kemeny, 2010). To fully understand how the social environment affects physical and 
mental health, it is important to understand links between the social environment and brain 
functioning.
Fourth, there has been increasing interest in how the peer environment works together with 
genetic factors to shape social behavior (Brendgen, 2012). However, there are multiple levels 
of explanation between the level of the genes coding for specific proteins in the body and the 
level of behavior. Neural responses could therefore be used as endophenotypes, which serve as 
biological markers that are intermediate between genes and behavior.
Fifth, neurobiological findings can help extend and constrain current theories on peer 
relations in childhood and adolescence. For example, brain networks sub serving complex 
cognitive functions such as executive control and perspective taking have been shown to 
continue to develop structurally and functionally well into the second and third decades of 
life (Crone & Dahl, 2012; Mills et al., 2012; Shaw et al., 2008). As reviewed in Chapter 6 
these changes in the brain have been shown to importantly map onto developmental changes 
in social behavior, which has many implications for understanding associations between peer 
relations and cognitive development. Theories on peer relations in childhood and adolescence 
could be improved by taking into account the protracted developmental trajectory of complex 
(social) cognitive functions. 
Future directions
The previously described advantages of joining forces between neuroscience and peer 
relations research open up several exciting avenues for future research. To inspire collaborations 
between developmental neuroscientists and peer researchers, the following sections describe 
several of them. They are structured in such a way that each recommendation has the potential 
to advance our understanding of the neuroscience of peer interactions, but at the same time can 
elucidate processes underlying peer interactions that are of interest to peer researchers. 
Longitudinal designs
Throughout the discussion, several directions for future research were mentioned. The 
majority of those recommendations call on the need for longitudinal designs to study actual 
developmental changes within participants. Longitudinal studies with multiple neuroimaging 
assessments and long-term classroom assessments could give us insights in the transactional 
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relationship between (functional) brain development and influences from the (social) 
environment. For example, rejected children who show greater neural reactivity to negative peer 
treatment might be more likely to overreact to negative peer treatment in their classrooms, which 
could increase the likelihood that they will be victimized. Rejected children who are victimized 
might show increasingly greater reactivity to emotional stimuli, giving rise to a developmental 
cascade, which could result in the emergence of externalizing and internalizing problems. Such 
prospective longitudinal designs could ultimately be instrumental in discovering ‘biomarkers’ 
(e.g. heightened neural reactivity to negative peer treatment) that can help identify children 
and adolescents who run a greater risk for developing psychopathology (e.g. internalizing 
behavioral problems). 
Paradigm development
Using longitudinal designs to study the neural correlates of social interactions places 
limits on the use of certain experimental paradigms. For example, it seems reasonable to infer 
that a second or third exposure to social exclusion in Cyberball has a different emotional 
impact compared to the first time someone is excluded in this game. This could hinder the 
interpretation of longitudinal effects in brain regions processing emotions. Furthermore, the 
paradigms used in the context of this thesis used deception to give participants the impression 
that they engaged in actual social interactions. Given that deception warrants debriefing about 
the nature of the deceit, it is a challenge for the future to develop inventive social interaction 
paradigms that can be used for longitudinal neuroimaging research. 
In addition to methodological considerations, there are also theoretical considerations 
encouraging paradigm development. For example, the immediate distress in response to 
exclusion was not modulated by peer status history. However, research has shown that chronic 
exposure to stress has been linked to a prolonged stress response, which is possibly associated 
with an inability to recover from stress ( Juster, McEwen, & Lupien, 2010). A task for future 
research could be to develop paradigms that can reliably assess recovery from a peer stressor 
(e.g. harassment or exclusion). A working hypothesis would be that children who have been 
chronically rejected or victimized show dysregulated recovery from peer stressors, which could 
play a role in the maintenance of a rejected status.
Connectivity
The neuroimaging studies in this thesis successfully showed that activity in brain regions 
known to be part of specialized neural networks varied as a function peer status history. However, 
cognitions, emotions, and behaviors are the product of complex interactions within and between 
specialized networks. Using a method called psychophysiological interaction (PPI), it has been 
shown that functional coupling between the vlPFC – a brain region involved in regulating 
the distress caused by social exclusion - and the vACC – a region linked to the distressing 
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aspect of exclusion - increases with age, possibly reflecting age-related increases in emotion 
regulation capacities (Bolling et al., 2011a). Crucially, poor emotion regulation might be one of 
the intra-personal factors underlying displays of negative affect or rejection-eliciting behaviors 
that play a role in the emergence or maintenance of a rejected status (Graziano, Keane, & 
Calkins, 2007). Relating measures of functional connectivity during emotion-processing tasks 
to measures of peer status can advance our understanding of both neural systems involved in 
emotion regulation and the role of emotion regulation difficulties in the maintenance of peer 
rejection.
Another promising approach to study how brain networks interact is examining structural 
connectivity. Diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) can be used to examine fractional anisotropy 
(FA), which is an index of the integrity of white matter tracts connecting different brain regions 
in a neural network. The relevance of studying structural connectivity between brain regions for 
psychosocial developmental processes has recently been demonstrated by a study showing that 
higher levels of structural integrity of white matter tracts between the striatum and prefrontal 
cortex is associated with a greater capacity for controlling the impulse to choose an immediate 
smaller reward instead of a larger delayed reward (Peper et al., 2013). Studying functional 
or structural connectivity between regulatory brain regions (e.g. PFC) and regions involved 
in processing basic emotions (e.g. striatum) can give us more insights into the mechanisms 
underlying problematic peer relations in rejected children. 
Computational approaches to decision-making
Studies described in this thesis have shown that social decisions are the product of activity 
in distinct neural networks and that activity in these networks varies as a function of chronic 
peer rejection. For example, Chapter 8 showed that stably accepted adolescents exhibited 
higher levels of activity in pre-SMA and TPJ during sharing decisions than chronically rejected 
adolescents. However, the precise nature of the computations performed by these brain regions 
remains to be discovered. A tool to learn more about the computations sub served by neural 
networks is computational modeling, which provides a quantitative framework to examine the 
relation between specific computational processes and brain activity.
Neuroimaging studies employing computational approaches have successfully linked 
different computational processes to activity in pre-SMA and TPJ in social decisions. Pre-
SMA activity has been linked to a discrepancy detection parameter in fairness decisions (e.g., 
the discrepancy between expectations about what is fair and actual received treatment; Chang 
& Sanfey,  2011). TPJ activity has been linked to expectation matching (e.g., giving the amount 
of money to another person that would be perceived as fair by the other person; Chang, Smith, 
Dufwenberg, & Sanfey, 2011). Using computational models to decompose social decision-
making in children with different peer status histories and link them to neural activity can 
give more insights into the processes (e.g. reduced sensitivity to violations of social norms) 
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underlying individual differences in social behavior and their relation to peer acceptance. 
9.8 CONCLUSIONS
Peer group rejection is a very pervasive phenomenon. Rejection can emerge as soon as 
children enter formal schooling and for some children rejection remains a reality throughout 
childhood and adolescence with detrimental consequences for mental health and school 
adjustment. Therefore, it remains critical to continue to study the developmental mechanisms 
involved in the emergence and maintenance of peer rejection. The studies described in this 
thesis show that a developmental cognitive neuroscience approach provides valuable insights 
into the affective, regulatory, and socio-cognitive processes that underlie behaviors thought 
to play a role in the emergence and maintenance of a rejected status. Prospective longitudinal 
designs, measures of brain connectivity, and computational models of decision-making offer 
promising approaches to further advance our understanding of the neural systems underlying 
(problematic) peer relations and the computations they sub serve. 
To conclude, although peer rejection is a pervasive phenomenon, not all children who are 
rejected at one point in time are rejected later in life (Hardy et al., 2002; Jiang & Cillessen, 
2005; Sandstrom & Coie, 1999). This thesis aimed to gain a better understanding of the 
mechanisms involved in the maintenance of peer rejection by comparing adolescents who 
maintained a rejected status throughout elementary school with adolescents with a history 
stable peer acceptance. Future studies could advance our understanding of the mechanisms 
involved in the maintenance peer rejection by studying the development of children who were 
initially rejected by peers, but who become more accepted over time. Studying the development 
of those children will further increase our understanding of why some children get caught in a 
vicious cycle of peer rejection that perpetuates itself over time, whereas others are able to escape 




De mens heeft een fundamentele behoefte om relaties aan te gaan met anderen (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995). Deze behoefte om toe te behoren (de zogenaamde ‘need to belong’) is zo 
fundamenteel dat allerlei problemen ontstaan op het moment dat deze behoefte niet bevredigd 
wordt. Gebeurtenissen die deze behoefte bedreigen zoals buitengesloten of afgewezen worden, 
leiden op de korte termijn tot hevig psychologisch ongemak. Op de lange termijn heeft 
chronische blootstelling aan sociale uitsluiting of afwijzing zeer ernstige gevolgen: van slechtere 
prestaties op school (DeRosier et al., 1994; Hymel et al., 1996) tot het ontwikkelen van 
psychische problemen zoals angst en depressie (Boivin et al., 1995; Coie et al., 1995) en zelfs 
crimineel gedrag (Kupersmidt et al., 1995). Daarom is het van groot belang om de mechanismen 
te begrijpen die een rol spelen bij het ontstaan en de instandhouding van langdurige afwijzing. 
Het doel van de in dit proefschrift beschreven onderzoeken was om de neurocognitieve 
mechanismen in kaart te brengen die een rol spelen bij de instandhouding van sociale 
uitsluiting als ook de mechanismen die belangrijk zijn voor het vertonen van gedrag dat leidt 
tot acceptatie. In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift staan de neurocognitieve processen centraal 
die ten grondslag liggen aan reacties op sociale uitsluiting. De manier waarop iemand reageert 
op uitsluiting bepaalt in sterke mate of het slechts bij een eenmalige uitsluiting blijft, of dat 
het een terugkerend fenomeen wordt. Kinderen en adolescenten die fel reageren op uitsluiting 
zouden hun pestkoppen kunnen provoceren en op die manier vaker tot slachtoffer van uitsluiting 
gemaakt worden dan kinderen die zich sociaal opstellen en proberen weer aansluiting te vinden 
bij hun klasgenoten (Coie, 1990; Sandstrom, 2004). Om beter te begrijpen waarom jongeren op 
een bepaalde manier reageren op uitsluiting hebben we niet alleen hun subjectieve reacties op 
uitsluiting onderzocht, maar ook hun gedragsmatige reacties bestudeerd en gekeken naar wat 
er in hun hersenen gebeurt tijdens en na uitsluiting. 
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift staan de neurocognitieve processen centraal die 
een rol spelen bij het tonen van prosociaal gedrag: gedrag met als doel het welbevinden van 
een ander te vergroten. Prosociale gedragingen zoals iemand helpen, samenwerken of iets met 
iemand delen, spelen een belangrijke rol bij het verwerven van acceptatie in een groep en het 
in stand houden van deze acceptatie (Coie & Kupersmidt, 1983; Deković & Gerris, 1994; 
Layous  et al., 2012). Vanwege de cruciale rol die prosociaal gedrag vervult in het verwerven 
van acceptatie in een groep hebben we de psychologische en neurale mechanismen onderzocht 
die belangrijk zijn voor prosociaal gedrag in de vorm van het gunnen van geld aan een ander. 
Om de neurocognitieve mechanismen die ten grondslag liggen aan reacties op uitsluiting 
en prosociaal gedrag in beeld te brengen, hebben we gebruik gemaakt van experimentele sociale 
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interactie paradigma’s in combinatie met een beeldvormende techniek genaamd functionele 
kernspintomografie (functional magnetic resonance imaging of fMRI). fMRI is een methode 
die het mogelijk maakt om psychologische processen te relateren aan activiteit in de hersenen 
(neurale processen) terwijl mensen een taak uitvoeren in een MRI scanner. Ook hebben 
we bij de deelnemers aan onze onderzoeken en bij hun ouders en klasgenoten vragenlijsten 
afgenomen om meer te weten te komen over verschillende psychologische vermogens zoals: 
het vermogen om je in een ander te verplaatsen en een situatie vanuit hun perspectief te 
bekijken (perspectief-nemen) en het vermogen tot het reguleren van je gedrag. Eerst hebben 
we de neurale en psychologische processen die betrokken zijn bij reacties op uitsluiting en 
prosociaal gedrag onderzocht in een groep jongvolwassenen. Om beter te begrijpen hoe 
deze neurocognitieve processen samenhangen met langdurige acceptatie en afwijzing in een 
groep van leeftijdsgenoten (c.q. de peer groep), hebben we deze processen ook onderzocht 
in adolescenten met een geschiedenis van langdurige afwijzing en in adolescenten met een 
geschiedenis van langdurige acceptatie. 
Acceptatie en afwijzing in peer groepen (bijvoorbeeld klassen van kinderen) kunnen op een 
betrouwbare manier gemeten worden door alle leden van de groep twee vragen te stellen: “Wie 
vind je het aardigst/met wie ga je het liefst om?” en “Wie vind je het minst aardig/met wie ga je 
het minst graag om?” (Bukowski et al., 2000; Coie et al., 1982; Newcomb & Bukowski, 1983). 
Door de antwoorden van alle leden van de groep te combineren, kan de mate waarin ieder 
individu geaccepteerd en afgewezen is door alle andere leden van de groep in kaart worden 
gebracht. Kinderen die door zeer weinig klasgenoten als ‘aardig’ en door zeer veel klasgenoten als 
‘niet aardig’ worden gezien worden volgens deze methode geclassificeerd als kinderen met een 
‘afgewezen’ status. Longitudinale onderzoeken - waarbij acceptatie en afwijzing van kinderen 
gedurende langere tijd meerdere keren is gemeten - hebben aangetoond dat afwijzing door 
leeftijdsgenoten voorspellend is voor een reeks aan negatieve levensuitkomsten, o.a. slechte 
schoolprestaties (DeRosier et al., 1994), internaliserende problematiek (bijv. angst en depressieve 
klachten; Ladd & Troop-Gordon, 2003) en externaliserende problematiek (bijv. agressief en 
normoverschrijdend gedrag; van Lier & Koot, 2010). Hoewel de relatie tussen groepsgewijze 
afwijzing en het ontstaan van dit soort problematiek tientallen keren is aangetoond, weten we 
nog vrij weinig over de mechanismen die er voor zorgen dat groepsgewijze afwijzing ontstaat 
en hoe deze in stand blijft gedurende de kindertijd en de adolescentie. Daarom hebben wij 
ingezoomd op verschillende processen die daarbij een rol zouden kunnen spelen. Als eerste 
hebben we processen onderzocht die een rol spelen in het stoppen of in stand houden van 
sociale uitsluiting. 
Deel I: Reacties op sociale uitsluiting 
Een klasgenoot buitensluiten is één van de manieren waarop kinderen en adolescenten het 
vaakst uiting geven aan een negatieve (groeps-)attitude jegens deze persoon (Coie et al., 1990). 
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Sociale uitsluiting is een manier van pesten die zowel direct als indirect kan plaatsvinden. 
Directe uitsluiting is het expliciet laten weten dat een ander niet mee mag doen met een 
activiteit. Indirecte uitsluiting is impliciet en kan zich uiten in het negeren van een klasgenoot 
of hem/haar niet te vragen om mee te doen aan een activiteit (Gazelle & Ladd, 2003). Alhoewel 
sociale uitsluiting een vervelende ervaring is in alle fasen van het leven (Williams, 2007), is er 
evidentie voor de hypothese dat sociale uitsluiting extra pijnlijk is gedurende de adolescentie. 
Adolescenten maken zich meer zorgen over acceptatie door leeftijdsgenoten dan volwassenen 
(O'Brien & Bierman, 1988). Daarnaast is het niet kunnen vinden van een plek in een groep 
van leeftijdsgenoten tijdens de adolescentie vaak een symptoom of voorloper van psychosociale 
problemen (Boivin et al., 1995; Prinstein & Aikins, 2004). 
De adolescentie zou met name erg stressvol zijn voor tieners die langdurig zijn afgewezen 
door hun klasgenoten (Coie et al., 1990). Langdurig afgewezen adolescenten hebben minder 
positieve interacties met leeftijdsgenoten gehad (Boivin & Hymel, 1997; Parker & Asher, 
1993), waardoor zij minder de kans hebben gehad om sociale vaardigheden te ontwikkelen 
die nuttig zijn voor het omgaan met alle veranderingen tijdens de overgang van de kindertijd 
naar de volwassenheid. Op het moment dat zij voor het eerst naar de middelbare school gaan, 
missen zij sociale vaardigheden die nodig zijn om op een adequate manier met alle nieuwe 
sociale ervaringen van de adolescentie om te gaan. Indien ze worden buitengesloten zouden 
zij mogelijke heftiger hierop kunnen reageren. Heftigere reacties kunnen op hun beurt juist 
weer leiden tot meer afwijzing en uitsluiting met alle negatieve gevolgen van dien voor hun 
schoolprestaties en psychische gezondheid. 
Niet ieder kind dat een afgewezen status heeft in zijn/haar klas wordt ook regelmatig 
buitengesloten. Desalniettemin, worden afgewezen kinderen wel veel vaker buitengesloten dan 
kinderen die in hoge mate geaccepteerd zijn in hun klas. Bovendien lopen kinderen die zowel 
buitengesloten als afgewezen worden een grotere kans op het ontwikkelen van psychosociale 
problemen (Buhs & Ladd, 2001; Buhs et al., 2006). Om meer te leren over de processen die 
een rol spelen bij reacties op uitsluiting en hoe deze samenhangen met groepsgewijze afwijzing 
hebben wij drie processen onderzocht: i) subjectieve (negatieve gedachten en gevoelens) en 
neurale reacties op uitsluiting; ii) gedragsmatige reacties op uitsluiting en de neurale processen 
die daarbij betrokken zijn en iii) gedragsmatige reacties op uitsluiting van een leeftijdsgenoot. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 hebben we met behulp van vragenlijsten en fMRI de relatie onderzocht tussen 
een geschiedenis van jarenlange afwijzing en subjectieve en neurale reacties op uitsluiting. Om 
dit te onderzoeken hebben we jongeren (12-15 jaar) uitgenodigd wiens acceptatie en afwijzing 
door klasgenoten gedurende zes jaar (groep 3 tot en met groep 8 van de basisschool) was gemeten. 
Sommige jongeren werden gedurende die zes jaar langdurig afgewezen en anderen werden juist 
langdurig geaccepteerd door hun klasgenoten. Om de reacties van beide groepen (langdurig 
afgewezen en geaccepteerde jongeren) op sociale uitsluiting te testen speelden zij twee keer een 
online balspel genaamd ‘Cyberball’ (Williams et al., 2000) terwijl ze in de MRI scanner lagen. 
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In beide spellen werden de deelnemers gekoppeld aan twee onbekende leeftijdsgenoten met 
wie ze via een knoppenkast en een computerscherm een bal konden overgooien. In het eerste 
spel kregen de deelnemers even vaak de bal als de twee onbekende leeftijdsgenoten. Ze werden 
dus betrokken in het spel. In het tweede spel werden de deelnemers gekoppeld aan twee nieuwe 
leeftijdsgenoten. Aan het begin van het tweede spel kregen de deelnemers de bal nog wel één keer 
toegespeeld, maar daarna sloten de andere twee spelers de deelnemers buiten door de bal niet 
meer naar hen te gooien. Na uitsluiting rapporteerden beide groepen een verlaagde stemming 
(ze voelden zich bijvoorbeeld verdrietiger) en lagere niveaus van gevoelens van toebehoren, 
zelfvertrouwen, controle over de sociale omgeving en een betekenisvol bestaan. Langdurig 
afgewezen jongeren rapporteerden negatieve gevoelens die niet te onderscheiden waren van de 
negatieve gevoelens die de geaccepteerde jongeren rapporteerden. De fMRI resultaten lieten 
zien dat de chronisch afgewezen jongeren meer activiteit vertoonden in de dorsale anterieure 
cingulate schors (of cortex) (dACC) - een soort neuraal alarmsysteem - op het moment dat 
zij werden buitengesloten in het balspel (spel 2). Deze verhoogde activiteit in de dACC was 
ook te zien op de momenten dat zij de bal incidenteel niet kregen in het spel waarin ze wel 
betrokken werden (spel 1). Deze incidentele uitsluiting ging ook gepaard ging met verhoogde 
activiteit in de anterieure prefrontale schors. Deze verhoogde neurale reactiviteit in dACC en 
prefrontale schors is eerder gevonden bij mensen die hypergevoelig zijn voor afwijzing en bij 
mensen die angstige of agressieve verwachtingen over afwijzing te hebben (Masten et al., 2009; 
DeWall et al., 2012). De verhoogde neurale reactiviteit op uitsluiting bij langdurig afgewezen 
adolescenten kan dus één van de mechanismen zijn die hebben bijgedragen aan gedachten, 
gevoelens en/of gedrag dat heeft geleid tot het ontstaan van groepsgewijze afwijzing.
Het tweede onderzochte proces dat een rol speelt in het ontstaan en/of in stand houden van 
uitsluiting is: de gedragsmatige reactie op uitsluiting. Om de neurocognitieve processen in kaart 
te brengen die een rol spelen bij gedragsmatige reacties op uitsluiting hebben we in Hoofdstuk 
3 de neurale processen onderzocht die gepaard gaan met wraakzuchtige en prosociale reacties 
op uitsluiting. We hebben een groep jongvolwassenen (in de leeftijd van 18-25) gevraagd om 
geld te verdelen tussen henzelf en leeftijdsgenoten die hen eerder hadden betrokken of eerder 
hadden buitengesloten in Cyberball. De deelnemers konden ervoor kiezen om wraak te nemen 
op de uitsluiters door hen minder geld te gunnen (‘straffen’) of om af te zien straf en het 
geldbedrag eerlijk te delen met de uitsluiters (‘vergeving’). Straffen kon samengaan met financiële 
winsten, verliezen of kon geen invloed hebben op de financiële uitkomst van de deelnemers. 
De resultaten lieten zien dat de deelnemers de uitsluiters straften wanneer dit leidde tot 
financieel gewin, maar ook wanneer er geen gevolgen waren voor de eigen uitkomsten en zelfs 
als straffen gepaard ging met financiële verliezen. Het straffen van de uitsluiters ging gepaard 
met activiteit in de pre-supplementaire motorische schors (pre-SMA) en de anterieure insula 
(AI) van de deelnemers. De pre-SMA werd bovendien meer geactiveerd op het moment dat 
straffen financieel kostbaar was in vergelijking met straf met financiële winst of geen financiële 
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gevolgen. Deelnemers die rapporteerden zich in het dagelijks leven vaker te verplaatsen in een 
ander (c.q. vaker andermans ‘perspectief nemen’) kozen er vaker voor om eerlijk te delen met 
de uitsluiters. Het eerlijk delen van het geldbedrag, ‘vergeving’, ging gepaard met activiteit in 
hersengebieden in netwerken die belangrijk zijn om je te kunnen verplaatsen in een ander 
(temporo-parietale junctie [TPJ] en dorsomediale prefrontale schors [dmPFC]) en gebieden 
die belangrijk zijn voor het reguleren van gedrag (dACC en dorsolaterale prefrontale schors 
[dlPFC]). 
Deze resultaten ondersteunen de hypothese dat perspectief-nemen en het reguleren van je 
gedrag (door cognitieve controle) belangrijke psychologische vermogens zijn om je prosociaal 
op te stellen tegenover leeftijdsgenoten die je net hebben buitengesloten. In vergelijking met 
jongeren die geaccepteerd zijn in hun klas, zijn afgewezen jongeren veel vaker geneigd om 
agressief te reageren op conflicten met klasgenoten waardoor deze conflicten vaker escaleren 
(Fabes & Eisenberg, 1992; Rabiner et al., 1990). Daarnaast hebben zij minder goed ontwikkelde 
sociaal-cognitieve vaardigheden en hebben zij moeite met het reguleren van hun gedrag en het 
beheersen van impulsen en negatieve gevoelens (Dodge et al., 2003; Eisenberg et al., 1997; 
Fink et al., 2014). Op basis van deze bevindingen, verwachtten wij dat activatie van de neurale 
systemen die belangrijk zijn voor sociale cognitie en gedragsregulatie tijdens vergeving varieert 
op basis van langdurige blootstelling aan afwijzing.
Om deze hypothese te testen, hebben we langdurig afgewezen jongeren en langdurig 
geaccepteerde jongeren (net als de volwassenen in Hoofdstuk 3) de mogelijkheid gegeven om 
de leeftijdsgenoten die hen hadden buitengesloten in het balspel te straffen of te vergeven 
(Hoofdstuk 4). De resultaten lieten zien dat, net zoals volwassenen, beide groepen adolescenten 
de uitsluiters straften door hen vaker minder geld te gunnen. In beide groepen, ging straffen 
gepaard met activiteit in het ventrale striatum, dlPFC en de pariëtale schors. Tijdens vergeving 
werden er individuele verschillen gevonden in de mate waarin de neurale netwerken die 
belangrijk zijn voor sociale cognitie en gedragsregulatie werden geactiveerd. Ten eerste 
vertoonden langdurig afgewezen jongeren tijdens vergeving een verhoogde activiteit in een 
controle netwerk in het brein (dorsale striatum en laterale PFC) ten opzichte van de langdurig 
geaccepteerde jongeren. Daarnaast werd er tijdens vergeving hogere activiteit gevonden in 
de dmPFC (een deel van het sociale cognitie netwerk) in deelnemers die hogere niveaus van 
perspectief-neem-vaardigheden rapporteerden. Jongeren waarvan hun ouders rapporteerden 
dat zij problemen hadden in het reguleren van hun gedrag vertoonden verhoogde activiteit in de 
pre-SMA en de dorsale AI (netwerken betrokken bij gedragsregulatie). Deze bevindingen laten 
zien dat hersenactiviteit tijdens prosociale reacties, maar niet tijdens wraakzuchtige reacties, op 
uitsluiting varieert op basis van een blootstelling aan langdurige afwijzing, sociaal-cognitieve 
vaardigheden en problemen in gedragsregulatie. Samen bieden ze inzicht in verschillende 
intra-individuele processen die betrokken zijn bij reacties op uitsluiting die een rol spelen bij de 
instandhouding van langdurige uitsluiting.
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Het derde onderzochte proces dat een rol speelt bij de instandhouding of de beëindiging 
van uitsluiting in een groep is de gedragsmatige reactie op uitsluiting van een ander. Eerder 
onderzoek heeft laten zien dat kinderen die getuige zijn van een pest-situatie er in meer dan 
50% van de gevallen voor kunnen zorgen dat het pesten stopt (Hawkins et al., 2001). Bovendien 
rapporteren pestslachtoffers die getroost of beschermd worden door een klasgenoot hogere 
niveaus van psychisch welbevinden dan slachtoffers die niet geholpen worden (Sainio et al., 
2010). Daarom hebben we in Hoofdstuk 5 de ontwikkeling van perspectief-nemen en reacties 
op de uitsluiting van een leeftijdsgenoot onderzocht. Deelnemers in vijf leeftijdsgroepen 
(van 9 tot en met 22 jaar) werden eerst zelf betrokken in Cyberball alvorens zij toekeken 
hoe een onbekende leeftijdsgenoot werd buitengesloten door twee uitsluiters. Vervolgens 
speelden zij twee verschillende economische spellen waarin zij geld verdeelden tussen henzelf 
en een leeftijdsgenoot. Deze ontvanger van het geld kon iemand zijn die de deelnemers had 
betrokken in het eerste balspel, een van de uitsluiters uit het tweede balspel of het slachtoffer 
van de uitsluiting. Resultaten lieten zien dat naarmate de deelnemers ouder waren, zij een 
groter deel van hun geld weggaven aan het slachtoffer van uitsluiting. Oudere adolescenten 
(14- en 16-jarigen) straften bovendien de uitsluiters ook strenger dan de jongere deelnemers 
(9-11-jarigen) door hen minder geld te gunnen dan de spelers uit het eerste balspel en het 
slachtoffer. Volwassenen (22-jarigen) straften de uitsluiters ook, maar zij gunden de uitsluiters 
meer geld dan de adolescenten. Deze kwadratische relatie tussen leeftijd en strafgedrag werd 
zowel in het eerste spel gevonden waarin straffen de deelnemers geld opleverde als in het tweede 
spel waarin straffen de deelnemers juist geld kostte. Deelnemers in alle leeftijdsgroepen die zich 
inleefden in het slachtoffer en rapporteerden dat het slachtoffer zich slechter moest voelen 
dan zijzelf waren prosocialer naar het slachtoffer toe en straften de uitsluiters strenger. Deze 
bevindingen laten zien dat het vermogen om je in te leven in een ander en om te begrijpen dat 
uitsluiting leidt tot negatieve gevoelens bij een slachtoffer belangrijk is om actie te ondernemen 
na het zien van uitsluiting van een leeftijdsgenoot. Met name in situaties waarin adolescenten 
de gevoelens van een ander moeten inschatten zonder dat zij daarbij gebruik kunnen maken 
van expliciete aanwijzingen van negatieve gevoelens (bijvoorbeeld gezichtsuitdrukkingen of 
verbale indicatoren van verdriet).
Deel II: Eerlijk delen
Het vaak vertonen van prosociaal gedrag is een van de sterkste voorspellers van de mate 
waarin een kind geaccepteerd is alsmede zijn/haar toekomstige acceptatie (Caprara et al., 
2000; Caputi et al., 2012; Crick, 1996; Deković & Gerris, 1994; Zimmer-Gembeck, et al., 
2005). Het vertonen van prosociaal gedrag heeft zelfs een causaal effect op de mate waarin een 
kind of adolescent geaccepteerd wordt door zijn/haar klasgenoten (Coie & Kupersmidt, 1983; 
Layous et al., 2012). Om inzicht te verkrijgen in verschillende mechanismen die betrokken zijn 
bij prosociaal gedrag, hebben we verschillende psychologische vermogens en hersenactiviteit 
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gemeten tijdens het verdelen van geld tussen hezelf en een onbekende leeftijdsgenoot. Bij het 
ene kind kan een ogenschijnlijke egoïstische beslissing om al het geld te houden gepaard gaan 
met verhoogde activiteit in hersennetwerken die belangrijk zijn om je te verplaatsen in een 
ander of in netwerken die betrokken zijn bij de emotionele reactie op het schenden van een 
sociale norm. Een ander kind kan dezelfde beslissing nemen zonder zich te verplaatsen in 
een ander of zonder emotionele signalen te voelen bij het schenden van de sociale norm. De 
hypothese is dan dat bij het laatste kind deze netwerken in mindere mate geactiveerd worden 
dan bij kinderen die zich wel verplaatsen in een ander en ongemak voelen bij het schenden van 
een sociale norm. Zo kan het meten van hersenactiviteit inzicht bieden in verschillende sociaal-
cognitieve en emotionele processen die ten grondslag liggen aan ogenschijnlijk vergelijkbaar 
egoïstisch of prosociaal gedrag.
Om een theoretisch kader te schetsen over de hersengebieden en de psychologische 
vermogens die belangrijk zijn voor het vertonen van prosociaal gedrag in verschillende fases 
van de ontwikkeling is in Hoofdstuk 6 de relevante literatuur samengevat. Dit overzicht laat 
zien dat belang hechten aan het welzijn van een ander en een voorkeur voor eerlijke (gelijke) 
verdelingen van goederen al in de baby- en peutertijd zichtbaar is. Ondanks dat deze bouwstenen 
van prosociaal gedrag al zo vroeg in de ontwikkeling aanwezig zijn, wordt prosociaal gedrag 
gedurende de kindertijd en de adolescentie steeds complexer van aard en ook steeds geraffineerder 
ingezet. Deze veranderingen gaan gepaard met de ontwikkelende vermogens om je te kunnen 
verplaatsen in een ander en om (zelfzuchtige) impulsen te beheersen. Een overzicht van fMRI 
studies laat zien dat de toename in de complexiteit van prosociaal gedrag gepaard gaat met 
functionele veranderingen in neurale netwerken die betrokken zijn bij perspectief-nemen 
(TPJ en MPFC) en gedragsregulatie (dlPFC). Het neurale netwerk dat belangrijk is voor het 
detecteren van sociale normoverschrijdingen (ACC-insula netwerk) wordt in verschillende 
fasen van de ontwikkeling (kindertijd, adolescentie en volwassenheid) op een vergelijkbare 
manier geactiveerd. Deze studies ondersteunen de hypothese dat het herkennen van sociale 
normoverschrijdingen en bijbehorende hersenactiviteit al voor de adolescentie ontwikkelt. 
Ze laten ook zien dat het vermogen om te handelen volgens sociale normen als de situatie 
meer aandacht voor de ander vereist of wanneer deze meer controle behoeft nog volop in 
ontwikkeling is tijdens de adolescentie. Hoofdstuk 6 bood ons de inzichten voor het opstellen 
van onze hypotheses over in welke neurale systemen we verschillen konden verwachten tussen 
geaccepteerde en afgewezen jongeren op het moment dat zij voor de keuze komen te staan of 
zij eerlijk willen delen met een ander. 
In Hoofdstuk 7 hebben we de neurale processen onderzocht die gepaard gaan met het 
kiezen voor een ongelijke verdeling van geld. Jongvolwassenen speelden drie verschillende 
economische spellen (‘equity games’) waarin zij geld mochten verdelen tussen zichzelf en een 
onbekende leeftijdsgenoot. In die spellen konden ze kiezen voor een eerlijke (beide spelers 
kregen evenveel) of oneerlijke (de ene speler kreeg meer dan de ander) verdeling. In deze 
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spellen kon een oneerlijke verdeling soms in het eigen voordeel zijn of in het voordeel van de 
onbekende leeftijdsgenoot. Onze resultaten lieten zien dat in beide gevallen het schenden van 
de eerlijkheidsnorm (door voor de oneerlijke verdeling te kiezen) gepaard ging met activiteit 
in de dACC, AI en dlPFC – een neuraal netwerk dat al eerder is aangetoond belangrijk te zijn 
voor het herkennen van, en het reageren, op oneerlijke behandeling. Er werd ook hersenactiviteit 
gevonden die uniek was voor prosociale schendingen van de eerlijkheidsnorm. Wanneer 
deelnemers besloten om niet de eerlijkheidsnorm te volgen, maar te kiezen voor een ongelijke 
verdeling in het voordeel van een ander hadden zij een verhoogde activiteit in het ventrale 
striatum en de ventromediale prefrontale schors. Deze hersengebieden vormen een netwerk 
dat belangrijk is voor de representatie van beloningen en subjectieve waarde. Deze gebieden 
worden bijvoorbeeld ook actief bij het eten van iets lekkers, bij het zien van seksuele stimuli, 
en bij het ontvangen van geld. Deze resultaten legden de basis om verder te onderzoeken hoe 
acceptatie en afwijzing tijdens de kindertijd samenhangen met neurale processen tijdens eerlijk 
en oneerlijk delen. 
In Hoofdstuk 8 wordt een studie beschreven waarin dit verder is onderzocht. Adolescenten 
met een geschiedenis van langdurige afwijzing en adolescenten met een geschiedenis van 
langdurige acceptatie speelden de equity games in een MRI scanner. Langdurig geaccepteerde 
adolescenten kozen vaker voor een gelijke verdeling van geld dan langdurig afgewezen 
adolescenten, maar alleen als dit henzelf geen geld kostte. Op het moment dat het geld kostte 
om eerlijk te delen werden er geen groepsverschillen gevonden. Er werden wel verschillen 
gevonden binnen de langdurige afgewezen groep. Om precies te zijn, langdurig afgewezen 
jongeren met lagere niveaus van perspectief-nemen gaven veel minder vaak geld weg dan 
afgewezen jongeren met hogere niveaus van perspectief-nemen. Perspectief-nemen bleek dus 
wederom een belangrijke voorspeller voor prosociaal gedrag. Tijdens het nemen van dit soort 
kostbare beslissingen over de verdeling van geld, vertoonde de langdurig geaccepteerde groep 
meer activiteit in netwerken in het brein die betrokken zijn bij perspectief-nemen (c.q. TPJ/
pSTS en de temporale pool) en het detecteren van sociale normoverschrijdingen (c.q. pre-
SMA en AI) dan de langdurig afgewezen groep. Uit eerder onderzoek weten we dat kinderen 
en jongeren die geaccepteerd zijn in hun klassen meer prosociaal gedrag vertonen en zich 
beter kunnen inleven in een ander (Caputi et al., 2012; Fink et al., 2014; Slaughter et al., 
2002). De verschillen in activatie in deze twee neurale netwerken bieden een eerste kijk op de 
mechanismen die mogelijk ten grondslag liggen aan deze observaties. 
Kritische bespiegeling
De verhoogde neurale reactiviteit op uitsluiting in de langdurig afgewezen adolescenten is 
in overeenstemming met literatuur die stelt dat langdurige blootstelling aan afwijzing leidt tot 
een overgevoeligheid voor afwijzing (Feldman & Downey, 1994; London et al., 2007). In het 
licht van dergelijk werk, zouden de verhoogde neurale reactiviteit op uitsluiting geïnterpreteerd 
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kunnen worden als een gevolg van langdurige blootstelling aan afwijzing. Echter, wij hebben 
de hersenactiviteit tijdens uitsluiting slechts op één moment gemeten. Daarom weten we 
niet of de verhoogde neurale reactiviteit een gevolg is van langdurige afwijzing of dat deze 
al aanwezig was voordat deze jongeren voor het eerst naar de basisschool gingen en dus nog 
voordat zij werden afgewezen door hun klasgenoten. De verhoogde neurale reactiviteit zou 
net zo goed een mechanisme kunnen zijn dat een rol heeft gespeeld bij het verwerven van 
afwijzing. Het zou bijvoorbeeld een afspiegeling kunnen zijn van problemen in het reguleren 
van negatieve gevoelens zoals verdriet of woede. Kinderen die moeite hebben met het reguleren 
van negatieve gevoelens lopen een grotere kans op afwijzing dan kinderen die hun gevoelens 
goed onder controle kunnen houden (Spinrad et al., 2006; Eisenberg et al., 1997). Om meer 
inzicht te krijgen in deze vraag, is het belangrijk om longitudinale onderzoeksdesigns te 
gebruiken waarbij kinderen langdurig gevolgd worden en meerdere malen gescand worden. 
Met dergelijke designs is het mogelijk om te testen of de verhoogde neurale reactiviteit een 
bijproduct is van een afgewezen status of dat deze reactiviteit zich ontwikkelt ten gevolge van 
langdurige blootstelling aan afwijzing.
Een tweede stap voor vervolgonderzoek is: verder onderzoek doen naar de relatie tussen 
hersenactiviteit enerzijds en gevoelens, gedachten en gedrag die acceptatie en afwijzing 
beïnvloeden anderzijds. De gevonden verhoogde activiteit in een ‘cognitieve controle-netwerk’ 
in het brein tijdens vergeving bij de langdurig afgewezen jongeren duidt erop dat een groter 
beroep op cognitieve controle een mogelijke rol speelt in de beteugeling van impulsieve reacties 
op uitsluiting. Maar om welke controle-vaardigheden gaat het hier? Het netwerk is immers 
betrokken bij een scala aan ‘executieve functies’ zoals inhibitie, switchen en het reguleren van 
emoties (Crone & Dahl, 2012). Om beter te begrijpen wat de verschillen in activatie van dit 
controle-netwerk betekenen, kunnen in de toekomst verschillende executieve functies gemeten 
worden. Vervolgens kunnen deze functies gerelateerd worden aan activiteit in de controle-
netwerken in het brein en individuele verschillen in prosociaal gedrag en sociale status. De 
uitkomsten van zulke onderzoeken kunnen op den duur bijdragen aan interventiestudies 
waarbij getest kan worden of het trainen van executieve functies positieve effecten heeft op 
acceptatie door klasgenoten. Een andere veelbelovende benadering die meer inzicht kan geven 
in de relatie tussen hersenprocessen en de cognitieve processen die zij representeren is een 
computationele benadering van hersenfunctie (Chang & Sanfey, 2011; Chang et al, 2011). Door 
gebruik te maken van wiskundige modellen wordt het mogelijk om de specifieke “berekeningen” 
die populaties van hersencellen samen uitvoeren beter te begrijpen. Computationele modellen 
kunnen ons helpen om problemen in de omgang met leeftijdsgenoten beter te begrijpen 
door inzicht te bieden in de neurale systemen die onderliggend zijn aan die problemen. 
 
Conclusies en toekomstperspectief 
Dit proefschrift toont aan dat een neurowetenschappelijke benadering waardevolle 
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inzichten biedt in de emotionele, regulerende en sociaal-cognitieve processen die ten grondslag 
liggen aan gedragingen die een rol spelen in het ontstaan en in stand houden van afwijzing 
en acceptatie door leeftijdsgenoten. Zo tonen de studies in dit proefschrift aan dat langdurige 
afwijzing tijdens de kindertijd gepaard gaat met een verhoogde “neurale gevoeligheid” voor 
uitsluiting tijdens de adolescentie. Langdurige afwijzing in de klas hangt ook samen met een 
verhoogde activiteit in controle-netwerken in het brein tijdens vergeving van pestkoppen en 
verminderde activiteit in ‘sociale cognitie’ netwerken tijdens prosociale keuzes. Tenslotte, laat 
ons onderzoek zien dat het vermogen om je in een ander te verplaatsen belangrijk is voor 
een reeks van prosociale gedragingen zoals: het vergeven van uitsluiters, een buitengesloten 
leeftijdsgenoot te helpen en eerlijk delen met een onbekende leeftijdsgenoot. 
Dit proefschrift laat zien dat de integratie van een neurowetenschappelijke en traditionele 
‘peer relaties’ methoden ons dichter bij antwoorden kan brengen op kernvragen in zowel de 
neurowetenschappen als de studie naar sociale relaties in groepen kinderen en jongeren. Wij 
moedigen 'peer-onderzoekers' en hersenwetenschappers aan om de handen in een te slaan om 
samen een theoretisch kader te ontwikkelen waarin sociale- en hersenontwikkeling begrepen 
kan worden als het product van biologische rijpingsprocessen en (sociale) ervaringen die 
elkaar voortdurend vormen. Toekomstige projecten waarin op meerdere momenten tijdens de 
ontwikkeling scans gemaakt worden van de hersenen van kinderen kunnen ons meer leren over 
de relatie tussen hersenontwikkeling en de sociale ontwikkeling op de lange termijn. Uiteindelijk 
zal een neurowetenschappelijk perspectief op acceptatie en afwijzing handvatten kunnen 
bieden voor interventies die gericht zijn op het helpen van jongeren die kampen met psychische 
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